










































the	History	 of	 Sexuality,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 law	 of	 the	
sovereign	to	that	of	the	norm.	Challenging	the	idea	that	the	concept	of	biological	
life	can	be	spontaneously	used	to	understand	the	type	of	relationship	which	links	
modern	 political	 power	 and	 life,	 this	 thesis	 questions	 the	 epistemological	
implications	of	this	concept	by	inscribing	it	within	Foucault’s	wider	description	of	
the	 emergence	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge.	 Instead	 of	 understanding	
biopolitical	modernity	as	the	expression	of	the	power	of	the	sovereign,	this	thesis	
demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 persistence	 of	 sovereign	 power	 but	 its	
transformation	which	allows	to	think	the	meaning	of	the	concept	of	life	targeted	
by	 human	 sciences.	 This	 thesis	 inscribes	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	
anthropological	knowledge	within	Foucault’s	wider	study	of	the	Western	history	
of	 subjectivity.	 It	 claims	 that	 it	 is	 the	postulate	of	anthropological	 truth	which	
provides	a	basis	 to	 the	concept	of	norm.	 It	demonstrates	 that	anthropological	
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introduced	 by	 Foucault	 in	 1976	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 his	History	 of	 Sexuality	




live”,	 became	 the	 power	 “to	 foster	 life	 or	 disallow	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 death”	
(Foucault:	1998d,	138).	According	to	Foucault,	this	new	form	of	political	power	




















of	domination	when	 they	claim	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	a	 “control	 that	extends	
throughout	 the	depths	of	 the	consciousnesses	and	bodies	of	 the	populations”	
(Hardt	 &	 Negri:	 2000,	 24).	 The	 problem	 with	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 fails	 to	








Giorgio	 Agamben	 is	 not	 exempt	 from	 such	 an	 ontologization	 of	 power.	 In	 his	
Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	he	produces	an	interesting	variation	
of	 the	 de-historicization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 political	 power	 and	 life.	















power	 to	 kill	 can	 be	 exerted	 upon	 anyone,	 every	 member	 of	 the	 camp	 is	 a	
potential	homo	sacer	whose	death	cannot	be	condemned	by	the	law.		
	
Although	 Agamben	 attempts	 to	 retrieve	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 historical	 specificity	
proper	 to	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics,	 he	 fails	 to	 see	 that	 his	 account	 actually	











existence	 of	 the	 individuals	 become	 the	 objects	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics.	
 8 
However,	the	gesture	which	consists	in	essentializing	the	singular	(the	immanent	
and	 concrete	 existence	 of	 individuals)	 prevents	 a	 proper	 understanding	 and	




intellectual	 exercise	 producing	 a	 metaphysical	 exegesis	 disconnected	 from	




been	 studied	and	 criticized	 in	 the	past	 fifteen	 years.	 In	 2004,	 Jacques	Derrida	
stressed	 Agamben’s	 problematic	 attempt	 to	 historicize	 bio-power	 whilst	 still	
arguing	in	favour	of	its	ahistorical	and	foundational	status.	He	writes:	
What	surprises	me	most,	incidentally,	and	constantly	disconcerts	me	in	

















him,	 “what	 matters	 to	 us”	 is	 “sovereign	 power,	 life	 and	 death,	 animality”	
(Derrida:	 2009,	 331).	 In	 other	words,	Derrida	 criticizes	Agamben’s	 paradoxical	
historicization	 of	 bio-power	 not	 by	 providing	 a	 more	 suitable	 one	 but	 by	
transferring	 it	 to	 other	 concepts:	 bio-power	would	 therefore	 not	 concern	 the	
threshold	between	the	power	of	the	sovereign	and	the	life	of	men	but	rather	the	
threshold	 between	 the	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 and	 what	 he	 briefly	 calls	























and	biopolitics	corresponds	to.	Nothing	 indicates,	 in	Foucault’s	1976	text,	 that	
the	life	which	becomes	the	object	of	the	strategies	of	political	modernity	can	be	
superimposed	with	the	life	of	the	subject	of	the	King.	Secondly,	Nancy’s	remark	
according	 to	which	 the	concept	of	 life	designates	a	“destinal	 figure”	 seems	 to	
better	 correspond	 with	 Foucault’s	 description.	 Still	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	
History	of	Sexuality,	the	latter	tells	us	that	the	concept	of	bio-power	is	divided	
into	 two	 sub-categories:	 “the	 disciplines:	 an	 anatomo-politics	 of	 the	 human	
body”	and	“regulatory	controls:	a	biopolitics	of	the	population”	(Foucault:	1998d,	
139).	The	concept	of	population,	understood	as	a	phenomenon	which	keeps	on	



















to	 the	 evolution	 of	 diseases	 amongst	 a	 specific	 group	 of	 individuals.	










and	 because	 the	 object	 of	 biopolitics	 seems	 to	 be	 nothing	 more	 than	 “its	
reproduction	and	 its	maintenance	through	finalities	that	remain	the	secrets	of	
power”	 (Nancy:	 	 2007,	 94),	 Nancy	 rightfully	 stresses	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
incompatible	with	the	old	idea	of	sovereign	power.	Whilst	the	logic	of	political	
sovereignty	 aims	 at	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 lawful	 order	 of	 the	 Kingdom,	 the	
finality	 of	 biopolitics	 seems	 to	 escape	 possible	 formalization.	 For	 this	 reason,	
Nancy	thinks	that	calling	it	“ecotechnology”	would	provide	a	way	to	overcome	
this	difficulty:	such	a	technology	would	designate	the	management	of	“natural	
life”	 in	 general	 (whether	 animal,	 vegetal	 or	 human).	 Ecotechnology	 therefore	








form	 of	 political	 power	 over	 life	 concerns	 a	 concept	 of	 life	 which	 is	 radically	



















of	 individuals	 understood	 as	 living	 beings.	 Unlike	 Agamben,	 who	 claims	 that	
                                                
4	“L’émergence	d’une	technologie	normalisatrice	agissant	sur	la	population	entendue	comme	un	
“tout	biologique”	 implique	 la	mise	en	oeuvre	d’une	 série	de	mécanismes	visant	 la	 regulation,	
c’est-à-dire	l’étabissement	d’un	équilibre	homéostatique	entre	le	“corps-espèce”	et	son	milieu.”	
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of	 the	 population	works	 “on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 norm,	 knowledge,	 life,	meaning”	
(Foucault:	1998d,	148).	This	is	a	crucial	point	that	all	the	commentators	of	bio-












already	 been	 provided	 by	 Stéphane	 Legrand	 in	 his	 Les	 Normes	 chez	 Foucault	
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(Legrand:	 2007).	 Neither	 does	 this	 thesis	 study	 how	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	
normativity	 still	 coexists	 with	 legal	 jurisdiction.	 François	 Ewald,	 in	 his	 essay	
“Norms,	Discipline	and	the	Law”	(Ewald:	1990)	and	Ben	Golder	&	Peter	Fitzpatrick	
in	 their	 Foucault’s	 Law	 (Golder	 &	 Fitzpatrick:	 2011),	 provide	 a	 very	 detailed	
reading	 of	 this	 question.	 Instead,	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned	with	 identifying	 the	
epistemological	and	ethical	implications	of	the	modern	integration	of	the	lives	of	
men	into	the	field	of	anthropological	knowledge.	Following	the	works	of	Etienne	
Balibar	 in	 his	 Citoyen	 Sujet	 et	 Autres	 Essais	 d’Anthropologie	 Philosophique	
(Balibar:	2001),	Pierre	Macherey	in	his	De	Canguilhem	à	Foucault:	La	Force	des	
Normes	(Macherey:	2009)	and	Judith	Revel	in	her	recent	Foucault	avec	Merleau-




many	 disciplines	 to	 characterize	 the	 forms	 taken	 by	 bio-power	 nowadays,	 be	














them.	 The	 knowledge	of	 the	natural	 truth	of	 the	modern	 subject	 is	 therefore	
made	possible	on	the	basis	of	that	symbolic	disjunction	between	the	subject’s	
speech	and	the	 logos	which	speaks	in	it.	 It	 is	the	pre-existence	of	such	a	 logos	
which	explains	the	confessions	of	the	subject,	but	reciprocally	it	is	the	confession	
of	the	subject	which	indicates	the	pre-existence	of	this	truth.	In	other	words,	the	
anthropological	 truth	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 is	 built	 upon	 a	 fundamental	
disjunction	characteristic	of	the	modern	episteme	that	Foucault	described	in	The	
Order	 of	 Things:	 the	 impossible	 presence	 of	 the	 subject	 within	 the	 space	 of	
representation,	both	become	subject	and	object	of	its	own	knowledge.	
	
Interestingly,	 the	 recent	 publication	 of	 Foucault’s	 first	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	
Collège	de	France	reveals	that	the	phrase	“will	to	knowledge”	does	not	appear	
for	the	first	time	in	1976.	Entitled	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	 to	Know,	 the	1970-




















jurisdiction	 (the	 act	 in	 which	 the	 sovereign’s	 judicial	 decision	 and	 his	 or	 her	
performance	 of	 truth	 coincide)	 produces	 the	 truth	 of	 nature.	 Rather,	 the	
epistemological	 truth	 of	 nature	 starts	 to	 constitute	 a	 logos	 which	 may	 be	
retrieved	through	the	exercise	of	knowledge	as	a	specific	human	technique.	This	









nature	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 also	 works	 upon	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 disjunction	
between	the	seen	and	the	said:	the	immanence	of	the	subject’s	existence	(the	







of	 nature	 is	 itself	 a	 historical	 construction	 whose	 emergence	 implies	 the	
problematization	of	the	relationship	between	sovereignty,	truth,	knowledge	and	
power.	The	 fact	 that	 the	anthropological	knowledge	which	grounds	bio-power	
and	 biopolitics	 emerged	 following	 the	 dismantling	 of	 the	 political	 sovereign	
power	 of	 the	 Classical	 Age	 is	 itself	 very	 striking.	 The	 Medieval	 and	 Classical	
sovereign	power	of	the	King	also	established	jurisdiction	through	acts	of	power:	
the	 King’s	 power	 to	 kill	 was	 the	 ritualistic	 manifestation	 of	 an	 act	 which	





























cannot	 coincide	 with	 the	 apparition	 of	 this	 existence	 within	 the	 field	 of	
anthropological	 positivity.	 It	 is	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 “empirico-transcendental”	
doublet	 described	 in	 chapter	 9	 of	 The	Order	 of	 Things	 which	 is	 almost	 never	
mentioned	 by	 contemporary	 readers	 of	 Foucault	 working	 on	 the	 question	 of	
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political	 modernity.	 Only	Michael	 Dillon,	 in	 his	 essay	 “Specters	 of	 Biopolitics:	
Finitude,	 Eschaton	 and	 Katechon”	 has	 thought	 of	 linking	 the	 emergence	 of	






the	 object	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics.	 Instead	 of	 understanding	 life	 as	 an	
ahistorical	 concept	 corresponding	 to	 biological	 determinations,	 I	 propose	 to	
study	how	 the	concept	of	 life	which	emerges	with	anthropological	 knowledge	
constitutes	an	abstraction	which	severs	the	subject	from	its	immanent	power	to	
act	 outside	 the	 natural	 determinations	 imposed	 by	 truth	 and	 knowledge.	
Therefore,	 I	propose	to	redefine	the	opposition	between	 life	and	death	not	 in	
relation	to	the	sovereign	power	to	kill	but	 in	relation	to	the	emergence	of	the	
concept	of	 life	as	 the	positivity	of	man’s	 finitude.	The	point	 is	 to	examine	 the	
relationship	between	different	but	complementary	occurrences	of	the	concept	
of	sovereignty	within	Foucault’s	work	 in	order	to	determine	how	this	concept,	





Agamben’s	 accounts	 of	 biopolitical	 modernity.	 Such	 a	 contrast	 reveals	 that	
 20 
Agamben	has	ignored	the	specific	historicity	of	the	concepts	of	life	and	sovereign	
power	 Foucault	 refers	 to	when	 he	 introduces	 the	 concepts	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality.	Because	 Agamben’s	
reading	relies	upon	the	concepts	of	life	and	sovereign	power,	it	allows	me	to	show	
by	contrast	how	these	concepts	are	also	studied	and	problematized	within	the	
scope	 of	 Foucault’s	 work.	 However,	 I	 demonstrate	 how	 Foucault,	 instead	 of	
falling	back	upon	ahistorical	concepts,	produces	a	radical	historicization	of	them.	
I	 use	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 mutation	 of	 the	 sovereign	 power	 and	 the	
emergence	of	the	government	of	population	in	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	
Sexuality,	 in	 Security	 Territory	 Population,	 and	 in	 Society	 Must	 Be	 Defended	




is	 the	modern	specificity	of	 the	concept	of	man,	 seeing	 the	emergence	of	 the	







                                                
5	Ernst	Kantorowicz,	The	Kings’	Two	Bodies	(Kantorowicz:	1997).	
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me	 to	 show	 that	 Foucault	 also	 studies	 the	question	of	 jurisdiction	before	and	
after	 the	 emergence	 of	 bio-power.	 However,	 I	 argue	 that	 his	 account	 of	




reading	 of	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemological	 truth	 and	
knowledge	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Archaic	 Greece.	 I	 show	 that	 Foucault	 borrows	 from	
Marcel	Détienne	and	Jean-Pierre	Vernant	a	concept	of	pre-epistemological	truth	
which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 performance	 of	 an	 immanent	 act	 of	 power	 and	
coincides	 with	 Foucault’s	 description	 of	 political	 sovereignty	 in	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”.	I	then	study	how	Foucault,	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	
Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants	and	Wrong-Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	





relationship	 between	 epistemological	 truth	 and	 facticity	 which,	 in	 Foucault,	
allows	us	to	understand	the	paradigm	of	liberal	political	power.	The	theoretical	
framework	 of	 norms	 implies	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	
corresponds	 to	 the	 immediate	 expression	 of	 this	 nature.	 Therefore,	 the	
relationship	 between	 bio-power	 and	 life	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 case	 of	





Finally,	 the	 third	 chapter	 proves	 that	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 biopolitical	
jurisdiction	does	not	integrate	the	political	figure	of	the	sovereign	but	does	not	
dismiss	the	question	of	sovereignty	either.	I	argue	that	the	figure	of	the	sovereign	









relationship	 between	 the	 self	 and	 its	 own	 ethical	 practice.	 This	 leads	 me	 to	
consider	how	Foucault	also	problematizes	 the	question	of	ethical	 sovereignty,	
understood	as	the	possibility	for	an	individual	to	determine	the	rationality	of	its	






































aims	 at	 providing	 a	 reflection	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 concepts	 of	
“veridiction”	 and	 “jurisdiction”	 Foucault	 introduces	 in	 Wrong-Doing,	 Truth-
Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice.	It	implies	to	question	the	relationship	





claim	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 reflection	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
immanence	of	one’s	acts	and	the	epistemic	discourses	which	take	them	as	their	
objects.	 It	 provides	 the	 space	 for	 a	 problematization	 of	 one’s	 sovereignty	 as	
individual	and	allows	us	to	ask	whether	the	truth	about	oneself	lies	in	a	rationality	
which	 claims	 to	 understand	 one’s	 acts	 in	 scientific	 terms	 or	 whether	 this	
rationality	constitutes	a	heterogenous	act	which	bears	no	essential	relationship	
with	 the	 acts	 it	 takes	 as	 its	 objects.	 Instead	 of	 reading	 Oedipus	 Rex	 in	







follows	 the	 emergence	 of	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 “mechanism	 of	 the	 sumbolon”	
(Foucault:	 2000c,	 24).	 This	 mechanism	 shows	 how,	 throughout	 the	 play,	




and	 Pierre	 Vidal-Naquet),	 shows	 the	mechanism	 by	which	 an	 epistemological	
form	of	truth	emerges	through	the	reunion	of	immanence	and	discourse.8	This	
thesis	chooses	to	follow	the	multiple	occurences	of	Foucault’s	analysis	of	Oedipus	
Rex	 (both	 in	 the	 lecture	 courses	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France	 and	 in	 other	
conferences)	as	a	way	to	examine	how	he	sees	this	structure	of	theoretical	truth		
at	work	in	other	political	and	epistemological	aspects	of	our	modernity.9			










relies	on	 the	corespodnence	between	discourse	and	 facts	and	 is	discovered	by	men.	Foucault	
makes	 it	 clear	 in	 “Truth	and	 Juridical	 Forms”:	 “It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 there	 really	 is	 an	Oedipus	











“What	was	 invented	 in	 law	during	this	period	was	a	particular	way	of	knowing,	a	condition	of	
possibility	of	knowledge	whose	destiny	was	 to	be	crucial	 in	 the	Western	world.	That	mode	of	
 26 
	
In	other	words,	 this	 thesis	demonstrates	 that	 the	question	of	 the	 relationship	




the	 relationship	 between	 knowledge	 and	 truth,	 which	 emerges	 in	 Classical	




















through	 the	 subject’s	 speech	 and	 acts.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 of	 the	 truth	 of	
sexuality	which,	as	scientific	and	anthropological	discourse	emerging	in	the	19th	
century,	 relies	 upon	 the	 postulate	 of	 the	manifestation	 of	 a	 nature.	 Foucault	
writes:	
Situated	at	the	point	of	intersection	of	a	technique	of	confession	and	a	
scientific	 discursivitity,	 where	 certain	 major	 mechanisms	 had	 to	 be	



























cases	 medicine	 takes	 to	 be	 normal	 (or	 to	 represent	 and	 ideal	 of	 health).	
Canguilhem	stresses	that	“[i]f	what	is	normal	here	can	be	pathological	there,	it	is	




problem.	The	genealogy	of	 the	postulate	of	 the	 truth	of	nature	 Foucault	 sees	
emerging	in	Classical	Greece	and	reappearing	in	modernity	does	not	concern	the	




to	 recognize	 that	 the	 values	 observed	 in	 life,	 understood	 as	 immanent	
experience,	 precede	 the	 truth	 that	 scientific	 discourse	 produce	 about	 them.	
However,	they	do	not	target	the	historical	and	political	conditions	which	allow	
epistemological	discourse	to	acquire	the	founding	role	of	an	a	priori	truth	that	
links	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 said	 (or	 makes	 existence	 correspond	 to	 the	 truth	 of	













the	 distance	 between	 Canguilhem’s	 and	 Foucault’s	 problematization	 of	 the	
concept	of	norm.	He	writes:	
Canguilhem	moves	away	from	Foucault’s	thought,	which	privileges	the	











                                                
10	“[…]	les	règles	sociales	sont	extérieures	à	leur	objet	alors	que	les	règles	vitales	d’ajustement	










Power	 and	 Bare	 Life	 (Agamben:	 1998).	 He	 fails	 to	 see	 that	 the	 historical	
emergence	of	 these	concepts	corresponds	 to	an	epistemological	configuration	
which	is	a	direct	consequence	of	theoretical	truth	derived	from	the	postulate	of	
the	 correspondence	 between	 scientific	 discourse	 and	 immanent	 existence.	
Agamben	leaves	unquestioned	the	equation	between	nature	and	biological	life,	



















For	 instance,	 the	 question	 of	 the	 shift	 from	 ritualistic	 sovereign	 power	 and	
knowledge	to	modern	anthropology	is	first	studied	in	Discipline	and	Punish	but	
this	 analysis	 is	 taken	 further	 in	Security,	 Territory,	 Population	 (Foucault:	 1995,	
2009c).	 In	 a	 similar	 way,	 the	 question	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 truth	
spoken	by	medical	and	anthropological	sciences	and	the	lives	of	men	they	take	
as	 their	objects	 is	studied	 in	The	Birth	of	 the	Clinic	and	 in	The	Order	of	Things	
(Foucault:	2003a,	2001e)	but	is	developed	further	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	
Know	 and	 in	 Wrong-Doing,	 Truth-Telling:	 the	 Function	 of	 Avowal	 in	 Justice	
(Foucault,	2013,	2014b).	The	question	of	the	relationship	between	the	subject’s	
speech	 and	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 a	 hermeneutics	 of	 desires	 is	 first	







On	 a	 broader	 level,	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 rethink	 the	 commonly	 accepted	
distrubtion	of	 Foucault’s	works	between	archaeology,	 genealogy	and	ethics	 in	










allows	 to	 reflect	 on	one’s	 conduct,	 to	manifest	 a	 form	of	 truth	 and	 to	 trigger	
political	change	without	the	need	for	epistemological	validation.	In	other	words,	
this	thesis	shows	that	thinking	epistemology,	politics	and	ethics	at	the	same	time	







thesis	 concludes	with	 the	 study	 of	 the	 question	 of	 ethical	 conduct	 in	 the	 last	
chapter.	
                                                
12 	Foucault’s	 scholarship	 usually	 divides	 his	 work	 in	 three	 main	 categories:	 whereas	 the	
“archaeological”	period	refers	to	his	works	up	to	the	1970s,	the	“geneaological”	period	refers	to	
his	works	from	the	1970s	up	to	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	The	latter	inaugurates	
the	 “ethical”	 period	 that	 runs	 until	 Foucault’s	 death.	 For	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 about	 this	
distribution,	 see	 Judith	 Revel’s	 Le	 Vocabulaire	 de	 Foucault	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	 entries	
“archéologie”,	“généalogie”	and	“éthique”	(Revel:	2002,	7-8,	37-38,	28-30).	This	thesis	argues	in	
favour	 of	 a	 more	 nuanced	 distribution	 and	 shows	 that	 the	 questions	 of	 the	 historicity	 of	
epistemology,	political	power	and	aesthetics	of	existence	(which	constitute	respectively	the	main	




















been	 stressed	 and	 used	 by	 Giorgio	 Agamben	who,	 in	Homo	 Sacer:	 Sovereign	













life	which	 is	 specifically	modern,	 deriving	 from	Foucault’s	 attempt	 to	 radically	





of	 the	 shift	 from	 sovereign	 power	 to	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 implies	 the	
historicization	of	sovereign	power	and	 life.	The	concept	of	anthropological	 life	
that	becomes	the	target	of	nineteenth	century	biology	indicates	the	emergence	
of	 a	 relationship	 between	 anthropological	 knowledge	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 life	
produced	by	the	positivity	of	this	knowledge.	The	reason	for	the	persistence	of	
death	within	biopolitical	modernity	needs	 to	be	 found	elsewhere:	 rather	 than	
claiming	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	 the	 essential	 expression	 of	 an	 ahistorical	
sovereign	 power,	 I	 claim	 that	 it	 is	 found	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
population	to	which	corresponds	an	epistemological	concept	of	nature	which	is	
politically	 protected,	 preserved	 or	 influenced.	 This	 epistemological	 concept	 of	













has	 contested	his	 power.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 scene	of	 torture	 is	 a	 performance	





(which,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 sovereign	 power,	 form	 the	 same	 reality),	 but	 which	 is	
apparently	gentler,	and	which	presents	itself	as	an	administrative	and	regulatory	












replaces	 by	 an	 essential	 and	 ahistorical	 characterization	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	sovereign	power	and	bare	life.	Such	a	historicization	leads	us	to	discover	
that	the	concept	of	the	norm,	which	replaces	the	will	of	the	sovereign,	operates	
according	 to	 an	 epistemic	 configuration	 that	 implies	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	




It	 is	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 positive	 abstraction	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 within	 the	
epistemic	 configuration	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge	 that	 the	 persistence	 of	
killing	as	an	operative	mode	of	political	power	can	be	understood.	It	relies	upon	
the	concept	of	natural	rule	that	provides	a	criterion	for	the	preservation	of	life	as	
positive	 abstraction.	 This	 abstraction	 is	what	 characterizes	 the	morphology	 of	

































In	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	The	History	 of	 Sexuality.	 The	Will	 to	
Knowledge,	he	writes:	
“Deduction”	has	 tended	 to	be	no	 longer	 the	major	 form	of	power	but	
merely	one	element	among	others,	working	to	incite,	reinforce,	control,	




















was	 the	 imbalance	 of	 power	 between	 the	 sovereign	 and	 the	 subject	 that	





As	 a	 ritual	 of	 armed	 law,	 in	 which	 the	 prince	 showed	 himself,	
indissociably,	 both	 as	 head	 of	 justice	 and	 head	 of	 war,	 the	 public	
execution	 had	 two	 aspects:	 one	 of	 victory,	 the	 other	 of	 struggle.	 It	
brought	to	a	solemn	end	a	war,	the	outcome	of	which	was	decided	in	
advance,	between	the	criminal	and	the	sovereign;	it	had	to	manifest	the	
disproportion	 of	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 over	 those	 whom	 he	 had	
reduced	to	impotence.	The	dissymmetry,	the	irreversible	imbalance	of	
forces,	 were	 an	 essential	 element	 in	 the	 public	 execution.	 A	 body	




Public	 executions	 were	 the	 scene	 of	 a	 predetermined	 confrontation	 that	
disclosed	 the	 order	 of	 a	 world	 within	 which	 the	 life	 of	 the	 condemned	 was	
exposed	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 physicality	 of	 his	 body.	 Every	 blow,	 every	 act	 of	





a	 crime	 that	 constitutes	 an	 example	 of	 disruption	 of	 the	 sovereign	 order	par	










by	 a	 power	 to	 foster	 life	 or	disallow	 it	 to	 the	 point	 of	 death.	 This	 is	
perhaps	what	 explains	 the	 disqualification	 of	 death	which	marks	 the	
recent	wane	of	the	rituals	that	accompanied	it.	That	death	is	so	carefully	
evaded	is	linked	less	to	a	new	anxiety	that	makes	death	unbearable	for	
our	 societies	 than	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	procedures	of	power	have	not	
ceased	to	turn	away	from	death.	In	the	passage	from	this	world	to	the	
other,	 death	 was	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 a	 terrestrial	 sovereignty	 was	




becomes	 the	 most	 secret	 aspect	 of	 existence,	 the	 most	 "private".	
(Foucault:	1998d,	138)	
	
As	 Foucault	 underlines,	 it	 is	 not	 because	 the	 reality	 of	 death	 has	 become	
unbearable	 to	 modern	 societies	 that	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 witnessed	 the	
decrease	 of	 the	 expression	 of	 sovereign	 power	 under	 the	 form	 of	 ritualized	
torture	and	executions.	 It	 is	 rather	with	 the	emergence	of	 a	new	economy	of	
power	that	the	violence	exerted	upon	life	disappears	from	public	view.	Whereas	
the	execution	marked,	within	the	logic	of	sovereign	power,	a	passage	from	the	
sovereignty	of	 the	King	 to	 the	 sovereignty	of	God	 (and	 therefore	 a	 continuity	
within	 the	 logic	of	 sovereignty	 itself),	with	bio-power	death	becomes	the	very	
limit	of	the	grasp	of	political	power.	Whilst	sentencing	a	subject	to	death	was	the	
paroxysmal	 expression	 of	 sovereign	 power	 under	 a	 ritual	 form	 whereby	 the	
power	of	the	King	was	exerted	and	expressed	through	each	carefully	measured	




If,	 however,	 executions	 disappear	 from	 the	public	 scene,	 and	 if	 the	 sovereign	
right	 of	 death	 no	 longer	 constitutes	 the	manifestation	 of	 political	 power,	 the	
emergence	 of	 bio-power	 does	 not	 mean	 the	 complete	 disappearance	 of	 the	




of	 the	 relationship	between	 sovereign	power	 and	biopower,	 has	 not	 failed	 to	
stress	the	importance	of	such	a	paradox	which	reappears	in	Foucault’s	Security,	




the	 resulting	 increase	 in	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 nation’s	 health	 and	
biological	life	as	a	problem	of	sovereign	power,	which	is	then	gradually	
transformed	into	a	“government	of	men”	(Dits	et	écrits,	3:	719).	“What	
follows	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 bestialization	 of	man	 achieved	 through	 the	most	
sophisticated	 political	 techniques.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 in	 history,	 the	
possibilities	 of	 the	 social	 sciences	 are	 made	 known,	 and	 at	 once	 it	




Bare	 Life,	 the	emergence	of	bio-power,	which	 sees	a	growing	 concern	 for	 the	
political	management	and	government	of	populations,	does	not	correspond	to	
the	 persistence	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign.	 The	 compatibility	 between	
sovereign	power	and	a	concern	for	“biological	life”	and	the	“nation’s	health”	is	






section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	 History	 of	 Sexuality	 carefully,	 it	 becomes	








The	 symbolic	 order	 of	 blood	 establishes	 a	 link	 between	 the	 violence	 either	
provoked	or	allowed	by	 the	power	of	 the	 sovereign	who	defends	 the	political	















                                                
14	As	Maurice	 Blanchot	 claims	 in	 his	 essay	 “Michel	 Foucault	 as	 I	 Imagine	 Him”:	 “sexuality,	 as	
[Foucault]	understood	it	or	at	least	the	quibbling	importance	attributed	to	it	today	(a	today	that	




of	 sovereign	 power.	However,	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 purity	 of	 the	 Kingdom,	


















able	 to	 wage	 so	many	wars,	 causing	 so	many	men	 to	 be	 killed.	 And	
through	 a	 turn	 that	 closes	 the	 circle,	 as	 the	 technology	 of	 wars	 has	
caused	 them	 to	 tend	 increasingly	 toward	 all-out	 destruction,	 the	
decision	that	initiates	them	and	the	one	that	terminates	them	are	in	fact	


















itself,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 for	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 biological	 existence	 of	 the	
population	as	a	biological	concept	and	reality.	It	is	therefore	the	link	between	life	
as	 epistemological	 concept	 and	 political	 power	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 examined	 in	
order	 to	 be	 faithful	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 Foucault’s	 attempt	 to	 historicize	 the	
relationship	 between	 power	 and	 life.	 It	 is	 therefore	 a	 radical	 reduction	 of	
Foucault’s	 philosophical	 enterprise	 to	 claim,	 as	 Agamben	 does,	 that	 the	
bestialization	 of	 man	 to	 which	 Foucault	 refers	 corresponds	 to	 the	 logic	 of	
sovereign	power	and	the	symbolic	function	of	blood	attached	to	it.	The	question	
of	 the	 bestialization	 of	 man	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 biological	
understanding	of	 life,	an	understanding	that	emerges	historically	at	the	end	of	
the	Classical	Age	with	the	development	of	human	sciences.	It	is	in	relation	to	the	
protection	 and	 fostering	 of	 life,	 whose	 paroxysmal	 manifestation	 lets	 the	
question	 of	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 population	 appear,	 that	 bio-power	 emerges	 in	
contrast	 to	 sovereign	 power.	 Instead	 of	 grasping	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 an	














to	 a	 change	 of	 object	 over	 which	 political	 power	 is	 exerted.	 An	 entire	
cosmological	 understanding	 is	 also	 at	 stake	 in	 this	 shift	 which,	 if	 we	 follow	
Foucault,	is	not	only	political	but	also	epistemic.	The	target	of	political	power	is	
no	longer	the	continuity	within	the	structure	of	sovereignty	in	relation	to	which	
death	 marks	 “the	 manner	 in	 which	 a	 terrestrial	 sovereignty	 was	 relieved	 by	
another”	(Foucault:	1998d,	138).	Just	as	the	body	loses	its	central	place	within	
the	procedure	of	punishment,	the	immediate	relationship	to	death	established	




to	 apply	 the	 death	 penalty.	 How	 could	 power	 exercise	 its	 highest	
prerogatives	 by	 putting	 people	 to	 death,	 when	 its	 main	 role	 was	 to	
ensure,	 sustain,	 and	multiply	 life,	 to	 put	 this	 life	 in	 order?	 (Foucault:	
1998d,	138)	
	











body	 of	 the	 condemned	 was	 a	 mark	 of	 the	 cosmological	 order	 attached	 to	
sovereignty	 affirming	 its	 persistence,	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 will	 see	
emergence	of	the	persistence	of	the	population	as	the	main	concern	of	political	
power.	In	Discipline	and	Punish,	Foucault	does	not	fail	to	underline	the	distinction	








A	 whole	 military	 machine	 surrounded	 the	 scaffold:	 cavalry	 of	 the	
watch,	archers,	guardsmen,	soldiers.	This	was	intended,	of	course,	to	
prevent	 any	 escape	 or	 show	 of	 force;	 it	 was	 also	 to	 prevent	 any	
outburst	of	sympathy	or	anger	on	the	part	of	the	people,	any	attempt	
to	save	the	condemned	or	to	have	them	immediately	put	to	death;	but	








the	public	 torture	 and	execution	displayed	 for	 all	 to	 see	 the	power	
relation	that	gave	his	force	to	the	law.	(Foucault:	1995,	50)	
	





was	 directed	 towards	 the	 traitor	 as	well	 as	 towards	 the	 potential	 conqueror.	
Thus,	 the	 tenet	 “rex	 qui	 nunquam	 moritur”	 [“the	 king	 who	 cannot	 die”],	
mentioned	by	Ernst	Kantorowicz	 in	The	King’s	Two	Bodies	 (Kantorowicz:	1997,	
316),15	finds	its	counterpart	in	“populus	non	moritur”	[“the	people	does	not	die”]	
(Kantorowicz:	 1997,	 295).	 It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that,	 in	 Kantorowicz’	 words,	 the	




and	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	 imperium	 is	 that	 which	 constitutes	 the	 object	 of	
political	power	at	the	time.	This	 is	 the	reason	why	 it	 is	 impossible	to	claim,	as	
Agamben	does,	that	“the	production	of	a	biopolitical	body	is	the	original	activity	
of	sovereign	power”	(Agamben:	1998,	11).	The	example	of	Medieval	sovereignty	
                                                











Baldus16 	[…]	 assumed	 a	 relatively	 permanent	 duration	 of	 the	 world	
which	 lasted	 “forever”	 although	 its	 dispositions	 changed	 and	 were	
subject	 to	 corruption	and	generation.	 In	 this	 case,	Baldus	applied	 the	
doctrine	of	permanent	duration	to	the	imperium	quod	semper	est;	but	
he	used	the	same	argument	also	with	regard	to	commonwealth	and	fisc	
in	 general	 when	 he	 said	 that	 “they	 cannot	 die”,	 that	 both	 were	














From	 the	 Middle	 Ages	 to	 the	 sixteenth	 century,	 sovereignty	 is	 not	
exercised	on	things,	but	first	of	all	on	a	territory,	and	consequently	on	the	
subjects	who	inhabit	it.	In	this	sense	we	can	say	that	the	territory	really	is	

















The	 opposition	 between	 the	 King	 and	 his	 subjects	 had	 to	 be	 joined	 to	 the	
permanence	of	the	territory:	the	subjects	were,	in	the	feudal	structure,	merely	









relation	 to	Christian	 theology	and	eschatology.	 It	 is	 the	 structure	of	 sovereign	











preserved	 by	 a	 fiction:	 Christ	 stepped	 into	 the	 gap	 as	 interrex	 and	
secured,	 through	 his	 own	 eternity,	 the	 continuity	 of	 Kingship.	
(Kantorowicz:	1997,	334)	
	




the	 political	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 King	 to	 the	 political	 concern	 for	 the	 State	



















the	 idea	 of	 a	 sovereign	 order	 perpetuating	 itself.	 The	 fact	 that	 such	 a	 power	
seemed	 to	be	 taken	within	 a	 ritualistic	 structure	 also	 conveys	 the	 idea	of	 the	
perpetuation	 of	 a	 fixed	 order	 of	 things.	 Under	 the	 paradigm	 of	 Medieval	
sovereignty,	the	perpetuation	of	the	Empire,	hence	of	the	existing	relationship	
between	 the	 sovereign	 and	 his	 subject,	 defines	 the	 intrinsic	 circularity	 of	
Medieval	 sovereignty.	 It	 is	 a	 circularity	 which	 concerns	 the	 persistence	 of	 a	
cosmological	 structure.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why,	 during	 the	 1st	 February	 1978	
lecture,	Foucault	claims:	





essential	 circularity	 that,	 whatever	 its	 theoretical	 structure,	 moral	
justification	or	practical	effects,	is	not	so	far	removed	from	Machiavelli	
saying	 that	 the	 Prince's	 main	 objective	 must	 be	 to	 preserve	 its	
principality,	 we	 always	 come	 back	 to	 this	 circular	 relationship	 of	
sovereignty,	or	the	principality,	to	itself.	(Foucault:	2009c,	98-99)	
	




the	 biological	 existence	 of	 individuals	 or	 of	 a	 population	 which	 defines	 the	
political	structure	of	Medieval	sovereign	power.	On	the	contrary,	what	matters	is	






cosmology	 which	 seeks	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 a	 structural	 and	
territorial	entity,	does	not	manage	the	life	of	its	subjects.	The	power	of	deduction	
the	sovereign	exerts	over	his	subjects	is	a	withdrawal	that	serves	the	interests	of	
the	Kingdom,	and	the	violence	of	 the	sovereign	 is	either	directed	towards	 the	







the	 sake	 of	 the	 Kingdom	 against	 an	 enemy.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	do	not	concern	the	cosmological	horizon	of	the	Empire	but	the	reality	
of	 life	understood	as	 a	biological	 and	natural	 phenomenon.	 This	 new	political	
reality	implies	that	the	existence	and	preservation	becomes	what	guides	modern	
political	 objectives.	 As	 Foucault	 argues	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 History	 of	










as	 the	basis	of	 the	biological	processes:	propagation,	births	and	mortality,	 the	







environment	 who	 constitute,	 as	 such,	 a	 phenomenon	 subjected	 to	 various	
fluctuations.	The	bestialization	of	man,	to	which	Agamben	refers	in	Homo	Sacer:	
Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life	(Agamben:	1998,	10),	is	not	merely	the	individual	
whose	body	 is	 disciplined	and	optimized,	 nor	 is	 it	 the	 individual	 sentenced	 to	
death	by	the	sovereign.	The	concept	of	population,	which	has	nothing	to	do	with	
the	people	belonging	to	a	Kingdom,	is	not	intrinsically	linked	to	a	territory	that	











dealing	 simply	 with	 subjects,	 or	 even	 with	 a	 “people”,	 but	 with	 a	
“population”,	 with	 its	 specific	 phenomena	 and	 its	 peculiar	 variables:	
birth	 and	 death	 rates,	 life	 expectancy,	 state	 of	 health,	 frequency	 of	








Foucault	 attempts	 to	 describe	 here:	 it	 no	 longer	 concerns	 the	 direct	 battle	
opposing	the	law	of	the	sovereign	to	the	subject	of	the	King	who	has	breached	it	
(as	 it	 is	 the	 case	with	public	 torture	 and	executions).	 It	 does	not	 concern	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 sovereign	 and	 his	 people	 either	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
extraction	of	labour	force	or	of	the	mobilisation	for	war	to	preserve	and	foster	
the	Kingdom).	It	concerns	the	way	in	which	political	power	both	regulates	and	
registers	 the	 fluctuations	 derived	 from	 the	 observation	 of	 the	 group	 of	 living	
people	to	which	the	population,	as	a	phenomenon,	corresponds.17	Foucault	calls	





                                                
17	As	Foucault	describes	in	Security,	Territory,	Population,	the	population	is	an	objective	and	not	
a	fixed	reality.	It	describes	a	tendency	that	a	group	of	individuals	taken	as	living	beings	and	object	
of	 scientific	 knowledge	 reveal	 (e.g.	 the	 increase	 or	 decrease	 of	 natality	 or	 mortality).	 The	
population	“is	pertinent	as	the	objective,	and	individuals,	the	series	of	individuals,	are	no	longer	





the	 life	 of	 a	 population	 defining	 a	 natural	 phenomenon	 fluctuating	 within	 a	
specific	milieu.18	Death	is	no	longer	the	occasion	of	the	immediate	manifestation	
of	 the	power	of	 the	 sovereign	 seizing	and	destroying	 the	 life	of	his	 subject,	 it	
becomes	 the	 aspect	 of	 existence	 which	 political	 power	 cannot	 embrace	 nor	
control	precisely	because	it	is	the	lives	of	people	as	living	beings	which	become	
the	very	object	of	political	power	at	the	beginning	of	the	nineteenth	century.	As	
Foucault	 puts	 it:	 ‘Now	 it	 is	 over	 life,	 throughout	 its	 unfolding,	 that	 power	
establishes	 its	 dominion;	 death	 is	 power’s	 limit,	 the	moment	 that	 escapes	 it;	





in	 opposition	 to	 being	 dead),	 the	 focal	 point	 of	modern	 political	 power	 is	 no	
longer	 the	 bipartite	 opposition	 between	 life	 and	 death	 through	 which	 the	
sovereignty	of	the	King	strives	to	negate	the	finitude	of	the	subjects	composing	
its	Kingdom.	 Instead,	 it	 finds	 its	 focus	 in	 the	administration	of	a	phenomenon	
whose	 progression	 is	 located	 at	 the	 crossroads	 of	 natural	 progression	 and	
political	 intervention.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 we	 no	 longer	 deal	 with	 the	
persistence	 of	 the	 ritualized	 expression	 of	 sovereign	 power	 as	 a	 punctual	
sentence	exerted	upon	individuals	as	subjects	of	the	King	but	with	the	political	
                                                
18	As	 Katia	 Grenel	 puts	 it	 in	 her	 essay	 “Le	 biopouvoir	 chez	 Foucault	 et	 Agamben”,	 biopolitics	





disciplined	 bodies	 and	 the	 regulation	 of	 populations,	 the	way	 political	 power	
operates	shifts.	It	moves	from	dealing	with	a	symbol	of	a	structural	entity	(the	
















knowledge,	 life,	 meaning,	 the	 disciplines,	 and	 regulations.	 (Foucault:	
1998d,	147-148)	
	
The	 shift	 from	 a	 symbolic	 order	 of	 blood	 to	 an	 analytics	 of	 sexuality	 clearly	
illustrates	the	new	form	of	power	which	emerges	after	the	Classical	Age.	Rather	


















one	hand	 it	was	 tied	 to	 the	disciplines	 of	 the	body:	 the	harnessing,	
intensification,	 and	 distribution	 of	 forces,	 the	 adjustment	 and	
economy	 of	 energies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 was	 applied	 to	 the	
regulation	 of	 populations,	 through	 all	 the	 far-reaching	 effects	 of	 its	
activity.	 It	 fitted	 both	 categories	 at	 once,	 giving	 rise	 to	 infinitesimal	
surveillances,	permanent	controls,	extremely	meticulous	orderings	of	
space,	 indeterminate	 medical	 or	 psychological	 examinations,	 to	 an	
entire	micro-power	concerned	with	the	body.	But	it	gave	rise	as	well	to	
comprehensive	measures,	 statistical	 assessments,	 and	 interventions	
aimed	at	the	entire	social	body	or	at	groups	taken	as	a	whole.	Sex	was	
a	means	of	access	both	to	the	life	of	the	body	and	the	life	of	the	species.	
It	was	employed	as	 a	 standard	 for	 the	disciplines	 and	as	 a	basis	 for	
regulations.	This	is	why	in	the	nineteenth	century	sexuality	was	sought	
out	in	the	smallest	details	of	individual	existences;	it	was	tracked	down	





interventions	 (through	 incitements	 to	 or	 curbs	 on	 procreation),	 and	
ideological	 campaigns	 for	 raising	 standards	 of	 morality	 and	
















Already	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality,	 the	
question	of	the	biologization	of	the	lives	of	men	cannot	be	understood	merely	as	
the	 expression	of	 a	 sovereign	 right	 of	 death	over	 individuals	 reduced	 to	 their	
utmost	existence	as	animals.	For	instance,	the	question	of	racism	–	examined	by	
Foucault	both	 in	 this	 text	and	 in	Society	Must	Be	Defended19	–	shows	that	 the	
fantasy	 of	 pure	 or	 superior	 blood	 held	 by	 Nazism	 is	 supported	 by	 a	 whole	












Racism	 took	 shape	 at	 this	 point	 (racism	 in	 its	 modern,	 “biologizing”,	
statist	 form):	 it	 was	 then	 that	 a	 whole	 politics	 of	 settlement,	 family,	
marriage,	education,	social	hierarchization,	and	property,	accompanied	
by	 a	 long	 series	of	 permanent	 interventions	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	body,	




combination	 of	 the	 fantasies	 of	 blood	 and	 the	 paroxysms	 of	 a	
disciplinary	power.	A	eugenic	ordering	of	society,	with	all	that	it	implied	
in	the	way	of	extension	and	intensification	of	micro-powers,	in	the	guise	
of	 an	 unrestricted	 state	 control,	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 oneiric	







the	race	that	 is	protected	and	preserved.	 It	 is	no	 longer	the	model	of	 the	war	




The	 modern	 racism	 Foucault	 describes	 does	 not	 deal	 with	 the	 paradigm	 of	
sovereign	power	ordering	an	imperium,	but	with	the	idea	of	life	as	true	nature	
that	 must	 resist	 corruption.	 If	 sovereign	 power	 survives	 under	 totalitarian	
regimes,	 it	 is	 thanks	 to	 a	 biologism	which,	 by	 preferring	 one	 population	 over	
another,	founds	its	validity	in	the	truth	of	the	pure	race.	This	is	the	reason	why	
Foucault	describes	the	modern	form	of	racism	as	a	form	of	counter-history:	20	a	















the	 Roman	 type,	 or	 which	 was	 still	 centered	 on	 the	 rituals	 of	
sovereignty	 and	 its	myths,	 and	 that	 we	 then	 entered	 a	 society	 […]	
whose	 historical	 consciousness	 centers	 not	 on	 sovereignty	 and	 the	
problem	 of	 its	 foundation,	 but	 on	 revolution,	 its	 promises,	 and	 its	
prophecies	 of	 future	 emancipation.	 […]	 And	 it	 was	 at	 the	moment	
when	a	counterhistory	of	the	revolutionary	type	was	taking	shape	that	
another	 counterhistory	 began	 to	 take	 shape	 –	 but	 it	 will	 be	 a	




the	 discourse	 of	 race	 struggle,	 but	 it	 distorts	 them,	 and	 it	 will	 be	





species,	 natural	 selection,	 and	 the	 survival	 of	 the	 fittest	 species.	
Similarly,	 the	 theme	of	 the	binary	 society	which	 is	divided	 into	 two	
races	or	two	groups	with	different	languages,	laws,	and	so	on	will	be	
replaced	by	that	of	a	society	that	is,	in	contrast,	biologically	monist.	Its	





by-products.	 The	 theme	 of	 the	 counterhistory	 of	 races	was,	 finally,	
that	 the	 State	 was	 necessarily	 unjust.	 It	 is	 now	 inverted	 into	 its	
opposite:	 the	 State	 is	 no	 longer	 an	 instrument	 that	 one	 race	 uses	





the	 point	 when	 the	 theme	 of	 racial	 purity	 replaces	 that	 of	 race	
struggle,	 and	 when	 counterhistory	 begins	 to	 be	 converted	 into	
biological	racism.	(Foucault:	2003b,	79-81)	
	
Whereas	 the	 foundation	of	 the	power	of	 the	sovereign	 is	 linked	 to	a	mythical	
truth	that	exists	outside	time	and	regardless	of	time,	the	biological	implications	
of	modern	racism	emerge	from	an	opposition	directed	towards	the	mythical	and	
timeless	 foundation	 of	 sovereign	 power.	 Parallel	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
counterhistory	 that	 goes	 against	 the	 mythical	 and	 timeless	 foundation	 of	
sovereign	power,	Foucault	sees	the	emergence	of	a	historical	discourse	of	 the	
revolutionary	type	supposed	to	challenge	the	foundation	of	sovereign	power	in	
the	name	of	 the	 King	 or	 of	God.	However,	 the	model	 of	 the	battle	 or	 of	war	
opposing	the	ally	of	the	Kingdom	to	its	enemy	gets	replaced	by	the	war	between	
races	which,	instead	of	being	supported	by	the	over-arching	sovereignty	of	God,	
















The	modern	 enemy	 is	 therefore	 less	 the	 stranger	 outside	 of	 the	 State	 or	 the	












The	 representation	 of	 sovereignty	 is	 in	 effect	 implied	 in	 the	 idea	 of	
eminence,	 and	 conversely	 the	 reality	 of	 finite	 things	 could	 not	 be	




feudal	 subject	 in	 the	 face	 of	 death	 (by	 including	 it	within	 the	 Kingdom	 as	 an	




22 	“La	 représentation	 de	 la	 souveraineté	 est	 en	 effet	 impliquée	 dans	 l’idée	 d’éminence,	 et	







divine	 sovereignty,	 it	 becomes	 a	 necessary	means	 for	 the	preservation	of	 the	
purity	of	a	population.	What	Foucault’s	take	on	racism	tells	us	is	that	the	apparent	
















existence	as	 living	being.23	It	 is	 the	conceptual	distinction	Agamben	 introduces	





problematize	 the	 specificity	 of	 modern	 political	 power	 in	 relation	 to	 the	









fact	 is	 that,	 together	 with	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	 exception	
everywhere	becomes	the	rule,	the	realm	of	bare	life	–	which	is	originally	
situated	 at	 the	 margins	 of	 the	 political	 order	 –	 gradually	 begins	 to	







the	 superimposition	 of	 a	 so-called	 “natural”	 and	 political	 life	 originally	
heterogeneous	 in	Classical	Greek	antiquity.	According	 to	Agamben,	as	soon	as	
natural	 life	 (zoe)	 becomes	 conflated	with	 political	 life	 (bios),	 the	mere	 fact	 of	
being	alive	cannot	but	become	the	object	of	political	strategies	and	calculations.	
The	problem	with	Agamben’s	political	diagnostic	of	modernity	lies	in	the	fact	that	
                                                
24	This	word	is	either	transcribed	physis	 (in	Agamben’s	Homo	Sacer:	Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	
Life)	or	phusis	(in	Foucault’s	texts).	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	I	have	chosen	to	spell	 it	phusis	
throughout	 the	 course	 of	 my	 argument.	 However,	 I	 have	 respected	 the	 spelling	 used	 in	 the	
original	texts. 
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lies	 in	 the	 paradoxical	 historicization	 and	 dehistoricization	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
sovereign	power	he	provides.	On	the	one	hand,	“the	inclusion	of	zoe	in	the	polis”	
is	 “absolutely	 ancient”,	 yet,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 “the	 realm	 of	 bare	 life	 […]	
gradually	begins	to	coincide	with	the	political	realm,	[…]	bios	and	zoe,	right	and	


















the	 juridico-institutional	 and	 the	biopolitical	models	of	power”.	 Yet,	he	 claims	
that	“the	production	of	the	biopolitical	body	is	the	original	activity	of	sovereign	
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power”,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 sovereign	 power	 and	 biopolitics	 are	 always	 already	
coextensive.	The	conceptual	heterogeneity	between	sovereign	power	and	bio-
power,	which	 I	have	exposed	 in	 the	 first	 section	of	 this	chapter,	prevents	one	
from	arguing	that	sovereign	power	remains	the	basis	upon	which	the	 juridico-





identified	 by	 Foucault	 in	 the	 last	 section	 of	 the	 first	 volume	of	 the	History	 of	
Sexuality	 into	 a	 transcendental	 and	 ahistorical	 pre-given	 concept	 allows	







1998,	 11)	 as	 the	 “original	 activity”	 of	 sovereign	 power	 transforms	 Foucault’s	




concepts	 of	 biological	 and	 “non-political”	 life	 could	 be	 superimposed	without	
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difficulty.	 It	 is	such	an	equation	that	allows	him	to	claim	that	biopolitics	 is	 the	
intrinsic	activity	of	sovereign	power.	He	writes:	




bring	 to	 light	 the	 secret	 tie	 uniting	 sovereign	 power	 and	 bare	 life,	
thereby	 reaffirming	 the	 bond	 (derived	 from	 a	 tenacious	





conceptual	 gesture	 that	 prevents	 any	 historical	 critique.	 Because	 Agamben	




modernity	 seems	 therefore	 highly	 questionable	 as	 it	 merely	 lies	 upon	 a	
primordial	 sovereign	 decision	 related	 to	 an	 ahistorical	 concept	 of	 sovereign	
power.	
	











politique	duquel	 sa	 vie	d’être	 vivant	est	 en	question],	he	designates	a	political	
administration	of	life	which	does	not	essentially	coincide	with	an	understanding	
of	life	understood	in	biological	terms.	Life	may	indeed	be	qualified	as	“biological”	
only	 through	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 understanding	 of	 life	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	
modern	 episteme	within	which	 Foucault	 places	 his	 analysis	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics.	 This	 biological	 life	 is	 first	 of	 all	 the	 product	 of	 a	 representation	 of	
knowledge:	 it	 is	a	kind	of	discourse	which	has	no	 relevance	when	referring	 to	
Greek	antiquity.	Hence,	biological	life	cannot	be	superimposed	with	the	idea	of	
an	 unqualified	 nature	 that	 would	 ground	 political	 power	 and	 constitute	 the	
“hidden	 point	 of	 intersection	 between	 the	 juridico-institutional	 and	 the	
biopolitical	models	of	power”	(Agamben:	1998,	11)	for	the	concept	of	biological	






as	 the	 absorption	 of	 bios	 (the	 realm	 of	 political	 life)	 by	 zoe	 (animal	 life	 and	
biological	 persistence)	do	not	do	 justice	 to	 the	 actual	 problem	underlying	 the	












centre	 of	 political	 power.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 now	 serves	 to	 regulate	 the	
emergence	 of	 the	 natural	 rule	 as	 a	 positivity,	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 that	
manifests	itself	through	the	code	of	normalization	defined	by	disciplines.25	This	
code	of	normalization,	which	determines	the	framework	within	which	the	natural	
rule	of	norms	gets	expressed,	 cannot	be	aligned	with	 the	concept	of	bare	 life	
whose	integration	into	the	political	sphere	Agamben	sees	as	the	distinctive	mark	






                                                
25	As	Blanchot	puts	it	in	his	essay	“Michel	Foucault	as	I	Imagine	Him”:	“when	power	renounces	its	
alliance	with	the	sole	prestige	of	blood	and	bloodlines	(under	the	influence	of	the	Church,	which	
would	 profit	 from	 it	 by	 overthrowing	 the	 rules	 of	 kinship	 –	 by	 suppressing	 the	 levirate,	 for	
example),	sexuality	takes	on	a	preponderance	that	no	longer	associates	it	with	the	Law	but	with	
the	norm,	no	longer	with	the	rights	of	masters,	but	with	the	future	of	the	species	–	life	–	under	

















isolates	 for	us	 the	beginning	of	 a	 certain	modern	manner	of	 knowing	
empiricities.	This	is	because	the	thought	that	is	contemporaneous	with	
us,	and	with	which,	willy-nilly,	we	think,	is	still	largely	dominated	by	the	
impossibility,	 brought	 to	 light	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	
century,	of	basing	syntheses	in	the	space	of	representation,	and	by	the	
correlative	obligation	–	 simultaneous	but	 immediately	divided	against	
itself	 –	 to	 open	 up	 the	 transcendental	 field	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 to	
constitute	 inversely,	 beyond	 the	 object,	 what	 are	 for	 us	 the	 “quasi-
transcendentals”	of	Life,	Labour	and	Language.	In	order	to	bring	about	























of	 basing	 syntheses	 in	 the	 space	 of	 representation,	 and	 […]	 to	 open	 up	 the	
transcendental	 field	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 to	 constitute	 inversely,	 beyond	 the	
object,	what	are	for	us	the	“quasi-transcendentals”	of	Life,	Labour	and	Language”	
(Foucault:	 2001e,	 272)	 shows	 that	 it	 is,	 according	 to	 Foucault,	 impossible	 to	
constitute	 within	 the	 field	 of	 positive	 knowledge	 a	 discourse	 which	 folds	 the	
subject	of	knowledge	back	on	himself	as	an	object	of	this	very	knowledge.	As	a	
consequence	of	this	impossible	posture,	Foucault	describes	the	modern	concepts	
of	 Life,	 Labour	 and	Work	 as	 givens	 whose	 historical	 emergence	 is	 no	 longer	
questioned.	 It	 is,	 however,	 by	 questioning	 this	 emergence	 that	 the	 field	 of	
transcendentality	 may	 be	 identified	 and	 put	 into	 question.	 This	 field	 of	
transcendentality	determines	the	condition	of	possibility	as	well	as	the	finitude	
of	 the	 modern	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life.	 Human	 life	 becomes	 a	






















Agamben	 here	 not	 only	 claims	 to	 identify	 a	 correspondence	 between	 the	
metaphysical	 question	 and	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 political	 question,	 he	 also	
advocates	 the	 possibility	 of	 reaching	 their	 essence	 through	 the	 isolation	 of	 a	
"pure"	being	and	"pure"	life.	The	isolation	of	this	“pure	Being”	corresponds	to	the	
isolation	of	bare	life	as	a	concept:	an	“unthinkable	limit”	which	is	not	so	distant	
from	 Foucault’s	 impossible	 synthesis	 of	 subjective	 experience	 but	 is	 yet	 not	
thought	in	terms	of	the	question	about	the	possibility	of	the	knowledge	of	 life	
(i.e.	in	terms	of	the	impossibility	to	represent	man’s	finitude).	Isolating	life	as	a	





fails	 to	 identify	 the	 problem	 targeted	 by	 Foucault	 when	 he	 questions	 the	
mutation	of	sovereign	power	after	the	Classical	Age	with	the	emergence	of	the	
modern	 episteme.	 Agamben	 remains	 committed	 to	 an	 ontological	 and	
metaphysical	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 which	 reaches	 its	
limits	when	confronted	by	the	question	of	the	relationship	between	knowledge	
and	 life	bio-power	describes.	 This	question	addresses	 the	 impossibility,	 for	 an	
individual,	to	represent	positively	the	essence	of	his	own	life.		
	
It	 is	 not	 by	 chance	 that	medicine	 comes	 first	 in	 Foucault’s	 list	 of	 apparatuses	
taking	part	 in	modern	 life’s	political	 administration.	One	must	 remember	 that	
when	 Foucault	 coins	 the	 term	 “biopolitics”	 for	 the	 first	 time,26	he	 is	 giving	 a	
lecture	on	social	medicine	at	 the	State	university	of	Rio	de	 Janeiro	 in	October	
1974	and	contextualizes	it	in	those	terms:	
What	I	maintain	is	that,	with	capitalism,	we	did	not	go	from	a	collective	
medicine	 to	 a	 private	 medicine.	 Exactly	 the	 opposite	 occurred:	
capitalism,	which	developed	from	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century	to	
the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 started	 by	 socializing	 a	 first	
object,	 the	 body,	 as	 a	 factor	 of	 productive	 force,	 of	 labor	 power.	
Society’s	 control	 over	 individuals	was	 accomplished	 not	 only	 through	
consciousness	or	ideology	but	also	in	the	body	and	with	the	body.	For	
capitalist	 society,	 it	 was	 biopolitics,	 the	 biological,	 the	 somatic,	 the	























empirical	existence	of	men	as	 living	beings	 is	 turned	 into	 its	possible	scientific	
representation.	 I	 claim	 that	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 share	 a	 historical	
specificity:	they	find	themselves	within	the	modern	episteme	whereby,	to	use	a	
phrase	 from	The	Birth	of	 the	Clinic,	 the	 individual	becomes	both	 “subject	 and	
object	of	his	own	knowledge”	(Foucault:	2003a,	244).28	 	
                                                






man	 –	 whose	 impossibility	 he	 will	 precisely	 demonstrate	 […].”	 [“Dans	 son	 Archéologie	 des	
sciences	humaines	(Les	Mots	et	les	Chose,	1966)	Foucault	explore	à	la	fois	le	fond	sur	lequel	repose	






mutation	 from	 sovereign	 power	 to	 bio-power	 is	 actually	 nourished	 by	 the	
underlying	question	of	 the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction.	This	question	 interrogates	
the	 historicity	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 truth	 which	 links	 the	 modern	 concept	 of	
“biological	life”	to	the	idea	of	a	true	nature.	This	question	of	jurisdiction,	which	
addresses	 the	historical	mutation	of	 the	 relationship	between	political	power,	
truth	and	knowledge,	 is	what	allows	one	 to	 identify	 the	rupture	 that	emerges	
after	the	Classical	episteme.	Such	a	rupture,	according	to	which	“the	law	operates	







power	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 decline	 of	 law.	 His	 further	 commentary	
makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 normalizing	 society	 in	 no	way	
diminished	the	power	of	law	or	caused	judicial	institutions	to	disappear.	
In	 fact,	 normalization	 tends	 to	 be	 accompanied	 by	 an	 astonishing	
proliferation	 of	 legislation.	 Practically	 speaking,	 legislators	 never	
expressed	 themselves	as	 freely	or	as	extensively	as	 in	 the	age	of	bio-
power.	The	norm,	then,	is	opposed	not	to	law	itself	but	to	what	Foucault	




                                                
29 	As	 Mika	 Ojakangas	 puts	 it	 in	 his	 essay	 “Impossible	 Dialogue	 on	 Bio-power.	 Agamben	 and	
Foucault”:	“This	does	not	mean	that	the	law	has	faded	into	the	background	or	that	institutions	of	
justice	have	disappeared,	but	rather	that	the	law	operates	more	and	more	as	a	tool	of	bio-power,	
that	 is,	 as	a	 technique	 the	 task	of	which	 is	 to	 regulate	and	correct	 the	development	of	 life	 in	
general”	(Ojakangas:	2005,	15).	
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can	 also	 function	 by	 formulating	 norms,	 thus	 becoming	 part	 of	 a	
different	 sort	 of	 power	 that	 “has	 to	 qualify,	 measure,	 appraise,	 and	
hierarchize	rather	than	display	itself	in	its	murderous	splendor.”	In	the	




























as	 transcendental	 conditions	 of	 politics:	 sovereign	 power	 and	 bare	 life.	
Agamben’s	reading	of	Foucault’s	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	History	of	
Sexuality	produces	a	conceptual	conflation	of	the	concepts	of	nature	and	biology.	
Whilst	 Agamben	 believes	 they	 refer	 to	 the	 same	 reality,	 Foucault	 clearly	
underlines	a	distinction	proceeding	from	the	specificity	of	the	modern	episteme.	
What	biology	means	since	the	nineteenth	century	corresponds	to	the	inclusion	of	































to	bios.	 In	 the	 introduction	of	Homo	Sacer:	 Sovereign	Power	and	Bare	Life,	he	
writes:	
The	Greeks	had	no	single	term	to	express	what	we	mean	by	the	word	
“life”.	 They	 used	 two	 terms	 that,	 although	 traceable	 to	 a	 common	
etymological	 root,	 are	 semantically	 and	morphologically	 distinct:	 zoe,	
which	 expressed	 the	 simple	 fact	 of	 living	 common	 to	 all	 living	 beings	
(animals,	men,	or	gods),	and	bios,	which	 indicated	the	form	or	way	of	
living	proper	 to	 an	 individual	 or	 a	 group.	When	Plato	mentions	 three	
kinds	 of	 life	 in	 the	 Philebus,	 and	 when	 Aristotle	 distinguishes	 the	
contemplative	life	of	the	philosopher	(bios	theoretikos)	from	the	life	of	
pleasure	 (bios	apolaustikos)	and	the	political	 life	 (bios	politikos)	 in	 the	
Nicomachean	Ethics,	neither	philosopher	would	ever	have	used	the	term	










to	 expose	 the	 fundamental	 zoe	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 any	 human	 being’s	 existence.	
However,	the	gesture	which	consists	in	positing	zoe	or	“natural	life”	as	the	basis	
over	which	an	ahistorical	form	of	sovereign	power	is	exerted	clearly	ignores	the	




sort	 of	 primal	 nucleus	or	 primordial	 stratum,	which	Agamben	defines	
exactly	as	the	reduction	of	bios	to	zoe.	Yet,	even	the	way	in	which	one	





ripe	 for	 an	 anthropological	 deconstruction.	 In	 short,	 the	 idea	 of	
“biological	life”	is	no	more	able	than	the	idea	of	“nature”	to	save	us	the	








allows	 the	modern	superimposition	of	 concrete	 individual	existence,	biological	
life	and	human	nature.30	
	
                                                
30	As	Foucault	clearly	states	during	his	conversation	with	Noam	Chomsky	on	Dutch	television	in	










The	 question	 brought	 forward	 by	 Foucault’s	 reflection	 on	 modern	 racism	 –	
expressed	 as	 the	 “battle	 for	 existence”	 no	 longer	 relies	 on	 the	 law	 of	 the	
sovereign	but	upon	the	nature	of	life	based	upon	the	concept	of	norm.	This	idea,	
already	expressed	by	Foucault	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	of	the	History	





It	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 matter	 of	 bringing	 death	 into	 play	 in	 the	 field	 of	
sovereignty,	 but	 of	 distributing	 the	 living	 in	 the	 domain	 of	 value	 and	
utility.	Such	a	power	has	to	qualify,	measure,	appraise,	and	hierarchize,	
rather	than	display	itself	in	its	murderous	splendour;	it	does	not	have	to	
draw	 a	 line	 that	 separates	 the	 enemies	 of	 the	 sovereign	 from	 his	
obedient	 subjects;	 it	 effects	 distributions	 around	 the	 norm.	 I	 do	 not	
























on	 the	basis	of	which	 it	 is	possible	 to	construct	a	social	 clinic.	 (Revel:	
2014,	115)	
	
Revel	 states	 the	 point	 clearly:	 in	 order	 for	 the	 norm	 to	 appear	 as	 a	 rule	 and	
replace	 the	 sovereign	will,	 it	must	 be	 based	 upon	 a	 concept	 of	 nature	which	
emerges	historically.	If	this	concept	is	“one	presumed	to	be	natural”,	it	is	because	
it	is	a	concept	which	implies	a	new	relationship	between	political	power	and	life.	




territory	but	 the	defence	of	 the	biological	nature	of	 the	population	which,	by	
extension,	may	serve	as	the	conceptual	basis	for	the	defence	of	the	true	race.	
The	concept	of	norm	which	implies	the	underlying	truth	of	nature	relies	upon	the	
anthropological	 objectification	 of	 the	 existence	 of	man	 into	 forms	 of	 positive	
scientific	knowledge.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	concept	of	norm	is,	for	Foucault,	


















and	 by	 all	 possible	 means	 assigned	 to	 an	 identity	 that	 proves	 their	
inclusion	in	the	system.	This	double	analysis	focuses,	on	one	side,	on	the	
governing	 of	 singularities	 through	 the	 production	 of	 the	 “individual”,	
and,	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 on	 the	 government	 of	 masses	 of	 such	
“individuals”	 through	 the	 production	 of	 equally	 objectivized	 and	
identitary	 “homogenous	 populations”.	 Beginning	 with	 Discipline	 and	
Punish,	this	analytic	division	of	labour	is	evident	–	I	refer,	for	example,	
to	the	extraordinary	pages	dedicated	to	the	functioning	of	the	maritime	
hospital,	 or	 more	 generally	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 “productive	 placement”	
(emplacement	productif).	Still,	in	Discipline	and	Punish	the	discourse	on	
“populations”	 is	 not	 pursued	 to	 its	 ultimate	 conclusions	 because	 it	 is	
missing	a	concept	that	would	be	able	to	account	for	both	the	production	
and	 the	 identification	 of	 a	 population	 as	 well	 as	 for	 its	 political	
management.	Foucault	is	still	lacking	the	concept	of	the	norm	as	a	new	
instrument	 of	 governmental	 technology	 which	 only	 makes	 its	
appearance	with	his	formulation	of	biopolitics.	(Revel:	2014,	115)	
	
The	 concept	 of	 norm	 allows	 Foucault	 to	 account	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	
governmental	 practices	 specifically	 linked	 to	 biopolitics,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 in	
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practices	 that	 Foucault	 attempts	 to	 describe.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Foucault’s	
characterization	of	biopolitics	in	the	14th	January	1976	lecture	from	Society	Must	
Be	Defended	makes	more	specific	Revel’s	account	of	the	difference	between	the	
law	 of	 the	 sovereign	 and	 the	 epistemological	 framework	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics.	He	says	that:	




norm.	 Disciplines	 will	 define	 not	 a	 code	 of	 law,	 but	 a	 code	 of	





According	 to	 this	quotation,	disciplines	are	already	 the	product	of	a	discourse	
heterogeneous	to	that	of	the	law:	they	are	not	the	expression	of	the	will	of	the	
sovereign.	The	“theoretical	horizon”	of	such	a	discourse	(its	foundation	in	truth)	
does	 not	 proceed	 from	 the	 timeless	 and	 transcendental	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	







Agamben	 to	 misconstrue	 Foucault’s	 problematization	 of	 the	 historical	
withdrawal	of	sovereign	power	and	the	emergence	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	
in	 such	 a	way	 that	 his	 conclusions	 end	 up	 at	 best	 contradicting	 and	 at	worst	
completely	 covering-up	 the	 originality	 of	 Foucault’s	 characterization	 of	 the	
modern	episteme	at	work	as	early	as	1966	in	The	Order	of	Things.31	The	Classical	
Age	introduces	a	gap	between	words	and	things	as	soon	as	discourse	no	longer	
corresponds	 to	 the	ordering	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	but	 to	 the	 knowledge	of	
men.	 Whereas	 the	 mythical	 language	 of	 cosmological	 foundations	 from	 the	
Middle	 Ages	 or	 the	 language	 of	 similitudes	 from	 the	 Renaissance	 did	 not	
disqualify	the	materiality	of	discourse	as	an	act	which	bears	the	concrete	reality	
of	the	world	in	its	very	expression,	the	kind	of	discourse	starting	with	the	Classical	
Age	 inaugurates	 signification:	 anthropological	 knowledge	 presupposes	 a	
rationality	which	pre-exists	 the	 strict	materiality	 of	 discourse.	 In	The	Order	 of	




                                                
31	Jacques	Derrida	who,	 in	The	Beast	and	 the	Sovereign	 (Derrida:	2009,	305-334),	 attempts	 to	
provide	a	critique	of	Agamben’s	account	of	biopolitical	modernity	during	the	20th	March	2002	





the	 “animality”	 of	 individuals	 amounts	 to	 failing	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 animality	 itself	
belongs	to	the	anthropological	paradigm	of	modern	science.		
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in	which	 the	seen	 and	 the	 read,	 the	visible	and	 the	expressible,	were	
endlessly	 interwoven,	 vanished	 too.	 Things	 and	 words	 were	 to	 be	
separated	from	one	another.	The	eye	was	thenceforth	destined	to	see	
and	only	to	see,	the	ear	to	hear	and	only	to	hear.	Discourse	was	still	to	
have	 the	 task	 of	 speaking	 that	 which	 is,	 but	 it	 was	 no	 longer	 to	 be	
anything	 more	 than	 what	 it	 said.	 This	 involved	 an	 immense	
reorganization	of	culture,	a	reorganization	of	which	the	Classical	age	was	
the	first	and	perhaps	the	most	important	stage,	since	it	was	responsible	
for	 the	new	arrangement	 in	which	we	are	still	caught	–	since	 it	 is	 the	
Classical	age	that	separates	us	from	a	culture	in	which	the	signification	
of	signs	did	not	exist,	because	it	was	reabsorbed	into	the	sovereignty	of	




entirely	the	role	of	 language	and	discourse.	 It	 is	no	 longer	the	expression	of	a	
reality	 which	 manifests	 its	 possibility	 through	 the	 materiality	 of	 its	 very	
expression	 (in	 the	 same	 fashion	 as	 the	 violent	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign	 both	
manifests	itself	and	the	possibility	of	its	order	upon	the	body	of	the	condemned),	
it	becomes	a	discourse	disconnected	 from	 its	materiality	which	 fundamentally	
lacks,	but	at	the	same	time	is	intrinsically	dependent	on,	the	object	it	represents.		
	
If	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 read,	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 “were	 endlessly	









same	 number	 of	 fishes	 in	 the	water	 as	 there	 are	 animals,	 or	 objects	
produced	by	nature	or	man,	on	the	land	[…];	the	same	number	of	beings	
in	the	water	and	on	the	surface	of	the	earth	as	there	are	in	the	sky,	the	
inhabitants	of	 the	 former	corresponding	with	 those	of	 the	 latter;	and	
lastly,	there	are	the	same	number	of	beings	in	the	whole	of	creation	as	
may	 be	 found	 eminently	 contained	 in	 God	 himself,	 “the	 Sower	 of	
Existence,	of	Power,	of	Knowledge	and	of	Love”.	Thus,	by	this	linking	of	



















across	 the	 sky	 by	 sun	 and	moon,	 the	 mouth	 is	 Venus,	 since	 it	 gives	
passage	 to	 kisses	 and	 words	 of	 love;	 the	 nose	 provides	 an	 image	 in	




it	 overcomes	 the	 place	 allotted	 to	 each	 things.	 But	 which	 of	 these	
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reflections	coursing	through	space	are	the	original	images?	Which	is	the	

















the	 echoes	 of	 emulation,	 all	 the	 linkages	 of	 analogy,	 are	 supported,	
maintained,	 and	 doubled	 by	 this	 space	 governed	 by	 sympathy	 and	
antipathy,	which	 are	 ceaselessly	 drawing	 things	 together	 and	 holding	
them	 apart.	 By	 means	 of	 this	 interplay,	 the	 world	 remains	 identical,	
resemblances	 continue	 to	 be	 what	 they	 are,	 and	 to	 resemble	 one	

















form	 which	 remains	 mysterious	 and	 opaque,	 the	 discourse	 of	 God	
signing	his	oeuvre.	A	miraculous	configuration	where	works	and	things	
together	 speak	 the	 beauty	 of	 the	 world;	 a	 harmony	 which	 will	
disappear	in	the	seventeenth	century	[…](Dekens:	2011,	145)	
	
Whilst	 the	 logic	 of	 similitudes	 organising	 the	 epistemic	 configuration	 of	 the	
Renaissance	obey	a	 language	whose	expression	cannot	be	separated	from	the	




of	similitude,	or	once	the	divine	 law	 is	no	 longer	what	can	save	the	terrestrial	










une	 forme	 demeurant	 mystérieuse	 et	 opaque,	 le	 discours	 de	 Dieu	 signant	 son	 oeuvre.	
Configuration	miraculeuse,	 où	 les	mots	 et	 les	 choses	 disent	 ensemble	 la	 beauté	 du	monde	 ;	
harmonie	qui	disparaît,	au	XVIIe	siècle	[…].”	
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object,	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 political	 sovereign	






with	 the	 shift	 from	 sovereign	 power	 to	 bio-power:	 it	 is	 the	 question	 of	 the	
possibility	of	 articulating	 the	 lived	experience	of	 human	beings	 to	 a	discourse	








                                                
33	As	Philippe	Sabot	puts	it	in	Lire	Les	Mots	et	les	Choses	de	Michel	Foucault,	human	sciences	are	
“negative	 sciences”	 [“sciences	 négatives”]	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 negative	 theology	 [“théologie	




difference	 between	words	 and	 things	 –	 the	 vertical	 division	 between	 language	 and	 that	 lying	
beneath	 it	 which	 it	 is	 the	 task	 of	 language	 to	 designate”.	 This	 difference	 and	 heterogeneity	
between	words	and	things,	which	emerges	with	the	modern	episteme,	will	find	the	possibility	of	
a	 new	 synthesis	 in	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 modern	 subject.	 Anthropological	 knowledge	 therefore	
initiates	 a	 transfer	 of	 sovereignty	 from	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 sovereign	 to	 the	 one	of	 the	modern	
subject	become	object	of	knowledge	(Foucault:	2001e,	118).  
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use	 for	 this	 reference	 to	 the	 natural,	 which	 is	 in	 itself	 absolutely	
unnatural	 and	 whose	 genealogy	 must	 be	 established.	 In	 sum,	
“Everything	 in	 our	 knowledge	 which	 is	 suggested	 to	 us	 as	 being	
universally	 valid	 must	 be	 tested	 and	 analysed.” 36 	The	 vitalism	 that	









the	 one	 attempting	 to	 retrieve	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 natural	 and	 the	
biological.	 Critiquing	 the	 vitalism	which	 proceeds	 from	biopolitics	 amounts	 to	
establishing	 a	 difference	 of	 level	 between	 the	 discourse	 of	 knowledge	 and	
                                                


















order	 of	 a	 world	 that	 there	 is	 room	 for	 a	 natural	 rule	 sustaining	 the	 clinical	
knowledge	of	human	sciences	and	 the	 truth	of	biology.	 It	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 this	
mutation	within	the	paradigm	of	jurisdiction	(whereby	the	just	and	true	no	longer	
proceeds	 from	 the	 will	 of	 the	 sovereign	 but	 from	 the	 veracity	 of	 biological	
discourse)	that	life	and	death	acquire	a	new	meaning.	Death	no	longer	intervenes	
in	 the	 political	 sphere	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	 sovereign	 power	 eradicating	 the	
threats	to	its	law	and	reaffirming	its	order;	it	becomes	that	which	threatens	the	
concept	 of	 life	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 biological	 discourse	 emerging	with	 the	 19th	
century.	It	is	a	concept	which	cannot	be	identified	with	the	immediacy	of	the	lived	
experience	but	cannot	be	more	than	the	positivity	derived	from	the	knowledge	
and	regulation	of	 the	existence	of	 individuals.	 It	always	already	constitutes	an	




racism	 appears,	 sustained	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 good	 and	 true	 race	 as	 the	










Because	 Agamben	 defines	 the	 intrinsic	 activity	 of	 sovereign	 power	 as	 the	
production	 of	 a	 biopolitical	 body	 (Agamben:	 1998,	 11),	 he	 fails	 to	 see	 the	
historical	critique	of	the	relationship	between	political	power	and	life	Foucault	
addresses	 in	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 The	 History	 of	 Sexuality.	 As	 a	 consequence,	
Agamben	is	led	to	claim	that	bio-power	is	in	itself	a	transcendental	category	of	
politics.	This	claim	fails	to	grasp	the	fact	that	bio-power	and	biopolitics	do	not	
target	 the	 same	 political	 object	 than	 sovereign	 power	 did.	 Unlike	 Medieval	
sovereign	power,	which	was	concerned	with	the	persistence	of	the	cosmological	
order	 linked	 to	 the	 Kingdom	 and	 the	 return	 of	 the	 same	 eschatological	 time,	
biopolitics	 target	 an	 object	 which	 lacks	 a	 finite	 temporality:	 the	 concept	 of	
population	 implies	 the	evolution	 in	 time	of	a	natural	phenomenon	which	 is	 in	
itself	a	non-finite	process.	However,	 the	concepts	of	nature	and	biological	 life	
which	underpin	the	concept	of	norm	at	the	basis	of	Foucault’s	diagnosis	of	the	
mutation	 of	 sovereign	 power	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 population	 are	 not	
transcendental	categories	which	can	be	used	outside	their	historical	context.38	





In	 this	 respect,	 Foucault’s	 description	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	should	be	 linked	to	the	epistemic	shift	he	describes	 in	The	Order	of	
Things	 (Foucault:	 2001e).	 This	 shift,	which	 implies	 that	modernity	 sees	 a	 new	
relationship	 between	words	 and	 things,	 goes	 hand-in-hand	with	 the	historical	
mutation	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 political	 sovereign	 power.	 Whilst	 the	 sovereign	
expressed	 the	 return	 of	 a	 cosmological	 order	 through	 the	 powerful	 and	
immediate	 expression	 of	 his	 law,	 the	 epistemological	 postulate	 of	
anthropological	 nature	 presupposes	 a	 disjunction	 between	 discourse	 and	 the	
facticity	it	describes.	It	is	within	the	space	of	that	disjunction	that	the	concept	of	
nature	attached	to	the	life	of	the	modern	subject	acquires	a	positive	form	and	it	





puts	 to	 death	–	 which	 was	 also	 the	 ritual	 expression	 of	 a	 hierarchized	 world	
order	–	cannot	function	any	longer.	As	soon	as	political	power	administers	life,	it	
expresses	an	order	derived	from	the	norm.	However,	the	norm	derived	from	the	
                                                
of	 biological	 life	 nor	 for	 a	 presumed	 ‘animal’	 naturalness	 preceding	 political	 action.	 […]	 The	
‘quantity’	 of	 life	 expressed	 by	 the	 ‘measure’	 of	 the	 population	 is	 not	 –	 never	 has	 been	 –	 an	
exclusively	biological	life:	the	‘regularities’	discovered	by	demography	must	be	put	in	relation	with	
a	 set	 of	 economic,	 technical,	 political	 and	 sociological	 human	 practices.”	 [“[…]	 il	 ne	 faut	 pas	
confondre	 la	 ‘nature’	 de	 la	 population	 avec	 une	 ‘naturalité’	 biologique	 de	 la	 vie,	 ni	 avec	 une	
présumée	naturalité	‘animale’	precedent	l’action	politique.	[…]	La	‘quantité’	de	vie	exprimée	par	




natural	 rule	 bears	 the	 marks	 of	 the	 dissolution	 of	 sovereignty:	 it	 neither	






corresponding	 to	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 law	 and	will	 of	 the	 sovereign	 to	 the	 law	
expressed	by	the	natural	rule:	the	concept	of	life	bio-power	and	biopolitics	speak	
about	 is	 an	 objectified	 reality	 which	 produces	 an	 alienation	 of	 the	 concrete	
existence	 it	 targets.	 It	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 such	 an	 alienation	 that	 the	modern	
meaning	of	life	and	death	needs	to	be	understood	and	problematized:	life	and	
death	 cannot	be	merely	understood	as	 the	opposition	between	 sentencing	 to	
death	or	allowing	to	live	(as	did	the	sovereign)	but	as	the	opposition	between	the	
positivity	derived	from	biological	science	and	the	negation	of	this	positivity.	This	













power	 and	 life,	 his	 account	 of	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 insists	 on	 a	modern	
specificity	 of	 political	 power	 over	 life.	 This	modern	 specificity	 relies	 upon	 the	
paradigm	of	the	concentration	camp,	which	reveals	the	relationship	between	the	
sovereign	 law	 (the	quaestio	 iuris)	 and	 the	 concrete	 and	 immanent	 reality	 this	
sovereign	 law	 produces	 (the	 quaestio	 facti).	 A	 careful	 reading	 of	 Agamben’s	
account	 of	 biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 offers	 an	 opportunity	 to	 better	 grasp	 the	
implications	of	Foucault’s	account	of	 the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction	which	occurs	





anthropological	 nature	 (i.e.	 the	 truth	 the	 knowledge	 the	 modern	 subject	
produces	about	himself	as	an	epistemological	concept).39	As	the	last	section	of	






finir	 avec	 la	 figure	 positive	 de	 l’homme	 qui	 fonctionne	 comme	 fondement	 pour	 notre	
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the	 first	 chapter	 demonstrates, 40		the	 ninth	 chapter	 of	 The	 Order	 of	 Things	
(Foucault:	 2001e,	 330-374)	 reveals	 that	 it	 is	 the	 attempt	 to	 derive	 positive	
knowledge	about	the	modern	subject	as	a	 living	being	which	characterizes	the	
epistemic	 structure	 of	modern	 anthropology.	 As	 I	 have	 argued,	 this	 epistemic	
structure	 produces	 an	 impossible	 synthesis	 between	 the	 modern	 subject	 as	
empirical	reality	and	his	representation	as	an	object	of	positive	knowledge.	Since	














truth	 of	 its	 nature.	 Consequently,	 a	 thorough	 examination	 of	 the	 question	 of	
                                                
herméneutique	de	soi,	nous	devons	interroger,	critique	et	refuser	la	politique	de	la	vérité	établie	
dans	notre	société:	un	regime	de	la	vérité	scientifique	qui	vise	à	gouverner	notre	conduit,	car	dans	







This	chapter	claims	 that	 this	historicization,	which	describes	 the	emergence	of	










the	 symbolic	 relationship	 between	 what	 happened	 and	 the	 discourse	 of	
knowledge	 which	 treats	 the	 facts	 as	 epistemological	 objects.	 This	 divorce	
coincides	 with	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 a	 mediation	 between	 truth	 and	
immanence.	
		














relation	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 their	 respective	 accounts	 target.	 Both	 authors	




                                                
41	I	 use	 the	 term	 “immanence”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 immediate	 experience	 of	 individuals,	 to	 their	
existence	understood	as	the	present	moment	in	which	their	actions	take	place.	Foucault	does	not	









from	 the	 strict	 immediacy	 and	 immanence	 of	 truth	 (the	 agonistic	 form	 of	 justice	 in	 Archaic	
Greece)	to	a	temporal	disconnection	between	the	act	(the	wrong	committed)	and	its	recognition	




doer.	 The	 discourse	 of	 truth	 which	 grounds	 this	 discourse	 functions	 as	 a	 transcendental	
recognition	 and	 validation	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 act.	 Therefore,	 I	 have	 chosen	 the	 word	
“immanence”	in	contrast	with	the	concept	of	epistemological	truth	which	functions	as	an	a	priori	





they	 reach	 strictly	 opposite	 conclusions.	 A	 proper	 understanding	 of	 Foucault’s	
historicization	of	political	sovereign	power	and	of	the	mutation	of	the	concept	of	
life	it	implies	shows	that	he,	like	Agamben,	grasps	biopolitical	modernity	as	the	
historical	 emergence	 of	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 jurisdiction.	 However,	 as	 I	 will	
demonstrate,	whilst	Agamben	grounds	the	specificity	of	 this	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	
essence	 of	 sovereign	 power	 itself,	 Foucault’s	 work	 provides	 a	 radical	
historicization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 truth,	 knowledge	 and	 life.	 Whilst,	
according	 to	 Agamben,	 it	 is	 the	 essence	 of	 sovereign	 power	 which	 makes	
immanence	lawful,	Foucault	provides	a	historical	account	of	the	way	in	which	the	
disappearance	of	political	sovereign	power	becomes	the	condition	of	possibility	
of	 the	 emergence	 of	 positive	 facticity	 (i.e.	of	 the	 epistemological	 coincidence	
between	 immanence	 and	 truth).	 Understanding	 that	 Foucault’s	 critique	 of	
biopolitical	power	over	life	finds	its	roots	in	a	historical	critique	of	facticity	(i.e.	in	
the	historicization	of	the	relationship	between	truth	and	immanence)	will	then	
lead	 us	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relevance	 of	 Foucault’s	 post-1976	works	 on	
Greek	 ethics	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 reflection	 upon	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 self	 (i.e.	
understood	as	the	possibility	for	the	self	to	determine	the	rationality	of	its	own	
actions).42	
                                                
42	I	have	chosen	to	call	“sovereignty”	the	self’s	ability	to	determine	its	own	conduct	because	what	








sovereigns	 in	 his	 last	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	Collège	de	 France.	 In	 this	 lecture	 course,	 Foucault	
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According	 to	 Agamben,	 it	 is	 the	 paradigm	 of	 the	 concentration	 camp	 which	
defines	 the	specificity	of	biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 in	 its	modern	 form.	He	claims	
that	 it	 is	 this	 paradigm	which	 allows	 the	 sovereign	 to	 suspend	 the	 distinction	
between	law	and	fact.	He	writes:	
The	 sovereign	 no	 longer	 limits	 himself,	 as	 he	 did	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	
Weimar	 constitution,	 to	 deciding	 on	 the	 exception	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
recognizing	 a	 given	 factual	 situation	 (danger	 to	 public	 safety):	 laying	
bare	the	inner	structure	of	the	ban	that	characterizes	his	power,	he	now	
de	facto	produces	the	situation	as	a	consequence	of	his	decision	on	the	




law	 and	 fact	 in	which	 the	 two	 terms	 have	 become	 indistinguishable.	
(Agamben:	1998,	97)	
	
The	 paradigm	 of	 the	 concentration	 camp	 provides	 the	 example	 of	 a	 situation	
where	the	distinction	entailed	by	the	discrimination	between	the	legal	(quaestio	
iuris)	 and	 the	 alegal	 or	 “bare”	 (quaestio	 facti)	 –	what	 Agamben	 also	 calls	 the	
"norm"	or	nomos	in	opposition	to	"nature"	or	physis	–	is	no	longer	possible.	This	
indistinguishability	emerges,	according	to	him,	as	a	consequence	of	the	sovereign	
intrinsic	 power	 to	 “trace	 […]	 and	 […]	 renew[…]	 the	 threshold	 of	 indistinction	
between	 outside	 and	 inside,	 exclusion	 and	 inclusion,	 nomos	 and	 physis	
(Agamben:	 1998,	 22).	 It	 is	 because	 "the	 state	 of	 exception	 […]	 is	 realised	
normally"	(Agamben:	1998,	97)	or	because	bio-power	corresponds	to	"the	space	
                                                
analyzes	 the	 theme	 of	 “the	 reversal	 of	 the	 sovereign	 life”.	 In	 contrary	 to	 the	 sage	 or	 the	































of	 being	 lived”	 or	 “a	 full	 life”	 and	 is	 not,	 in	 any	 case,	 “an	 inert	 biological	







him	 from	 seeing	 that	 the	 biopolitical	 valuation	 of	 life	 actually	 reveals	 the	
relationship	 between	 knowledge	 and	 life	 which,	 according	 to	 Foucault,	
characterizes	the	modern	episteme.	It	is	indeed	the	way	in	which	the	shift	from	
sovereign	power	to	bio-power	is	described	in	the	last	section	of	the	first	volume	







of	 the	sovereign	but	 the	 truth	 implied	by	 the	norm	(or	 the	natural	 rule)	as	an	
epistemological	 criterion.	 The	 14th	 January	 1976	 lecture	 from	Society	Must	 Be	
Defended	clearly	exposes	the	historical	shift	according	to	which	the	will	of	 the	




of	 truth?	 Or:	 What	 type	 of	 power	 is	 it	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 producing	




constitute	 the	 social	 body,	 they	 are	 indissociable	 from	 a	 discourse	 of	
truth,	 and	 they	 can	neither	 be	 established	nor	 function	unless	 a	 true	
discourse	 is	 produced,	 accumulated,	 put	 into	 circulation,	 and	 set	 to	
work.	[…]	Power	constantly	asks	questions	and	questions	us;	it	constantly	
investigates	 and	 records;	 it	 institutionalizes	 the	 search	 for	 the	 truth,	
professionalizes	it,	and	rewards	it.	We	have	to	produce	the	truth	in	the	





to	 perform	 tasks,	 and	 destined	 to	 live	 and	 die	 in	 certain	 ways	 by	















recall	 the	 interview	given	 to	André	Berten	on	7th	May	1981	before	a	 series	of	
lectures	Foucault	was	invited	to	give	at	the	Faculty	of	Criminology	at	the	Catholic	
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University	 of	 Leuwen	 between	 22nd	 April	 and	 20th	 May	 1981. 43		During	 this	
interview,	Foucault	says:	
There	are	powers	that	lack	foundation	and	that	function	very	well,	and	









–	 to	 determine	 their	 conduct	 voluntarily	 according	 to	 a	 number	 of	
objectives	that	are	his	own.	 In	other	words,	when	one	examines	what	













certain	ways	by	discourses	that	are	true”,	 it	 is	 the	relation	which	power	 is	and	
enforces	 according	 to	 its	 truth	which	 produces	 justice	 and	 compels	 a	 specific	
conduct.	 Instead	 of	 accounting	 for	 modern	 jurisdiction	 as	 the	 immediate	
expression	of	the	will	of	the	sovereign,	Foucault	grounds	it	in	the	presupposition	
                                                
43	This	series	of	lectures,	entitled	Wrong	Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	in	Justice)	
has	 been	 recently	 translated	 in	 English	 (Foucault:	 2014b).	 It	 has	 been	 originally	 published	 in	
French	as	Mal	Faire,	Dire	Vrai:	La	Fonction	de	l’Aveu	en	Justice	(Foucault:	2012b).	
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of	the	truth	of	anthropological	nature.	However,	 this	 truth	 is	not,	according	to	
Foucault,	 a	 metaphysical	 concept.	 It	 is	 the	 strict	 expression	 of	 an	 immanent	





















                                                




the	 esoteric	 knowledge	 of	 the	 sovereign	 that	 realizes	 the	 order	 or	 the	world.	
Foucault	says:	
In	 European	 societies	 of	 the	 Mediterranean	 East,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
second	millennium	and	the	beginning	of	the	first,	political	power	always	
implied	 the	possession	of	 a	 certain	 type	of	 knowledge.	By	 the	 fact	of	
holding	power,	 the	king	and	 those	around	him	held	a	knowledge	 that	
could	not	and	must	not	be	communicated	 to	 the	other	 social	 groups.	
Knowledge	 and	 power	 were	 exactly	 reciprocal,	 correlative,	
superimposed.	 There	 couldn’t	 be	 any	 knowledge	without	 power,	 and	
there	couldn’t	be	any	political	power	without	the	possession	of	a	certain	
special	 knowledge.	 This	 is	 a	 form	 of	 power-knowledge	 that	 Georges	
Dumézil,	 in	 his	 studies	 concerning	 the	 three	 functions,	 has	 isolated,	
showing	 that	 the	 first	 function	 was	 that	 of	 a	 magical	 and	 religious	
political	power.	Knowledge	of	the	gods,	knowledge	of	the	action	that	can	
be	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 us	 by	 the	 gods	 –	 that	 whole	magico-religious	
knowledge	is	present	in	the	political	function.	(Foucault:	2000c,	31)	
	
Foucault	 refers	 to	 a	 form	 of	 political	 power	 existing	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	
philosophical	 thought	which	worked	 according	 to	 an	 intrinsic	 esotericism	 and	






of	 power	 is	 an	 esoteric	 knowledge	 from	a	divine	origin.	 It	 is	 an	 intrinsic	 unity	
between	 power	 and	 the	 knowledge	 of	 truth	 that	 makes	 justice	 possible	 and	
defines	 the	 right	 order	 of	 the	world.	 In	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 Foucault	
locates	the	dismantlement	of	the	unity	between	sovereign	power	and	sovereign	







age	 of	 the	 fifth	 century,	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 our	 civilization,	 was	 the	
dismantling	of	the	great	unity	of	a	political	power	that	was,	at	the	same	
time,	a	knowledge	–	the	dismantling	of	that	unity	of	a	magico-religious	










disappears	 when	 Classical	 Greece	 emerges.	 More	 precisely,	 it	 is	 the	 very	
coincidence	 of	 power	 and	 knowledge	 in	 an	 act	 that	 realizes	 truth	 which	
disappears	 when	 Classical	 Greece	 emerges.	 The	 emergence	 of	 philosophical	
thought	during	the	fifth	century	B.C.	links	discourse	to	a	truth	that	becomes	the	
object	 of	 philosophical	 reflection	 as	 well	 as	 its	 condition	 of	 possibility.	
Consequently,	the	knowledge	of	the	one	in	power	will	no	longer	be	a	means	of	
pursuing	 the	 interests	 of	 a	 political	 tyrant	 but	 instead	 acquires	 an	 objective	
relationship	to	a	truth	preexisting	its	pursuit.		
	
However,	 the	 problematization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	
knowledge	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 a	mutation	 occurring	 at	 the	 turn	 from	Archaic	 to	
Classical	Greece.	In	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants,	the	lecture	course	given	at	the	






















The	 distinction	 as	 well	 as	 the	 correlation	 Foucault	 establishes	 between	 the	
"particular	circumstance"	or	the	"particular	kairos"	and	the	"order	of	things	as	
they	were	 fixed	 in	 the	beyond"	 clearly	 shows	 that	 the	 logic	 of	 political	 power	
corresponded	 to	 a	 knowledge	 made	 power	 and	 therefore	 repeated	 the	
coincidence	between	political	power	and	knowledge	Foucault	described	in	“Truth	
                                                








were	 fixed	 in	 the	beyond”	evokes,	under	a	slightly	different	 form,	 the	magico–
religious	 esoteric	 coincidence	 between	 political	 power	 and	 knowledge	 which	
disappears	with	Classical	Greece.	 It	 is	 “the	 same	 logos”	which	determines	 the	
timeless	order	of	the	world	and	speaks	through	each	of	the	Emperor’s	decision	of	
justice.	 When	 Foucault	 characterizes	 cases	 of	 political	 power	 linked	 to	 the	













(Foucault:	 2013)	 as	 well	 as	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 in	 1973,	 is	 the	
emergence	of	a	 concept	of	knowledge	which	 results	 from	the	use	of	a	 tekhne	
whose	first	occurrence	appears,	according	to	him,	in	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex.46	
                                                
46	In	his	essay	“Knowingness	and	Abandonment:	An	Oedipus	for	Our	Time”,	Jonathan	Lear	stresses	
that	Sophocles	provides	in	Oedipus	Rex	an	implicit	critique	of	knowledge	as	attitude	towards	the	




between	 power,	 truth	 and	 justice	 at	work	 in	 our	modern	 societies	 is	 put	 into	
question	because	their	coincidence	is	no	longer	synthesised	by	a	political	figure	
performing	truth	in	an	act	of	power.	In	Society	Must	Be	Defended,	when	Foucault	
interrogates	 the	 mechanism	 at	 work	 between	 “rules	 of	 right,	 mechanisms	 of	
power	 [and]	 truth-effects”	or	between	“rules	of	power,	and	the	power	of	 true	
discourses”	(Foucault:	2003b,	25),	he	puts	the	discourse	of	knowledge	and	the	
efficacy	of	power	on	 the	same	 level	of	 immanence	and	challenges	 the	 idea	of	























to	Know.	 The	published	 lectures	 contain	 in	 an	 appendix	 the	 transcription	of	 a	
lecture	given	at	the	State	University	of	New	York,	Buffalo	in	March	1972	and	at	
Cornell	University	in	October.	Entitled	Oedipal	Knowledge,	it	presents	Foucault’s	
reading	 of	 Sophocles’	 tragedy	 through	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 status	 and	 role	 of	





save	 the	 city	 of	 Thebes	 that	 he	 was	 enthroned	 and	 thus	 accessed	 political	




                                                
47	Depending	on	the	text	quoted,	the	spelling	of	the	name	of	this	character	varies.	It	is	sometimes	
















the	 bond	 between	 them	 is	 based	 on	 knowledge;	 and	 on	 a	 double	
knowledge	 moreover:	 that	 of	 Oedipus,	 who	 demonstrated	 his	
superiority	by	solving	the	riddle,	and	[that	of]	the	city,	which	was	able	to	
ascertain	 beyond	 doubt	 that	 Oedipus	 knew;	 it	 is	 because	 he	 was	
recognized	“sophos”	and	on	evidence	(basano),	that	he	was	loved	by	the	





is	 this	 power-knowledge	 that	 is	 exposed,	 risked,	 endangered	 by	 the	
plague	of	Thebes:	if	the	king	does	not	know	what	is	to	be	done,	if	he	does	


















































The	 case	 of	Oedipus	 Rex	 interests	 Foucault	 for	 it	 stands	 at	 a	 point	where	 the	
problematization	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge	 appears	
vividly	 in	 the	 Greek	 literature	 of	 the	 time.49	Philippe	 Chevallier,	 in	 his	Michel	



























Foucault	 et	 le	 Christianisme,	 insists	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 Sophocles’	 tragedy	 as	
disqualification	 of	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 political	 ruler	 which	 synthesizes	 political	
power	and	knowledge	according	to	a	truth	which	remains	his	privilege.	But	more	








his	 personal	 achievements.	 […]	 Once	 recognized	 as	 a	 tyrant	 like	 any	
other,	Oedipus	can	indeed	be	compared	to	real	kings	and	legislators	such	
as	Kypselos	or	 Solon,	 although	 the	play	 itself,	 through	 its	 prosecution	
speech	against	the	tyrannical	procedures	of	government	by	knowledge,	
heralds	in	its	own	way	Plato’s	Republic.	The	play	thus	partakes	in	this	vast	








































                                                
51	In	the	original	text,	Oedipus’	decision	to	blind	himself	for	he	cannot	stand	to	face	the	truth	is	
told	by	the	Messenger	in	scene	9	and	follows	the	discovery	of	Jocasta’s	suicide.	The	text	develps	
















Greek	 word	 oida: 52		“Oida	 evokes	 both	 oidano,	 “to	 inflate,	 swell”,	 oidema,	
“swelling”	(Oedipus’	feet),	and	eideo,	eido,	to	see	with	one’s	own	eyes	(Foucault:	
2013,	259).	Oedipus	 is	 the	one	who	seeks	 to	see	 the	 truth	with	his	own	eyes.	
However,	 the	truth	he	will	discover	 is	different	 from	the	one	derived	 from	the	





of	 what	 is	 said	 with	 what	 has	 been	 seen:	 the	 incomplete	 discourse	 of	 the	
characters	speaking	a	part	of	the	truth	in	the	play	(Jocasta,	Tiresias	and	Creon)	
will	meet	the	truth	of	a	visual	witness	(the	peasant)	and	reveal	to	Oedipus	that	
Tiresias,	 the	 blind	 seer	 who	 sees	 the	 full	 truth,	 was	 right.	 Sophocles’	 text	
constitutes,	according	 to	Foucault,	a	 turning	point	 in	 the	 relationship	between	
power	and	knowledge:	Oedipus	acts	as	a	tyrant	because	he	does	not	care	about	
                                                
at	the	ones	that	they	should	not	have	seen,	
and	fail	to	know	those	that	he’d	longed	for.	(Sophocles:	2015,	64-65).	Oedipus	will	not	witness	
the	 consequences	 of	 his	 acts	 but	 he	will	 forever	 reflect	 on	 the	 ones	 he	 has	 committed.	 The	
paradoxical	reference	to	vision	shows	that	Oedipus’	fate	heralded	at	the	beginning	of	the	play	is	













However,	 the	 originality	 of	 Oedipus’	 quest	 is	 that	 it	 corresponds	 to	 a	 specific	
tekhne	which	is	neither	an	attempt	at	solving	a	riddle	(as	it	was	in	the	case	of	the	
Sphinx)	 nor	 a	 hermeneutic	 exercise.	 The	 novelty	 of	 Oedipus’	 tekhne	 is	 that	 it	
precisely	 avoids	 the	 gods’	 justice	 by	 the	 use	 of	 the	 inquiry.	 What	 matters	 is	
therefore	 not	 the	 interpretation	 of	 what	 has	 been	 said	 by	 the	 gods,	 but	 the	
possibility	of	linking	what	is	said	to	be	true	with	what	actually	happened.		
	
The	 use	 of	 this	 technique	modifies	 the	 relationship	 between	men	 and	 tukhe.	
Tukhe	 is	no	 longer	 the	 fate	 conveyed	by	 the	 truth	and	 justice	of	 the	gods	but	
instead	 becomes	 the	 unexpected	 event	 whose	 occurrence	 can	 constitute	 an	
occasion	 to	 change	 the	 course	 of	 things.	 In	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know,	
Foucault	writes:	




it	 lends	 attention	 to	 those	 irregularities,	 detours,	 and	 highs	 and	 lows	
which	constitute	Fortune	[Tukhe].	The	knowledge	(savoir)	of	Oedipus	is	



















What	 Foucault	 is	 interested	 in	 is	 precisely	 the	 emergence	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	
tekhne	that	can	be	used	by	men	in	order	to	counterbalance	the	esoteric	divine	
decrees.	The	process	that	will	lead	Oedipus	to	confirm	the	divine	truth	is	a	search	
for	 truth	 that	 no	 longer	 consists	 in	 the	 sovereign	 coincidence	 between	 truth,	
discourse	and	justice	in	one	and	the	same	act	of	power.	On	the	contrary,	Oedipus	
risks	his	power	and	goes	through	the	play	on	the	basis	of	a	disjunction:	it	is	by	




the	 discourse	 of	 the	 messenger).	 This	 restores	 the	 coincidence	 between	 the	
expressible	 and	 the	 visible	which	 characterized	 the	 divine	 esoteric	 knowledge	












“I	 know”	 (oida),	 Sophocles	 makes	 Oedipus	 the	 one	 who	 knows.	 It	 is	
through	knowledge	and	art	that	he	has	freed	Thebes	from	the	dangerous	






























the	 adjustment	of	 complementary	 fragments	 that	 go	hand-in-hand,	 if	
you	will,	at	each	level,	with	the	totality	of	truth.	You	are	given	the	totality	
of	truth	that	is,	actually,	uttered	by	the	gods	[by	the	oracle	and	Tiresias	
the	 seer].	 This	 totality	 of	 truth	 is,	 if	 not	 completely	 spoken,	 at	 least	


















                                                
55 	“On	 a	 donc	 statistiquement	 un	 jeu	 de	 six	 moitiés.	 […]	 En	 fait,	 il	 s’agit	 d’ajustements	 de	
fragments	complémentaires	qui	se	font	deux	par	deux	avec,	si	vous	voulez,	à	chaque	niveau,	la	
totalité	de	la	vérité.	Vous	avez	la	totalité	de	la	totalité	de	la	vérité	qui,	au	fond,	est	dite	par	les	












play	 shows	 that	 the	 type	 of	 truthful	 and	 just	 discourse	 it	 relies	 on	 is	 always	
fundamentally	lacking	and	dependent	on	a	symbolic	structure:	the	sumbolon	 is	






truth	which	 sees	 and	 speaks	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 Foucault	 shows	 that	 the	 truth	
spoken	by	men	relies	on	a	divorce	between	the	seen	and	the	said	and	it	is	only	






































described.	 It	 is	 this	 symbolic	 structure	 that	 will	 determine	 the	 shape	 of	 the	
knowledge	that	emerges,	according	to	Foucault,	within	Classical	Greek	thought.	
It	is	a	form	of	knowledge	that	dismantles	the	unity	that	characterized	the	power	
of	 the	 sovereign	 –	 the	 strict	 coincidence	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge	 that	













of	 a	 symbol	 whose	 reunited	 totality	 has	 the	 value	 of	 proof	 and	








and	 the	 total	 figure	 is	 reconstituted.	 The	 tessera	 has	 been	 reformed	




know;	 designation	 of	 the	 person	 who	 must	 have	 the	 absent	 and	
complementary	 fragment	 in	his	possession.	This	 is	what	Oedipus	calls	
“making	an	inquiry”.	(Foucault:	2013,	234–235)	
	
We	 learn	 from	 this	 quote	 that	 the	 circularity	 of	 the	 symbolic	 structure	 that	
characterizes	the	new	morphology	of	knowledge	based	upon	the	inquiry	is	both	








the	 type	 of	 philosophical	 discourse	 which	 emerges	 with	 Platonism	 seeks	 a	
relationship	between	knowledge	and	the	remembrance	of	the	form	the	soul	has	








Although	 it	 is	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	and	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	
Forms”	 that	 Foucault	 insists	 on	 this	 mutation	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth,	 the	








his	 share,	 the	 discourse	 which	 in	 prophesying	 the	 future	 not	 only	






to	 its	 reference.	 Between	 Hesiod	 and	 Plato	 a	 certain	 division	 was	
established,	 separating	 true	 discourse	 from	 false	 discourse:	 a	 new	




its	 enunciation	 and	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 parrhesiast.	 Unlike	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 teacher	 or	 of	 the	
technician,	the	truth	of	the	parrhesiast	implies	the	strict	coincidence	between	one’s	actions	and	
the	production	of	 truth	which	correspond	 to	 them.	 It	 is	an	act	made	 truth	 through	which	 the	
individual	defines	an	ethical	conduct	by	himself.	This	form	of	truth-telling	is	linked,	throughout	



















the	 object	 of	 discourse	 –	 its	 absent	 referent.	 Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 the	 play	
deepens	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 mutation	 of	 sovereign	 power	 by	 adding	 to	 the	
question	 of	 the	 coincidence	 between	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 law	 and	 the	








the	world	 in	 order	 and	 thus	marks	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	kosmos.	
However,	this	sung	speech	is	not	merely	the	reminder	of	a	lost	origin	but	plays	an	
active	part	in	realizing	the	order	of	the	world:	
Hesiod	 does	 appear	 to	 provide	 the	 final	 remaining	 example	 of	 sung	
speech	praising	the	figure	of	the	king,	in	a	society	centered	on	the	type	












Sung	 speech,	 delivered	 by	 a	 poet	 with	 the	 gift	 of	 second	 sight,	 was	
















the	 exclusive	 possession	 of	 gods	 and	 the	 Masters	 of	 Truth.	 Between	 the	
symbolicoreligious	 function	 of	 the	 poet	 who,	 by	 praising	 God,	 makes	 his	




cosmogonic	 power	 come	 true	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 sumbolon	 which	 runs	
through	the	story	of	Oedipus	Rex,	the	nature	of	truth	changes.	In	the	case	of	the	




of	 truth	 is	 asked	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 parricide	who	 needs	 to	 be	
identified	through	a	correspondence	between	the	vision	of	Tiresias	and	that	of	














realize	 truth	 in	 one	 and	 the	 same	 act	 becomes	 the	 deployment	 of	 a	 tekhne	
through	 which	 the	 veracity	 of	 a	 fact	 is	 established.	 The	 dismantling	 of	 this	
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coincidence	entails	a	definition	of	truth	as	dissociation	between	the	visible	and	




truth	 is	 associated.	 Truth	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 partial	 truth	 spoken	 by	 different	
characters	 throughout	 the	 play	 but	 a	 true	 fact.	 During	 the	 17th	 March	 1791	
lecture,	Foucault	says:	
And	 this	 system	 of	 constraints	 shown	 by	 the	 Oedipus	 fable	 could	 be	
characterized	very	schematically	in	the	following	way:	on	the	one	hand,	
the	political,	juridical,	and	religious	requirement	to	transform	the	event,	














The	 transformation	of	 the	 lightning	 flash	of	 the	event	 into	observed	
fact,	 and	 access	 to	 truth	 given	 only	 to	 someone	 who	 respects	 the	
nomos,	are	the	two	great	historical	constraints	that,	since	Greece,	have	
been	imposed	on	the	true	discourse	of	Western	societies,	and	it	is	the	
birth,	 the	 formation	 of	 these	 historical	 constraints	 that	 Oedipus	
 129 
















                                                









immanence	of	subjective	acts	not	determined	by	scientific	 judgment.	As	 I	 remark	on	page	47,	
Foucault’s	definition	of	the	will	as	“the	pure	act	of	the	subject”	is	that	which	produces	truth.	This	




cannot	 be	 read	 as	 “the	 permanentizing	 of	 Becoming	 into	 presence”	 (Heidegger:	 1991,	 156).	
Rather,	the	will	understood	as	“pure	act	of	the	subject”	is	that	which	allows	becoming.	As	Foucault	
puts	 it:	 “there	can	be	 truth	only	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	other	world	and	 the	other	 life”	 (Foucault:	
2011b,	356).			
61	This	 opposition	 between	 the	 production	 of	 an	 autonomous	 truth	which	 coincides	with	 the	






paradigm	 of	 sovereign	 justice,	 the	 right	 order	 of	 things	 is	 either	 enforced	 or	
restored:	 it	 is	 the	 function	 fulfilled	 by	 the	 ritual	 as	 it	 expresses	 the	 proper	
sovereign	 order	 that	 has	 been	 threatened.	 But	 once	 justice	 gets	 linked	 to	 the	
retrieval	of	facts,	the	synthesis	between	truth	and	power	is	no	longer	performed	
autonomously	 by	 the	 sovereign	 but	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 fact	 that	
confirms	 that	 what	 is	 said	 corresponds	 to	 something	 that	 has	 happened.	 In	
Oedipus	Rex,	the	visual	witness	is	the	one	entitled	to	confirm	the	truthfulness	of	
the	truth	by	doubling	the	actuality	of	his	discourse	to	the	non-actuality	of	a	past	




has	 changed.	 Truth	 no	 longer	 consists	 in	 the	 private	 knowledge	 of	 one	 (i.e.	
Oedipus	being	able	to	solve	the	riddle	on	his	own)	which	suffices	to	legitimate	the	
truth,	 it	 is	 the	 truth-value	of	 the	 fact	which	 is	 spoken	about	 (the	possibility	of	




intrinsic	 correspondence	 between	 the	 expressible	 and	 the	 visible	 or	 between	




















implied	 an	 essential	 coincidence	 between	 the	 manifestation	 of	 truth	 and	 its	
actualization	as	act	of	power.	This	disappearance,	which,	according	to	Foucault,	
happens	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Archaic	 Greece,	 is	 of	 crucial	 importance	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 the	 specificity	 of	 biopolitical	 jurisdiction	 because	 it	 recurs	 when	
Foucault	studies	the	emergence	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	in	the	nineteenth	
century.	 This	 time,	 it	 is	 the	 model	 of	 Medieval	 political	 sovereignty	 which	
disappears	after	the	Classical	Age	to	give	rise	to	the	anthropological	knowledge	







subjective	 truth	 and	 subjective	 acts	 is	 always	 already	 preceded	 by	 an	
anthropological	 rationality	which	presupposes	a	 transcendental	 truth	divorced	




immanent	 and	 powerful	 act.	 This	 will	 provide	 the	 conceptual	 framework	
necessary	 to	 understand	 how,	 within	 biopolitical	 modernity,	 the	 postulate	 of	
anthropological	 truth	 also	 conceals	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 anthropological	
nature	 is	 not	 a	 transcendence	 given	prior	 to	 experience.	 It	 is	 based	upon	 the	







The	 juridical	 and	 epistemological	 mutation	 Foucault	 identifies	 in	 his	 study	 of	
Sophocles’	Oedipus	 Rex	 reappears	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 and	 takes	 a	







the	 sovereign	 responsible	 for	 the	 right	 and	 just	 order	 of	 things.	 The	
epistemological	 counterpart	 of	 the	 adequacy	 between	 discourse	 and	 justice,	
instead	of	being	derived	from	the	esoteric	divine	truth,	will	be	derived	from	the	
concept	 of	 nature	whose	 laws	 are	 accessible	 to	 human	 knowledge.	 It	 is	Jean-
Pierre	Vernant,	who	provides	a	clear	account	of	the	process	of	rationalization	of	
the	poetic	myths	by	the	discourse	of	the	philosophers	and	by	the	knowledge	of	
the	 Phusikoi.	 In	 Mythe	 et	 Pensée	 chez	 les	 Grecs,	 Vernant	 insists	 upon	 the	
emergence	of	philosophy	and	the	natural	sciences	in	Classical	Greece	as	a	way	of	
producing	 a	 rational	 knowledge	 which,	 through	 the	 positivity	 of	 discourse,	
replaces	what	the	power	of	the	sovereign	previously	realized:	
In	philosophy,	 [Cornford	writes]	myth	 is	 "rationalized".	But	what	does	
that	mean?	Firstly,	that	it	has	taken	the	form	of	a	problem	formulated	




rituals	 only	 subsist	 as	 vestiges	 whose	 meaning	 has	 been	 lost;	 the	
memory	 of	 the	 king	 as	 creator	 of	 order	 and	maker	 of	 time	 has	 been	
erased.	 […]	 It	 is	 these	 questions	 (genesis	 of	 the	 cosmic	 order	 and	
explanation	 of	 the	meteôra)	 which	 constitute,	 in	 their	 new	 form	 as	
problems,	 the	 matter	 of	 the	 first	 philosophical	 reflection.	 The	
philosopher	 thus	 replaced	 the	 old	 king–magician,	master	 of	 time:	 he	
theorizes	what	the	king	used	to	effectuate.	62	(Vernant:	2006,	379)		
	
                                                






et	 faiseur	du	temps	 […].	Ce	sont	ces	questions	 (genèse	de	 l’ordre	cosmique	et	explication	des	
meteôra)	 qui	 constituent,	 dans	 leur	 forme	 nouvelle	 de	 problème,	 la	 matière	 de	 la	 première	




at	producing	 the	positivity	of	what,	 in	 the	words	of	 the	Masters	of	Truth,	was	
fundamentally	 a	 performance.	 The	 discourse	 which	 replaces	 the	 sovereign	
synthesis	of	power	and	truth	establishes	a	 fundamental	distance	which	affects	
the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 logos	 operates:	 it	 no	 longer	 effectuates	 a	 truth	 which	
disappears	after	its	expression	and	gets	actualized	again	through	the	logic	of	the	
ritual	but	makes	truth	the	condition	of	possibility	of	its	own	expression:	it	is	no	
longer	 the	 sovereign	 who	 produces	 truth	 through	 his	 logos	 but	 truth	 which	
expresses	 its	 sovereignty	 by	 always	 already	 determining	 a	 rationality	 which	
survives	 its	expression.	 In	“Truth	and	 Juridical	Forms”,	Foucault,	who	had	read	
Vernant,	provides	the	same	kind	of	analysis:	the	replacement	of	truth	effectuated	
in	an	act	of	power	by	knowledge	produces	a	disjunction	of	the	expressible	and	
the	 visible.	 This	 disjunction	 works	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 past	 (memory	 and	
recollection),	or	to	the	future	(inquiry).	Foucault	writes:	
[…]	there	was	the	development	of	a	new	type	of	knowledge	–	knowledge	
gained	 through	 witnessing,	 through	 recollection,	 through	 inquiry.	 A	
knowledge	by	inquiry	which	historians	such	as	Herodotus,	a	short	time	




specific	 form	 of	 judicial,	 juridical	 discovery	 of	 truth.	 The	 latter	
constituted	the	mold,	the	model	on	the	basis	of	which	a	series	of	other	



















This	 is	 the	 reason	why	Vernant,	 in	Oedipe	et	 ses	mythes,	writes	 that	“Oedipus	
leads	both	a	judicial	and	scientific	inquiry,	as	underlined	by	the	repeated	use	of	
the	 verb	 zetein.”63		(Vernant	 &	 Vidal-Naquet:	 2006,	 34).	64		The	 practice	 of	 the	
inquiry	which	retrieves	truth	from	its	absence	through	the	use	of	knowledge	is	a	





the	 Self	 and	 Others	 II:	 The	 Courage	 of	 Truth.	 During	 the	 15th	 February	 1984	












is	 wiser	 than	 Socrates?	 And	 you	 know	 that	 the	 god’s	 answer	 to	 this	
question,	put	not	by	Socrates	but	by	one	of	his	friends,	was:	No	one	is	











translates	 zetein	 by	 the	 verb	 “check”:	 “I	 set	 myself	 at	 last	 with	 considerable	
reluctance	to	check	the	truth	of	 it	 in	the	following	way”	(Foucault:	2011b,	94).	
What	this	tells	us	is	that	the	discovery	of	knowledge	through	inquiry	that	Foucault	
describes	 is	 not	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	oracle’s	words	 but	 their	 verification.	
During	the	same	lecture,	Foucault	indeed	adds	that	Socrates	does	not	attempt	to	




















availability	 of	 a	 natural	 rationality	 produces	 an	 alienation	 of	 the	 ability	 to	
determine	the	truth	which	one	speaks:	since	truth	preexists	the	act	of	speech,	it	





Know,	 Foucault	 links	 the	nomoi	 (the	 laws	written	by	men	 in	opposition	 to	 the	
esoteric	 divine	 truth)	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 justice:	 the	 practice	 of	 knowledge	
through	inquiry	aims	at	the	retrieval	of	the	right	and	just	laws	decipherable	in	the	
order	 of	 nature.	 Not	 only	 are	 the	 laws	 which	 govern	 nature	 made	 positive	
knowledge,	they	must	also	correspond	to	the	just	expression	of	truth.	It	is	in	the	
space	of	the	disjunction	between	sovereign	power	and	sovereign	knowledge	that	












longer	 ordered	 so	much	 by	 reference	 to	 an	 asserted	 and	 risky	 truth;	




sentence,	 but	 he	 gives	 advice.	 Advice	 to	 kings	 of	 justice,	 advice	 to	 a	




political	 demand	 are	 not	 yet	 distinguished	 from	 each	 other.	 It	 is	 a	





Following	 Hesiod,	 but	 also	 his	 successors,	 it	 is	 the	 truth	 of	 days	 and	
dates;	of	favourable	times;	of	the	movements	and	conjuctions	of	stars;	
of	 climates,	 winds,	 and	 seasons:	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 a	 whole	 body	 of	
cosmological	knowledge.	It	 is	also	the	truth	of	the	genesis	of	the	gods	
and	 the	world,	 of	 their	 order	 of	 succession	 and	 precedence,	 of	 their	





of	 the	 cosmological	 order,	 Foucault	 chooses	 to	 link	 it	 to	 the	 question	 of	
knowledge:	 he	 is	 concerned,	 in	 The	 Lectures	 on	 the	 Will	 to	 Know,	 with	 the	
historical	 shift	 from	the	paradigm	of	 sovereign	 truth	and	 justice	 to	 that	of	 the	
knowledge	 of	 nature	 sustained	 by	 an	 already	 existing	 truth.	 According	 to	
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Foucault,	the	mutation	which	occurs	with	the	emergence	of	Classical	Greece	and	
philosophical	 discourse	 is,	 beyond	 the	 disjunction	 of	 sovereign	 power	 and	
sovereign	 knowledge	 he	 explicitly	 refers	 to	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 a	
concern	for	the	ways	in	which	men	have	strived	to	make	the	esoteric	and	fateful	
divine	 logos	 the	words	of	an	 intelligible	description	of	nature.	 In	this	respect,	 I	
agree	with	Arianna	Sforzini	who	defines	the	mutation	of	truth	as	a	“wrenching	of	
the	 power	 of	 truth-telling	 from	 the	 divine	 in	 order	 to	 construct	 and	 found	





It	 is	 Détienne	 who,	 in	 The	 Masters	 of	 Truth	 in	 Archaic	 Greece,	 takes	 care	 to	







"truth”	 is	 explicitly	 defined	 as	 a	 "nonforgetfulness"	 of	 the	 poet's	
precepts.	But	no	fundamental	difference	exists	between	these	two	cases	
of	 Aletheia.	 They	 are	 simply	 Aletheia	 considered	 from	 two	 different	
perspectives	 –	 in	 one	 case	 in	 its	 relation	 to	 the	 poet,	 in	 the	 other	 in	










It	 is	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 “two	 cases	 of	 Aletheia	 […]	 considered	 from	 two	
perspectives”	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 truth	 and	 knowledge	 which	 is	
introduced	in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know	can	be	understood.	Whereas	the	



















that	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 positive	 justice	 of	men	 (the	nomos)	 represents	 an	







just	 order	 of	 truth	 and	 nature.	 By	 “positive	 law”	 I	 mean	 the	 expression	 of	 a	
knowable	and	transmissible	law	which,	at	the	same	time	as	it	gains	accessibility	
and	 correspondence	 to	 the	 truth	 of	 phusis,	 loses	 its	 strict	 connection	 to	 the	
materiality	 of	 its	 act	 of	 expression.	 In	 the	 second	 part	 of	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	
Forms”,	it	is	the	same	kind	of	correspondence	Foucault	identifies	when	he	reads	
Oedipus	Rex:		
So	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	 entire	Oedipus	 play	 is	 a	 way	 of	 shifting	 the	
enunciation	 of	 the	 truth	 from	 a	 prophetic	 and	 prescriptive	 type	 of	
discourse	 to	 a	 retrospective	 one	 that	 is	 no	 longer	 characterized	 by	




say	 the	 same	 thing,	 they	 see	 the	 same	 thing,	 but	 not	with	 the	 same	
language	or	with	 the	same	eyes.	All	 through	 the	 tragedy,	we	see	 that	
same	 truth	 presented	 and	 formulated	 in	 two	 different	 ways,	 with	
different	words	in	a	different	discourse,	with	another	gaze.	[…]	Here	we	
have	 one	 of	 the	 basic	 features	 of	 the	 Oedipus	 tragedy:	 the	
communication	 between	 the	 shepherds	 and	 the	 gods,	 between	 the	
recollection	 of	 men	 and	 the	 divine	 prophecies.	 The	 correspondence	






based	 on	 evidence	 underlines	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 historical	 configuration	
between	power	and	knowledge.	Knowledge	is	no	longer	linked	to	the	sovereign	
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performance	 of	 an	 act	 of	 justice	 which	 puts	 the	 world	 in	 order	 (as	 Détienne	




shifts	 from	 an	 immediate	manifestation	 to	 a	 discourse	 conveying	 a	 truth	 that	
remains	after	its	expression	and	which	can	be	appropriated	through	the	use	of	
knowledge.	 The	 “symbolic	 world”	 is	 described	 by	 Foucault	 as	 the	 “empirical	
margin”	around	the	prophecy	of	gods	since	it	reaches	the	same	truth	not	through	




and	 to	 the	 endless	 possibility	 of	 retrospection.	 This	 shift	 defines	 a	 new	
relationship	between	knowledge	and	power	 that	 is,	according	 to	Foucault,	 the	
“complex”	epitomized	by	Oedipus	Rex	which	 illustrates	 the	morphology	of	our	
Western	mode	of	 thinking:	 it	 is	a	mode	of	 thinking	which	always	already	 links	




a	 sense	 the	 founding	 instance	 of	 a	 definite	 type	 of	 relation	 between	
power	and	knowledge	[savoir],	between	political	power	and	knowledge	





operates	 not	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 but	 at	 the	 collective	 level;	 not	 in	
connection	 with	 desire	 and	 the	 unconscious	 but	 in	 connection	 with	














of	the	inquiry	 is	also	a	 juridical	one:	 it	 is	now	the	truth	of	nature	that	will	also	
dictate	the	right	order	of	justice	no	longer	through	an	act	of	sovereign	power	but	
through	the	knowledge	of	truth	decipherable	by	men	in	nature.	In	the	Lectures	






application	 to	 become	 the	 correlative	 of	 the	 just,	 of	 the	 dikaion	 as	
natural,	divine,	and	human	order.	The	knowledge	that	was	the	secret	of	
effective	power	will	become	the	order	of	the	manifest,	measured	world,	
effectuated	 daily	 and	 for	 all	men	 in	 its	 truth.	 And	 the	 truth	 that	was	
memory	 of	 ancestral	 rule,	 challenge,	 and	 accepted	 risk,	 will	 take	 the	
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form	 of	 knowledge	 revealing	 and	 conforming	 to	 the	 order	 of	 things.	
There	were	two	correlative	transformations	therefore:	one	revealing	the	






that	 which	 is	 fitted	 to	 the	 order	 of	 the	 world	 and	 things,	 and	which	







investigation,	 also	 restores	 the	 just	 order	 of	 things	 and	 discloses	 himself	 as	


















What	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 Oedipus,	 as	 illegitimate	 sovereign,	





opposed	 by	 the	 emergence	 of	 philosophy	 and	more	 precisely	 Plato’s	Republic	















and	 Foucault’s	 point	 seem	 similar,	 but	 Foucault	 clearly	 rejects	 the	 idea	 that	 Being’s	
unconcealment	should	be	preserved	or	that	Being	offers	itself	merely	through	Lichtung.	On	the	
contrary,	 Foucault	 refuses	 to	 fall	 back	 upon	 the	 primacy	 of	 Being.	 For	 Foucault,	 there	 is	 no	
authenticity	of	truth	as	such,	it	is	always	the	effectuation	of	a	will	and	a	strict	act	of	power.	As	he	




2013,	 215).	 Foucault’s	 point,	 either	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	 or	 in	 the	History	 of	
Sexuality:	The	Will	to	Knowledge	is	to	make	will	and	truth	coincide.	Consequently,	there	is	neither	
pure	will	 nor	 pure	 truth.	Quite	 the	 contrary,	 in	 his	 conversation	with	 Farès	 Sassine,	 Foucault	
defines	the	will	as	“the	pure	act	of	the	subject”	[“l’acte	pur	du	sujet”]	(see	reference	p.170):	the	
act	which	 receives	no	other	determination	 than	 its	own	actuality.	 Foucault’s	point	 is	 in	direct	








takes	 care	 to	 further	 distinguish	 the	 two	 distinct	 relationships	 to	 truth	 and	








without	 any	mention	 of	 the	 verb	 εύρίσκειν.67	(Chevallier:	 2011,	166–
167)	
	
In	 contrary	 to	 gnome	 which	 designates	 opinion,	 Chevallier	 rightly	 stresses	
Foucault’s	specification	of	Oedipus’	tekhne	once	the	latter	endeavours	to	discover	
the	truth	by	himself:	it	is	not	a	truth	proceeding	from	common	belief	nor	from	









verbe	 εύρίσκειν	 ,	 qui	 signifie	 ‘trouver,	 découvrir’.	 Le	 commentaire	 pose	 alors	 une	 deuxième	
distinction,	 à	 l’intérieur	 cette	 fois	 des	 propres	 manières	 de	 faire	 d’Oedipe.	 Il	 appuie	 cette	










an	 analysis	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 Oedipus	 Rex	 in	 Du	
Gouvernement	des	Vivants.	Already	 in	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	 to	Know	and	 in	
“Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”,	 Foucault	 insisted	 upon	 the	 convergence	 and	 the	
juridical	and	epistemological	mutation	 that	marked	the	emergence	of	Classical	
Greek	thought.	 It	 is	on	this	very	basis	that	the	concept	of	nature	as	the	law	of	
gods	 accessible	 to	men	 is	 characterized	 in	 the	 1970–1971	 text.	During	 the	 3rd	
March	1971	 lecture,	Foucault	tells	us	that	“[nomos]	speaks	as	 if	by	 itself,	 in	 its	
own	name”,	is	“present	in	the	midst	of	everyone	without	having	to	formulate	it”	
but	 is	at	the	same	time	“activated	 in	 logos	 […]	and	 legible	 in	nature”.	Foucault	
writes:	
Inscribed	 in	 stone,	 present	 in	 the	midst	 of	 everyone	 without	 anyone	
having	 to	 formulate	 it,	 nomos	 is	 no	 longer	 uttered	 by	 anyone	 in	
particular,	it	speaks	as	if	by	itself,	in	its	own	name,	the	only	name	it	has,	











What	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 a	 new	 configuration	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 sovereign	
power	 which	 emerges	 with	 Classical	 Greek	 thought	 and	 the	 nomos	 (the	 law	
written	 by	 men)	 opposed	 to	 thesmos	 (the	 law	 of	 gods	 and	 kings	 expressed	
through	 rituals).	 The	 law	of	men	 (nomos)	 corresponds	 to	 the	 law	of	nature,	 it	
always	already	exists	but	 is	at	the	same	time	only	activated	when	spoken.	The	













The	 fact	 that	 the	 production	 of	 truth	 is	 linked	 to	 juridical	 forms	 brings	 back	
epistemological	truth	and	the	postulate	of	its	transcendental	status,	to	a	strictly	
immanent	act	of	power.	For	Foucault,	“the	history	of	 the	birth	of	 the	 inquiry”	
constitutes	the	emergence	of	a	specific	way	of	defining	and	experiencing	truth	as	







In	 the	 same	 way,	 when	 Foucault	 contrasts	 the	 truth	 emerging	 from	 the	
knowledge	gathered	through	inquiry	with	the	way	judicial	conflicts	were	settled	
within	the	paradigm	of	old	Germanic	law,70	he	insists	on	the	fact	that	disputes	
were	 settled	 through	 a	 test	 or	 an	 ordeal	 (very	much	 as	 they	were	 in	 Archaic	
Greece)	which	proves	truth	without	severing	it	from	its	performance:	
The	 old	 law	 that	 settled	 disputes	 between	 individuals	 in	 Germanic	






































the	 penal	 procedure	 was	 merely	 the	 ritualization	 of	 that	 conflict	
between	 individuals.	 Germanic	 law	 did	 not	 assume	 an	 opposition	
between	war	and	justice,	or	an	identity	between	justice	and	peace;	on	
the	 contrary,	 it	 assumed	 that	 law	 was	 a	 special,	 regulated	 way	 of	
conducting	war	between	individuals	and	controlling	acts	of	revenge.	Law	
was	thus	a	regulated	way	of	making	war.	For	example,	when	someone	
was	 killed,	 one	 of	 his	 close	 relatives	 could	 make	 use	 of	 the	 judicial	
practice	of	revenge,	which	meant	not	renouncing	the	possibility	of	killing	








The	 settlement	 of	 conflicts	 under	 the	Germanic	 law	 recalls	 the	 ritualized	 and	
codified	struggle	between	the	King	and	the	suppliced	Foucault	describes	in	the	
first	chapter	of	Discipline	and	Punish.	In	both	cases,	the	establishment	of	justice	
and	 truth	has	nothing	 to	do	with	 the	 search	 for	 knowledge.	 Truth	and	 justice	






































says	 to	 the	 judge,	 or	 to	 the	 jury	 who	 must	 award	 the	 prize,	 that	
Antilochus	 committed	a	 foul.	 […]	Curiously,	 in	 this	 text	by	Homer	 the	
parties	 involved	 do	 not	 call	 upon	 the	 person	 who	 saw,	 the	 famous	
witness	who	was	near	the	turning	post	and	who	should	attest	to	what	

















that	 truth	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 Archaic	 Greece,	 but	 truth	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	
established	through	the	positivity	of	knowledge.	Antilochus	knows	it	(hence	his	
refusal	to	take	up	the	challenge),	Zeus	knows	it	and	the	judicial	procedure	takes	





a	 challenge	 hurled	 by	 one	 adversary	 at	 another.	 If	 by	 chance	 he	 had	
accepted	the	risk,	 if	he	had	actually	sworn,	the	responsibility	for	what	
would	 happen,	 the	 final	 uncovering	 of	 the	 truth	 would	 immediately	
devolve	upon	the	gods.	And	it	would	be	Zeus	who,	by	punishing	the	one	
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Justice	where	Foucault	 takes	again	 the	example	of	 the	confrontation	between	
Antilochus	and	Menelaus,	we	see	that	he	completes	his	reading	of	it	by	analyzing	
the	 liturgical	 character	of	 the	 race.	 This	 race	 is	 not	 like	 any	other	 race	where	
opponents	with	diverse	but	unknown	abilities	are	confront	one	another	in	order	
to	 let	a	winner	emerge.	On	the	contrary,	 this	 race	appears	as	 the	display	of	a	





accordance	with	 the	 correct	 rules,	 to	 check	 that	 no	 one	 cheats	 and	 that	 the	
correct	order	of	things,	according	to	which	the	stronger	is	the	stronger	and	the	






















The	element	which	 Foucault	 adds	 in	 the	 Leuwen	 lecture,	 and	which	does	not	
clearly	appear	in	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”	in	1973,	is	the	concept	of	alethurgy	
he	 coins	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 a	 relation	 between	 the	 idea	 of	 truth	 as	alêthes	
coming	to	the	fore	through	a	liturgy,	hence	a	celebrative	and	ritual	practice.	In	




his	 initial	 uses	of	 it	 in	 the	1970s:	 this	 episode	 from	Homer	 is	 not	 so	much	an	
unpredictable	truth	that	emerges	through	the	struggle	of	the	agôn	but	an	already	
settled	picture	where	this	truth	gets	displayed.	In	this	case,	the	truth	is	known	





the	 judicial	 practice	 to	 which	 the	 ritualized	 setting	 of	 the	 race	 corresponds.	
Foucault	says:		
It	 is	 clear	 then	 that	we	 are	 dealing	with	 a	 scene	 that	 is	 typically	 and	
precisely	judicial	and,	at	the	same	time,	that	has	entirely	the	texture	of	
a	conflict,	an	agôn.	And	I	will	quote	for	you,	in	this	respect,	a	passage	by	
Gernet	 on	 this	 altercation	between	Menelaus	 and	Antilochus,	 from	a	
very	 interesting	and	 important	work,	Droit	et	Société	en	Grèce,	which	
explains:	“The	law	that	begins	to	appear	in	the	scene	between	Menelaus	
and	Antilochus,	 the	 law	 that	 beings	 to	 appear	 in	 this	 scene	 does	 not	
appear	 to	 be	 a	 specialized	 or	 professional	 technique.	 The	 law	 itself	
emanates	from	the	life	of	the	games.	There	is	a	continuity	between	the	
agonistic	customs	and	the	judicial	customs.	The	question	of	competence	
is	 settled	 by	 itself;	 the	 agôn,	 the	 combat,	 the	 milieu	 that	 is	 pre-
established	for	reaching	a	decision	through	competition,	is	also	a	milieu	
favorable	to	reaching	a	decision	by	means	of	a	sentence.”	The	first	point	









(which	 Foucault	 calls	alethurgy),	 that	 truth	 is	made	 apparent.	 Truth	 does	 not	
correspond	to	the	positivity	of	a	knowledge	that	needs	to	be	gathered	through	
investigation	 in	order	 to	allow	 the	manifestation	of	 truth	but	 rather	 the	 strict	
manifestation	of	the	truth	that	the	histor	is	supposed	to	guarantee.		
	
When	 Foucault	 uses	 Gernet	 to	 specify	 that	 the	 judicial	 practice	 is	 not	 a	















University	 of	 Rio,	 Foucault	 does	 not	 first	 distinguish	 the	 γνώμε	–	 the	
knowledge	 that	allowed	Oedipus	 to	 solve	 the	 riddle	of	 the	Sphinx’s	–	
from	the	act	of	finding	out	εύρίσκειν	–	which	leads	Oedipus	to	the	slave	












                                                
73 	“La	 seule	 nouveauté	 introduite	 par	 le	 cours	 de	 1980	 par	 rapport	 aux	 conférences	 de	 Rio	
concerne	justement	ce	qui	appartient	en	propre	à	Oedipe	et	n’apparaît	nulle	part	ailleurs	dans	le	
texte	de	Sophocle.	La	question	posée	est	pourtant	la	même	qu’en	1973:	“qu’est-ce	que	c’est	que	
ce	 savoir	 oedipien?”.	 Mais	 la	 réponse	 brésilienne	 était	 sur	 ce	 point	 hâtive,	 tout	 du	 moins	
incomplète:	 à	 l’université	 de	 Rio,	 Foucault	 ne	 distingue	 pas	 tout	 d’abord	 la	 γνώμε	 -	 la	
connaissance	 qui	 a	 permis	 à	 Oedipe	 de	 résoudre	 l’énigme	 du	 Sphynx	 -	 de	 l’acte	 de	 trouver	
εύρίσκειν	-	qui	mène	Oedipe	à	l’esclave	ayant	assisté	au	meurtre,	à	travers	une	certaine	τεκνε.	
Au	sujet	du	verbe	εύρίσκειν,	Foucault	se	contente	de	préciser	qu’il	s’agit	d’une	activité	qui	se	fait	







1973	 to	 Du	 Gouvernement	 des	 Vivants	 in	 1980,	 Foucault	 nuances	 and	
complexifies	 the	 “ultra-aggressive	 positivist	 reading	 [l’interprétation	 ultra	
agressivement	positiviste]”	of	Sophocles’	Oedipus	Rex	he	has	provided.	He	now	
links	the	term	alethurgy	to	the	notion	of	“veridiction	[véridiction]”	and	writes:	
Last	 time,	 I	 tried	 to	 show	 you	 how	 […]	 one	 could	 see	 develop	 in	
Sophocles’	play,	in	a	very	coherent	and	systematic	manner,	two	modes	
of	 truth,	 two	modes	 of	 veridiction,	 two	 ways	 of	 truth-telling,	 what	 I	
would	 call	 two	 kinds	 of	 alethurgy	 which	 answer	 one	 another,	 finally	
adjust	to	one	another	and	fall	back	upon	Oedipus.	These	are	two	forms	
of	alethurgy	which,	both	–	precisely	because	they	fit	together,	adjust	to	




time,	 which	 speak	 from	 afar	 the	 eternal	 decrees;	 it	 is	 oracular	 and	





of	 [what	 the	 subject]	 has	 himself	 seen	 with	 his	 own	 eyes.	 Religious	








                                                
74	“La	 dernière	 fois,	 j’avais	 essayé	 de	 vous	montrer	 comment	 […]	 on	 voyait	 dans	 la	 pièce	 de	
Sophocle	se	développer,	d’une	façon	très	cohérente	et	systématique,	deux	modes	de	vérité,	deux	
modes	de	véridiction,	deux	façons	de	dire	vrai,	ce	que	j’appellerai	deux	types	d’alèthurgie	qui	se	





The	 specification	 Foucault’s	 reading	 from	 1980	 adds	 allows	 us	 to	 understand	
more	precisely	the	recurrence	of	the	notions	of	alethurgy,	veridiction	and	truth-
telling	 in	Wrong-Doing,	Truth-Telling:	The	Function	of	Avowal	 in	 Justice.	Those	
three	notions	are	terms	Foucault	coins	following	the	same	principle:	it	is	enough	
to	decompose	those	three	terms	to	reveal	the	idea	Foucault	is	trying	to	convey.	
Alethurgy	 mixes	 aletheia	 with	 liturgy	 to	 express	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 ritualized	
manifestation	of	truth,	veridiction	(a	term	Foucault	coins	from	the	French	prefix	
“véri”	 found	 in	 “véridique”	 (true,	 truthful)	 and	 “diction”	 (diction,	 elocution)	
means	the	fact	of	telling	what	 is	true	or	putting	truth	 into	words.	 In	the	exact	
same	way,	 “truth-telling”	 refers	 to	 the	 act	 that	 consists	 in	 telling	 the	 truth	or	
manifesting	it	through	discourse.	In	short,	Foucault	reveals	that	whether	the	way	
in	which	truth	appears	in	the	play	comes	from	the	esoteric	divine	truth	or	from	










qui	obéit	à	 la	 forme,	à	 la	 loi,	et	aux	contraintes	de	 la	mémoire,	et	c’est	un	dire-vrai	qui	ne	se	
prononce	que	sur	ce	[que	le	sujet]	a	vu	lui	même	de	ses	yeux.	Alèthurgie	religieuse,	donc	d’un	
côté,	et	interprétative,	qui	s’autorise	de	la	force	d’un	nom:	“C’est	parce	que	que	suis	le	serviteur	










is	 the	very	 fact	 that	Antilochus	attempts	 to	disrupt	 the	order	of	 the	 ritualized	
truth	which	displaces	the	agôn,	moving	it	onto	the	scene	of	a	judicial	practice.	
This	scene	does	not	merely	rely	on	a	single	agôn	but	on	two	different	struggles.	
The	 race	corresponds	 to	 the	 first	agôn	which	 is	a	codified	and	predetermined	








as	 a	 judicial	 procedure,	 inasmuch	 as,	 from	 that	 moment	 on,	 from	 the	
moment	 the	oath	 is	demanded,	 there	are	only	 two	possible	outcomes.	
Either	Antilochus	takes	the	oath,	and	in	that	case	Menelaus	is	forced	to	
concede.	But	this	would	mean	that	the	conflict	between	Antilochus	and	
Menelaus	would	be	 transferred	 from	the	human	to	 the	divine	 realm.	 It	
would	be	in	some	way	Zeus	that	Antilochus	would	be	forced	to	confront	




























settlement	 of	 the	 case	 remains	 an	 agôn	 through	 and	 through.	 In	 the	 same	






appears	 in	Homer’s	 text	 remains	 connected	 to	 the	manifestation	of	 truth	and	
justice	 as	 an	 act.	 Foucault	 shows	 that	 Antilochus’	 refusal	 to	 confront	 Zeus	
constitutes	 a	 form	 of	 avowal	 since	 Antilochus’	 choice	 means	 that	 he	
acknowledges	 he	 has	 breached	 the	 ritualized	 manifestation	 of	 truth	
corresponding	to	the	alethurgy	of	the	race:	
The	role	of	the	race	was	to	ritualize	this	situation	and	this	relationship;	
and	 what	 Antilochus	 did	 –	 and	 is	 now	 renouncing	 –	 was	 to	 try	 to	





know	 what	 actually	 happened.	 Antilochus’s	 quasi-avowal	 consists,	 in	














the	agôn	 and	 the	 judicial	 practice	 share	 the	 same	 texture.	What	 shifts	 is	 the	
manifestation	 of	 truth	 as	 a	 ritual;	what	 remains	 is	 the	manifestation	 of	 truth	






















a	 fact	severed	 from	the	act,	a	 fact	whose	truth	 is	established	through	 inquiry,	
investigation	 or	 memory.	 The	 fact	 acquires	 a	 positive	 value	 only	 once	 the	
disjunction	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 is	 compensated	 by	 the	
completion	 of	 truth	 through	 the	 testimony,	 hence	 by	 a	 settlement	 of	 the	
relationship	between	a	discourse	and	its	object.	In	“Truth	and	Juridical	Forms”,	
Foucault	tells	us	that	the	settlement	of	the	relationship	between	the	said	and	the	














to	be	dispelled.	 It	 is	 this	myth	which	Nietzsche	began	 to	demolish	by	
showing,	in	the	numerous	texts	already	cited,	that,	behind	all	knowledge	
[savoir],	 behind	 all	 attainment	 of	 knowledge	 [connaissance],	 what	 is	
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recollection,	 through	 inquiry”	 reveals	an	 interesting	 choice	of	words:	 Foucault	

















contrast	 different	 judicial	 practices	 (according	 to	 an	 agonistic	 and	 ritualistic	










is	 an	 entirely	 legitimate	 problem.	 I	 did	 not	 try	 to	 determine	 which	
ideology	the	criminologists’	discourse	obeyed	–	even	if	this	too	would	be	









characterized	 by	 astonishment	 before	 the	 very	 ancient	multiplication	














plant	 in	 his	 body	 or	 like	 another	 body	 in	 his	 own.	 […]	 Hence,	 no	
technique,	since	there	is	co-naturalness	–	or	this	pretension,	in	any	case,	

















“γνώμε”	 which	 is	 “an	 opinion,	 a	 way	 of	 thinking,	 […]	 a	 judgment”	 (Foucault:	
2012a,	 66)	 whereas	 the	 knowledge	 collected	 through	 investigation	 is	 a	
“τεκμαίρεται”	which	involves	“these	elements,	these	signs	and	these	marks	[…]	
designated	by	the	word	τεκμήριον,	that	is	to	say	mark,	clue”	[ces	éléments,	ces	
signes	et	 ses	marques	 […]	désignés	par	 le	mot	 τεκμήριον,	 c’est-à-dire	marque,	
indice].	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 develops	 here	 the	 analysis	 given	 in	 the	 1970-1971	
Lectures	 on	 the	Will	 to	 Know	and	 the	 one	 he	 repeats	 in	 the	 1973	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”	but	the	difference	is	that	the	sumbolon	Foucault	used	to	express	
                                                
76	“En	fait,	ce	qui	caractérise	la	pratique	de	Tiresias,	et	dont	il	semble	bien	que	Oedipe	et	Jocaste	
n’admettent	pas	qu’on	puisse	l’appeler	τέχνη,	ce	sont	deux	choses	qu’on	a	évoquées	d’ailleurs	la	







y	 trouver	 la	 vérité	 avec	 laquelle	 il	 est	 connaturel.	 Par	 rapport	 à	 cela,	 quelle	 va	 être	 la	 τέχνη	






becomes	the	 intrinsic	part	of	tekhne	which	 is	also	the	practice	of	 investigation	
through	which	knowledge	is	constituted.	The	specifications	as	well	as	the	lexical	
connections	Foucault	provides	in	Du	Gouvernement	des	Vivants	fulfill	at	least	two	
tasks:	 the	 first	one	consists	 in	 insisting	on	the	 fact	 that	 the	use	of	knowledge,	
being	a	specific	tekhne,	is	also	a	practice,	a	use,	an	act	which	cannot	be	covered	
by	the	ontological	truth	of	metaphysical	discourse:	the	tekhne,	the	practice,	the	
act	 remain	 immanently	 first.	 On	 this	 very	 point,	 Revel	 has	 provided	 a	 very	






of	 the	 opposition	 between	 speech	 and	 writing,	 but	 concerns	 the	




but	 by	 the	 divorce	 of	 truth	 from	 the	 strict	 practice	 which	 corresponds	 to	 its	
                                                
77 	Revel	 made	 this	 point	 during	 a	 roundtable	 discussion	 organized	 on	 13th	 January	 2012	 at	
Goldsmiths	University	in	London	for	the	publication	of	the	English	translation	of	Foucault’s	last	
lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France.	 This	 resource	 is	 available	 at	
http://www.materialifoucaultiani.org/en/materiali/materiali/63-roundtable-qfoucault-and-the-
courage-of-truthq/195-roundtable-qfoucault-and-the-courage-of-truthq.html	 (accessed	 on	 30th	
















upon	 the	 object	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 target:	 it	 provides	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	
ethical	 attitude	 which	 is	 not	 mediated	 by	 the	 postulate	 of	 a	 transcendental	



















the	 epistemic	 configuration	 which	 characterizes	 modern	 anthropological	
knowledge.		
	
In	 order	 to	 grasp	 the	 logic	 through	which	 the	 rationality	 expressed	 by	 norms	
appears	to	ontologically	coincide	with	the	immanence	they	describe,	this	chapter	
claims	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 examine	 the	 point	 where	 the	 question	 of	 the	
emergence	of	epistemological	truth	is	treated	in	Foucault’s	work.	It	appears	that	
this	question	is	problematized	by	Foucault	when	he	studies	the	disappearance	of	
the	 political	 power	 which	 characterized	 Archaic	 Greece:	 the	 esoteric	 rule	 of	
 169 
emperors,	oracles	and	gods	 is	progressively	 replaced	by	 the	knowledge	of	 the	
Phusikoi.		
	
As	 the	 third	 section	 claims,	 the	 emergence	 of	 this	 knowledge	 relies	 upon	 an	
epistemological	relationship	to	the	world	which	implies	the	disjunction	between	





of	 his	 logos,	 no	 longer	 coincides	with	 his	 act	 of	 power.	My	 claim	 is	 that	 this	
dismantlement	 of	 political	 sovereign	 power	 has	 direct	 epistemological	
consequences:	 the	 disjunction	 of	 the	 seen	 and	 the	 said	 postulates	 the	
transcendental	 status	 of	 a	 concept	 of	 truth	 which	 determines	 the	 rationality	
through	which	immanence	is	understood.	Truth	is	no	longer	a	non-mediated	(and	










that	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 any	 rationality	 which	 claims	 to	 offer	 a	 positive	
representation	of	immanent	existence,	there	is	but	strict	power.	The	move	from	
positivity	 to	 its	 formal	 and	 immanent	 condition	 of	 possibility	 will	 allow	 us	 to	
study,	in	the	following	chapter,	the	similarity	of	the	philosophical	gesture	which	
leads	Foucault	to	study	the	“will	to	know”	in	his	first	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	













In	 the	 last	 section	 of	 chapter	 2,	 I	 demonstrated	 how	 Foucault’s	 insistence	 on	
modes	 of	 veridiction	 allows	 him	 to	 bring	 back	 the	 concept	 of	 epistemological	
truth	to	a	historical	mutation	of	the	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world.	
According	to	his	account	of	the	mutation	of	political	power	at	the	end	of	Archaic	
Greece,	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 coincidence	 between	 sovereign	 power	 and	
sovereign	 knowledge	 corresponds	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemological	
knowledge	 and	 truth.	 Knowledge	 and	 truth	 no	 longer	 coincide	 with	 the	
performance	 of	 a	 sovereign	 act	 of	 power	 but	 correspond	 to	 the	 symbolic	




Foucault’s	 first	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	Collège	de	 France	directly	 addresses	 this	
mutation	of	the	concept	of	truth.	Foucault	questions	the	definition	of	the	desire	
for	 knowledge	 as	 a	 natural	 inclination,	 which	 appears,	 according	 to	 him,	 in	





to	 an	 intrinsic	 disposition	 but	 rather	 to	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 violence.	 The	
movement	 which	 leads	 the	 self	 to	 epistemological	 truth	 through	 the	 use	 of	





is	 a	 historical	 shift	 which	 can	 be	 transposed	 to	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	
anthropological	 knowledge	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 The	
postulate	of	a	natural	truth	discoverable	by	the	knowledge	of	man	applies	this	
time	 to	 the	anthropological	 knowledge	of	 the	modern	 subject	which	enquires	
about	the	truth	of	 its	own	nature.	 In	each	case,	Foucault	describes	a	historical	
mutation	 of	 sovereign	 power.	Whereas	 divine	 sovereignty	 used	 to	 perform	 a	
cosmological	 truth	 in	 a	 strict	 act	 of	 power,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 King	 during	 the	
Classical	Age	also	produced	a	truth	which	coincided	with	its	power.	The	historical	
emergence	 of	 anthropological	 knowledge	 associated	 with	 bio-power	 and	




“will	 to	know”	and	the	“will	 to	knowledge”	 in	1970	and	1976	(Foucault:	2013,	
Foucault:	 1998d).	 In	 both	 cases,	 he	 diagnoses	 a	 historical	 mutation	 of	 the	
relationship	between	truth	and	the	world.	Whilst,	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece,	






truth.78	Similarly,	 the	postulate	of	 the	epistemological	 truth	of	anthropological	
nature	works	on	the	basis	of	a	divorce	between	the	immanent	acts	of	the	modern	
subject	 and	 the	 rationality	 which	 grounds	 them	 within	 the	 positivity	 of	
knowledge.	Therefore,	I	argue	that	the	dismantling	of	the	coincidence	between	





world	 or	 others)	 and	 the	 truth	 corresponding	 to	 it	 which	 allows	 the	 truth	 of	
nature	to	acquire	a	transcendental	status.	
	
The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 studies	 how	 this	 mutation	 masks	 the	 strict	








The	 second	 section	 applies	 this	 analysis	 to	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 divorce	









Consequently,	 the	 third	section	of	 this	chapter	examines	 the	 relevance	of	 this	
divorce	 in	 the	 way	 bio-power	 and	 biopolitics	 should	 be	 understood.	
Apprehending	 the	 relationship	between	power	 and	 knowledge	 as	 a	matter	 of	
subjective	alienation	is	paramount	if	we	are	to	grasp	properly	Foucault’s	account	
of	 the	 question	 of	 modern	 governmentality	 as	 a	 determination	 of	 conduct	






















































to	 knowledge”	 corresponds	 to	 the	 search	 for	 the	 truth	 of	 desire.	 Such	 an	
inversion,	which	both	complements	and	specifies	Burchell’s	remark,	allows	us	to	
stress	 the	 similarity	between	 the	 two	historical	moments	 Foucault	 chooses	 to	
describe	as	the	replacement	of	a	form	of	political	sovereign	power	by	the	concept	













Foucault	 focuses	on	 two	pivotal	 historical	moments	 (the	 turn	 from	Archaic	 to	
Classical	Greece	and	the	turn	from	the	Classical	Age	to	modernity)	characterized	
by	 a	 mutation	 of	 paradigms	 of	 political	 sovereign	 power	 which	 showed	 a	
coincidence	between	sovereign	knowledge	and	sovereign	discourse.	The	divine	
sovereignty	spoken	by	oracles,	 the	seer	or	 the	poets	 (the	Masters	of	Truth)	 in	
Archaic	 Greece	 corresponds	 to	 a	 form	 of	 knowledge	 actualized	 as	 power82 .	
Similarly,	 the	 King,	 during	 the	 Classical	 Age,	 still	 expresses	 a	 knowledge	 of	 a	




                                                
82	As	 I	have	developed	 in	section	3	of	chapter	2,	Détienne	and	Vernant	defined	Archaic	Greek	
political	sovereignty	as	the	coincidence	between	the	sovereign	act	which	expresses	the	law	and	







the	 reason	why	 the	 character	 of	 the	 sophist	 constitutes	 another	 example	 of	 the	 coincidence	
between	truth	and	power.	The	discourse	of	the	sophist,	bypassing	the	postulate	of	an	overarching	
transcendental	truth,	shoes	that	 it	 is	the	materiality	of	discourse	 itself,	as	act	of	power,	which	
produces	immanent	truth.	In	this	respect,	the	mutation	of	political	sovereign	power	at	the	end	of	
the	 Classical	 Age	 produces	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 epistemological	 mutation:	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 the	
coincidence	between	the	sovereign	law	and	the	immediate	truth	it	produces	which	has	an	effect	





nature	 of	man	 in	 the	 case	 of	modernity)	 be	 determined	 by	 a	 transcendental	


















from	 the	great	Platonic	division,	 the	will	 to	 truth	had	 its	own	history,	
which	 is	 not	 that	 of	 constraining	 truths:	 the	 history	 of	 the	 range	 of	
objects	 to	 be	 known,	 of	 the	 functions	 and	 positions	 of	 the	 knowing	




underline	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 not	 the	 object	 that	 this	 knowledge	 targets	which	
characterizes	its	importance.	Instead,	it	is	its	strict	existence	as	immanent	attitude	















analyses	 I	 have	 carried	out	 up	until	 now.	 It	 could	 also	describe	 those	 I	
would	now	like	to	undertake.	 I	 think	all	 these	analyses	–	past	or	still	 to	












                                                





definition	 of	 life	 as	 ethical	 conduct	 (which	 bypasses	 the	mediation	 of	 epistemological	 truth),	
corresponds	 to	Foucault’s	 interest	 in	 forms	of	counter-philosophical	practices	when	he	comes	
back	 to	 the	Greeks	 after	 1976	 (considering	 the	 original	 books)	 or	 after	 1978	 (considering	 the	
lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France).	It	is	therefore	easy	to	see	how	the	work	of	historicization	of	






the	 cohesion	 of	 the	 trajectory	 of	 his	 philosophical	 enterprise:	 retrieving	 the	







reference	to	 it	yet	appears	 in	a	conversation	about	the	 Iranian	revolution	with	






MF:	Oh,	 I	would	 say	 that,	hum,	 the	will	 is	 the	pure	act	of	 the	 subject.	And	 that	 the	
subject	is	what	is	fixed	and	determined	by	an	act	of	will”.86	
                                                
84	When	 I	use	 the	expression	“immanent	act	 in	 the	world”,	 I	also	 refer	 to	a	concept	of	power	
defined	as	a	 relation.	 It	corresponds	to	an	 immanent	act	of	power	which	has	epistemological,	
political	and	ethical	dimensions.	It	changes	the	way	the	world	appears	to	the	self	and	to	others.	
In	this	respect,	the	philosophical	attitude	of	the	Cynic,	studied	by	Foucault	in	1983-1984,	really	
corresponds	 to	 these	 three	dimensions.	The	Cynic	 is	 the	one	who	“change[s]	 the	value	of	 the	
currency”	[parakharaxon	to	nomisma]	(Foucault:	2011b,	240).	Changing	the	value	of	the	currency	
which,	according	to	Foucault,	should	be	understood	in	relation	to	nomos,	means	that	the	Cynic	is	
the	 one	 who	 changes	 the	 value	 of	 the	 laws	 amongst	 men.	 This	 attitude	 corresponds	 to	 an	
epistemological,	political,	and	ethical	re-evaluation:	by	changing	the	value	of	the	laws	(and	not	
merely	the	laws	themselves),	the	Cynic	reveals	that	what	is	commonly	considered	as	important	
or	 valuable	 can	 be	 radically	 overturned	 through	 a	 change	 of	 ethical	 attitude.	 Refusing	 the	
epistemological	value	of	theoretical	truth,	the	Cynic	reveals	that	truth	is	first	of	all	a	condition	of	
a	change	towards	the	way	the	world	appears	to	us.	








point	according	to	which	the	 individual’s	strict	 immanent	act	of	power	 is	what	





no	 longer	 sufficient	 to	 reveal	 the	 truth	 of	 the	world,	 or	 through	 the	 subject’s	
speech	which	gets	linked	to	the	ontological	truth	of	his	nature)	demonstrates	his	








Foucault	 wants	 to	 challenge	 the	 idea	 according	 to	 which	 the	 truth	 acquired	
through	knowledge	is	a	founding	origin.	In	both	texts,	the	idea	of	the	invention	of	
knowledge	 is	 substituted	 for	 a	 metaphysical	 concept	 of	 truth	 that	 would	
determine	the	nature	of	things.	In	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	Know,	he	specifically	
insists	on	the	“invention”	of	knowledge	mentioned	by	Nietzsche	in	the	essay	“On	










about	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 fable	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 original	 German	 expression	
which	 is	not	exactly	Erfindung	but	das	Erkennen	erfanden:	a	verbal	expression	
that	 could	 be	 translated	 as	 “the	 making-up	 of	 understanding.”	 In	 “Nietzsche,	
Genealogy,	History”,	Foucault	is	even	more	explicit	about	the	fictional	nature	of	
this	invention:	referring	to	The	Twilight	of	the	Idols,	he	compares	it	to	“a	secret	
formula,	 in	 the	 rituals	 of	 black	 magic,	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Schwarzkünstler”	
(Foucault:	 1980,	 141).	 The	 invention	of	 understanding	 is	 therefore	 a	mask,	 an	
artifice	 that	 conceals	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 knowledge,	 which	 in	 Foucault’s	 own	
words,	“is	not	made	for	understanding	[but]	is	made	for	cutting”	(Foucault:	1980,	
154).	Foucault’s	point	is	that	the	invention	of	knowledge	is	an	artifice	that	masks	










Thus	all	 that	appears	 to	our	eyes	 is	a	 truth	conceived	as	a	 richness,	a	
fecundity,	a	gentle	and	insidiously	universal	force,	and	in	contrast	we	are	
unaware	 of	 the	 will	 to	 truth,	 that	 prodigious	 machinery	 designed	 to	
exclude.	(Foucault:	1980,	56)	
	
The	 idea	 of	 a	 gentle	 and	 universal	 concept	 of	 truth	 covering	 the	will	 (i.e.	 the	
violent	power	that	corresponds	to	it)	reappears	soon	after	in	the	Lectures	on	the	
Will	 to	 Know.	 During	 the	 9th	 December	 1970	 lecture,	 Foucault	 insists	 on	 his	
attempt	 to	 un-root	 truth	 from	 its	 ontological	 evidence	 in	 order	 to	 stress	 the	
violence	of	the	will	which	determines	its	search.	He	writes:	
we	will	have	put	the	game	of	truth	back	in	the	network	of	constraints	




The	will	 to	know	appears	 therefore	as	 the	manifestation	of	a	historical	human	
activity	 corresponding	 to	 a	 way	 of	 producing	 truth	 that	 is	 a	 manifestation	 of	
power,	a	power	that	conceals	its	strict	immanence	and	that	acquires	the	status	of	
a	 transcendental	 foundation.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 Foucault	
chooses	to	call	the	object	of	his	historical	investigations	a	“morphology”:	he	wants	
to	inscribe	the	forms	taken	by	the	will	to	truth	in	our	Western	tradition	in	a	strict	
exteriority	 which	 dismantles	 the	 metaphysical	 implication	 between	 truth	 and	
knowledge,	or	 truth	as	 transcendental	 logos	which	precedes	 the	meaning	and	
validity	of	experience.	If	the	truth	targeted	by	the	will	to	know	becomes	a	strict	




Foucault’s	 reading	 of	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 a	 rationality	 determined	 by	
truth	both	at	the	origin	and	as	a	result	of	the	use	of	knowledge	is	what,	at	two	
















to	 Know	 that	 Foucault	 explicitly	 formulates	 the	 historical	 emergence	 of	 an	
ontological	concept	of	 truth	whose	reality	as	a	strictly	 immanent	act	of	power	
disappears.	During	the	3rd	March	1971	lecture	from	the	Lectures	on	the	Will	to	










own	 condition	of	 possibility	 as	well	 as	 the	 condition	of	 just	 logos.	 Truth	 is	 no	


























sovereign	 truth	 as	 efficacious	 utterance	 disappears	 that	 the	 intrinsic	 and	
reciprocal	relationship	between	discourse	and	its	object	(the	said	and	the	seen)	










Here,	 we	 see	 that	 Foucault’s	 Nietzschean	 problematization	 of	 the	 primacy	 of	
knowledge	 and	 truth	 challenges	 the	 symbolic	 structure	 of	 interdependence	




the	murderer	 and	 actualizes	 his	 testimony	 through	 speech	 becomes	 the	 new	






of	 interdependence	 between	 discourse	 and	 its	 object	 that	 the	 laws	 of	 men	
replace	 the	 truth	 of	 gods	when	 the	nomos	emerges.	 In	 “Oedipal	 knowledge”,	
Foucault	indeed	tells	us	that:	
[…]	 This	 system	 of	 constraints	 shown	 by	 the	 Oedipus	 fable	 could	 be	
characterized	very	schematically	in	the	following	way:	[…]	the	political,	
juridical,	 and	 religious	 requirement	 to	 transform	 the	 event,	 its	




on	 a	 knowledge-virtue	 which	 is	 quite	 simply	 in	 itself	 respect	 for	 the	
nomos.	Truth	will	be	given	only	to	someone	who	respects	the	nomos	and	














justice.	 But	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 respect	 of	 the	 just	 law	 becomes	 the	 condition	 of	
possibility	of	its	knowledge,	nothing	can	exist	outside	the	scope	of	knowledge	and	
what	can	be	known	(i.e.	what	can	appear	positively)	cannot	not	be	true	(i.e.	 it	













that	Revel	points	out	when	 she	 calls	 the	 concept	of	nature	both	 “the	basis	of	
Western	metaphysics”	and	“the	idea	of	a	foundation	or	of	an	origin”	(Revel:	2014,	
119).	But	what	Revel	does	not	stress	sufficiently	is	that	the	historical	emergence	
of	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	 as	 an	 epistemological	 object	 is,	 in	 Foucault,	 clearly	
inscribed	 within	 the	 problematization	 of	 jurisdiction	 brought	 forward	 by	 the	

















to	 Know	 and	 repeats	 in	 his	 essay	 “Nietzsche,	 Genealogy,	 History.”	 This	 first	
critique	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 nature	 endeavours	 to	 substitute	 to	 the	 foundation	
provided	by	metaphysical	truth	a	historicity	that	questions	the	meaning	of	origin	
as	foundation	and	replaces	it	by	the	idea	of	historical	event.	This	first	aspect	of	




first	 one:	 it	 is	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 metaphysical	 concept	 of	 truth	 Foucault	
formulates	 in	 1970-1971	 that	 allows	 the	 rethinking	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	








two	 types	 of	 knowledge.	 He	 wants	 to	 differentiate	 between	 a	 knowledge	
[connaissance]	 that	 defines	 a	 specific	 technique	 towards	 the	 world	 and	 a	
knowledge	[savoir]	which	concerns	the	domain	of	objects	which	emerge	through	
the	practice	of	 this	 technique.	During	 the	9th	December	1970	 lecture	 from	 the	
Lectures	on	the	will	to	know,	Foucault	establishes	this	distinction	as	such:	
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and	 obliterates	 the	 strict	 reality	 of	 the	will	 as	 a	 strife	 for	 knowledge	 [savoir].	
Foucault’s	point	is	not	to	claim	that	savoir	does	not	exist	but	that	the	desire	of	
the	self	for	it	is	not	a	transcendental	determination	that	characterizes	a	natural	








that	 the	 definitions	 of	 connaissance	 and	 savoir	 appear	 the	 most	 clearly,	 the	
difference	between	these	two	concepts	had	already	been	thematized	in	1969	in	
The	 Archaeology	 of	 Knowledge.	 A	 footnote	 in	 the	 English	 edition	mentions	 a	
comment	by	Foucault	himself	who	distinguishes	the	two	concepts	in	those	terms:	
By	connaissance	I	mean	the	relation	of	the	subject	to	the	object	and	the	






Even	 though	 Foucault	 does	 not	 seem	 at	 this	 point	 to	 have	 carried	 out	 the	
genealogical	work	which	 allows	him	 to	define	 connaissance	 as	 precisely	 as	 he	
does	a	year	later	in	his	first	lecture	course	at	the	Collège	de	France,	the	definition	
provided	in	The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge	still	distinguishes	connaissance	as	the	
type	 of	 relationship	 between	 the	 knowing	 subject	 and	 the	 object	 of	 his	
knowledge	 [savoir],	 and	 savoir	 as	 the	 knowledge	 which	 historically	 becomes	
objects	of	connaissance.	Therefore,	archaeology	also	belongs	 to	 the	project	of	
historicization	 and	 dismantlement	 of	 a	 strict	 continuity	 between	 the	 knowing	
subject,	 the	 knowledge	 that	 subject	 acquires	 and	 the	 scientific	 truth	 it	
establishes.	 Instead,	 the	 archaeological	 analysis	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 truth	 and	
knowledge	 emerging	 from	 a	 “discursive	 practice”	 (Foucault:	 2002,	 202).	
Identifying	 a	 discursive	 practice	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 already	
corresponds	to	an	attempt	at	retrieving	the	acting	subject	from	the	alienation	of	
its	own	positivity:	 it	 is	neither	a	transcendental	disposition	towards	knowledge	
and	 truth	 which	 allows	 the	 development	 of	 sciences	 but	 the	 emergence	 of	
historical	 “ways	 of	 speaking”	 (Foucault:	 2002,	 213)	 which	 are	 historically	
determined.	 If	 they	 are	 historically	 determined,	 they	 are	 not	 linked	 to	 a	
scientificity	that	would	reveal	their	intrinsic	truth,	but	to	historical	events	that	are	
heterogeneous	from	the	field	of	knowledge	defined	by	science.	Foucault	writes:	
Instead	 of	 exploring	 the	 consciousness/knowledge	













grounds	 the	 truth	 of	 science	 and	 savoir	 in	 discursive	 practices	 prefigures	 the	
critique	of	the	transcendental	position	of	truth	Foucault	describes	in	the	Lectures	
on	the	will	to	know:	if	connaissance	is	the	element	which	unites	the	traditional	
axis	 (which	 goes	 from	 the	 knowing	 subject	 to	 the	 discovery	 of	 scientific	 truth	




the	 Lectures	 on	 the	will	 to	 know	 continues	 the	 project	 of	The	Archaeology	 of	
Knowledge.	 This	 shift,	 which	 consists	 in	 concluding	 that	 the	 knowing	 subject	
naturally	 prone	 to	 discover	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 world	 does	 not	 exist,	 ultimately	
indicates	that	knowledge,	as	power	which	modifies	the	world,	corresponds	to	a	













concept	 of	 epistemological	 truth	 produces	 an	 inversion	 through	 which	 the	
affirmation	 of	 truth	 as	 an	 act	 of	 power	 gets	 replaced	 by	 a	 transcendental	
rationality.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 one	 finds,	 as	 early	 as	 The	 Archaeology	 of	
Knowledge,	 an	 attempt	 to	 disrupt	 the	 apparent	 continuity	 between	 the	
overarching	 rationality	 connecting	 the	 knowing	 subject	 to	 the	 practice	 of	




operate	 on	 an	 immanent	 level	 which	 effectively	 modifies	 the	 relationship	











Such	 an	 archaeology	would	 show,	 if	 it	 succeeded	 in	 its	 task,	 how	 the	
prohibitions,	 exclusions,	 limitations,	 values,	 freedoms	 and	
transgressions	of	sexuality,	all	its	manifestations,	verbal	or	otherwise,	are	
linked	to	a	particular	discursive	practice.	It	would	reveal,	not	of	course	as	










the	net	of	 strictly	 immanent	power	 relations.	 The	 “system	of	prohibitions	and	
values”	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 always	 the	 strict	 manifestation	 of	 power	 which	
establishes	and	modifies	relationships	between	individuals	and	the	world.		
	
It	 is	 therefore	 to	 stress	 that	 truth	 and	 knowledge	are	 instances	of	 power	 that	
Foucault	attempts	to	associate	them	with	the	concept	of	will	both	in	1970-1971	
and	 in	 1976:	 it	 means	 that	 the	 foundation	 provided	 by	 truth	 only	 emerges	








































If	 we	 distinguish	 between	 the	 speaking	 subject	 (the	 subject	 of	
enunciation)	and	the	grammatical	subject	of	the	enounced,	we	could	say	
that	there	is	also	the	subject	of	the	enunciandum	-	which	refers	to	the	
held	 belief	 or	 opinion	 of	 the	 speaker.	 In	 parrhesia,	 the	 speaker	
emphasizes	the	fact	that	he	is	both	the	subject	of	the	enunciation	and	
the	subject	of	the	enunciandum	-	that	he	himself	 is	the	subject	of	the	
opinion	 to	 which	 he	 refers.	 The	 specific	 “speech	 activity”	 of	 the	
parrhesiastic	enunciation	thus	takes	the	form:	“I	am	the	one	who	thinks	
this	and	that.”	I	use	the	phrase	“speech	activity”	rather	than	John	Searle’s	
“speech	 act”	 (or	 Austin’s	 “performative	 utterance”)	 in	 order	 to	













                                                
















and	truth	whose	power	gets	concealed	by	a	 transcendental	 foundation,	but	 in	














to	 the	 “pure”	 knowledge	 of	 Forms	 sought	 by	 Platonic	 philosophy.	 Rather,	 it	


















true	 is	 otherness:	 that	 which	 makes	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 world	 and	 in	
people’s	 opinions,	 that	 which	 forces	 one	 to	 transform	 one’s	 mode	 of	
being,	that	whose	difference	opens	up	the	perspective	of	an	other	world	
to	 be	 constructed,	 to	 be	 imagined.	 The	 philosopher	 thus	 becomes	
someone	 who,	 through	 the	 courage	 of	 his	 truth-telling,	 makes	 the	










coincides	with	 an	 ethical	 practice	which	 aims	 at	 transforming	 the	 relationship	
oneself	entertains	with	himself,	others	and	the	world.	It	is	a	concept	of	truth	in	
strict	 relation	 to	 a	 concept	 of	 life	which	 is	 not	 defined	 as	 the	 expression	 of	 a	






















the	 foundation	 on	 which	 the	 modern	 subject	 becomes	 an	 object	 of	
anthropological	 knowledge.	 In	 both	 cases,	 Foucault	 puts	 into	 question	 the	








mutation	of	 the	 relationship	between	knowledge,	 the	 self	 and	 the	world.	 It	 is	
when	the	nature	of	the	world	emerges	as	an	object	of	knowledge	that	the	life	of	
the	 self	 becomes	 no	 longer	 the	 matter	 of	 a	 reflexive	 tekhne	 and	self-
transformation	but	the	occasion	of	the	experience	of	both	the	truth	of	the	self	




of	 Western	 thought	 to	 philosophy	 as	 discourse	 and	 tradition.	 The	
challenge	is	this:	How	can	what	is	given	to	us	as	the	object	of	knowledge	
(savoir)	connected	to	the	mastery	of	tekhne,	at	the	same	time	be	the	site	




appears	 and	 is	 experienced?	 If	 this	 really	 is	 the	 problem	 of	Western	
philosophy	 -	 how	 can	 the	 world	 be	 the	 object	 of	 knowledge	
(connaissance)	and	at	the	same	time	the	place	of	the	subject’s	test;	how	







the	 status	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 as	 empirico-transcendental	 doublet	
presupposes	 that	 knowledge	 about	 the	nature	of	man	 can	be	 abstracted	 as	 a	
transcendental	foundation	that	would	ground	the	rationality	of	his	existence	as	
living,	speaking	and	working	subject.	This	means	that	it	would	grant	the	possibility	
for	 the	 subject	 to	 know	 its	 existence	 as	 a	 finite	 positivity	 amongst	 the	 other	
positivities	 which	 characterize	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world.	 My	 claim	 is	 this	






















The	 concept	 of	 nature	 appearing	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 dismantlement	 of	
sovereign	power	 is	 problematized	a	 second	 time	 in	 Foucault’s	work.	When	he	
introduces	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 Classical	 power	 of	 the	 King	 to	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	in	the	first	volume	to	the	History	of	Sexuality,	the	truth	spoken	by	the	
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subject	 who	 puts	 his	 sexual	 desires	 into	 words	 through	 the	 mechanism	 of	
confession	coincides	with	a	nature	whose	manifestation	is	fragmented	and	which	
needs	 to	be	 completed	and	acknowledged	 in	order	 to	be	 true.	 In	 the	 chapter	
entitled	“Scientia	Sexualis”,	Foucault	describes	how	the	19th	century	produces	a	
hermeneutics	of	sexual	desires	whose	acknowledgement	rests	on	a	relationship	








in	 the	one	who	spoke,	 it	could	only	 reach	completion	 in	 the	one	who	
assimilated	 and	 recorded	 it.	 It	 was	 the	 latter’s	 function	 to	 verify	 this	
obscure	truth:	the	revelation	of	confession	had	to	be	coupled	with	the	
decipherment	of	what	it	said.	The	one	who	listened	was	not	simply	the	
forgiving	master,	 the	 judge	who	condemned	or	acquitted;	he	was	 the	
master	 of	 truth.	 His	 was	 a	 hermeneutic	 function.	With	 regard	 to	 the	
confession,	his	power	was	not	only	to	demand	it	before	it	was	made,	or	
decide	what	was	to	follow	after	it,	but	also	to	constitute	a	discourse	of	
truth	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 decipherment.	 By	 no	 longer	 making	 the	
confession	a	test,	but	rather	a	sign,	and	by	making	sexuality	something	
to	be	 interpreted,	 the	nineteenth	century	gave	 itself	 the	possibility	of	
causing	 the	 procedures	 of	 confession	 to	 operate	 within	 the	 regular	
formation	of	a	scientific	discourse.	(Foucault:	1998d,	67)	
	
The	 resemblance	 between	 the	 morphology	 of	 truth	 and	 knowledge	 whose	
emergence	Foucault	describes	at	the	turn	of	Archaic	and	Classical	Greece	and	the	
one	 which	 appears	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 is	 striking.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	














kings	 is	 completed	 by	 the	 spoken	 truth	 of	 the	 peasant	 who	 has	 seen	 the	
murderer)	 in	 order	 to	manifest	 a	 truth	which	 acquires	 a	 temporal	 dimension:	
Oedipus’	 identity	 is	no	 longer	 identified	according	to	his	presence	alone	but	 in	
relation	to	a	story	which	encompasses	the	entirety	of	his	life.	The	logic	Foucault	




                                                
90 	The	 question	 of	 the	 replacement	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 act	 by	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
speaker’s	 discourse	 and	 a	 primordial	 logos	which	 grounds	 its	 truth-value	 is	 a	 theme	 Foucault	
comes	 back	 to	 in	 his	 essay	 “A	 Preface	 to	 Transgression”.	 Foucault	 writes	 that:	 “A	 rigorous	
language,	as	it	arises	from	sexuality,	will	not	reveal	the	secret	of	man's	natural	being,	nor	will	it	
express	the	serenity	of	anthropological	truths,	but	rather,	it	will	say	that	he	exists	without	God;	















Foucault	 calls	 the	 confessor	 a	 “Master	 of	 Truth”	 (Foucault:	 1998d,	 67):	 he	
implicitly	refers	to	Détienne’s	work	on	truth	in	Archaic	Greece	according	to	which	
the	Masters	 of	 Truth	 are	 the	ones	 able	 to	 actualize	 truth	 through	 their	 act	 of	




Over	 all	 these	 endeavors	 on	 the	 part	 of	 clinical	 thought	 to	 define	 its	
methods	and	scientific	norms	hovers	the	great	myth	of	a	pure	Gaze	that	
would	 be	 pure	 Language:	 a	 speaking	 eye.	 It	 would	 scan	 the	 entire	
hospital	 field,	 taking	 in	 and	 gathering	 together	 each	 of	 the	 singular	
events	 that	occurred	within	 it;	and	as	 it	 saw,	as	 it	 saw	ever	more	and	
more	clearly,	it	would	be	turned	into	speech	that	states	and	teaches;	the	
truth,	which	events,	in	their	repetitions	and	convergence,	would	outline	





The	 first	 two	 lines	 state	 the	 point	 very	 clearly:	 what	 the	 logos	 of	 scientific	
rationality	makes	possible	is	the	stabilization	of	a	truth	that	grounds	and	validates	
the	 events	 which	 occur	 within	 the	 clinical	 space	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 their	
manifestation	 under	 the	 timeless	 truth	 of	 a	 foundation	 which	 explains	 and	
justifies	 them.	 The	 “pure	Gaze”	which	 is	 “pure	 Language”	 and	 “speaking	 eye”	
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of	 things	whose	 rationality	 is	no	 longer	granted	by	 the	knowledge	of	 the	King	
which	was,	at	the	same	time,	an	ordering	power.	In	The	Order	of	Things,	Foucault	
tells	 us	 that	 modern	 empiricities	 are	 no	 longer	 organized	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
taxonomy	of	 representation	set	up	 in	accordance	to	a	 fixed	mathesis.	They	no	
longer	correspond	to	a	knowledge	expressing	an	infinite	number	of	things	whose	
coexistence	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 the	 order	 of	 a	 nature	 but	 to	“quasi-
transcendental	fields”	which	are	the	concepts	of	Life,	Labour	and	Language.	These	






the	 rift	 that	 divides	 in	 depth	 the	 episteme	 of	 the	Western	 world,	 and	
isolates	 for	 us	 the	 beginning	 of	 a	 certain	modern	 manner	 of	 knowing	
empiricities.	This	is	because	the	thought	that	is	contemporaneous	with	us,	




up	 the	 transcendental	 field	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	 to	 constitute	 inversely,	








the	 life,	 labour	 and	 language	 of	 the	modern	 subject,	 understood	 as	 temporal	
fields	of	human	activity	in	an	attempt	to	fix	the	forms	of	its	finitude,	cannot	be	
fully	represented.	The	living,	working,	and	speaking	man	cannot	be	expressed	by	














onto	 the	 plane	 of	 empirical	 knowledge	 the	 question	 formulated	 by	
Kantian	 criticism,	 which	 is	 the	 question	 of	 finitude.	What	 happened,	
quite	 simply,	was	 that	 each	 discipline	 came	 up	with	 a	 new	name	 for	
finitude.	They	called	it	“language”	or	“life”	or	“work.	
	
This	 imbalance	between	 the	concrete	existence	of	man	and	 the	 fixation	of	his	
truth	 by	 modern	 knowledge	 (what	 Balibar	 calls	 “the	 plane	 of	 empirical	
knowledge”)	 amounts	 to	 fixing	 finitude	 into	 concepts	 which	 acquire	 a	 new	
meaning	after	the	eighteenth	century.	Life	is	one	of	those	concepts:	it	designates	
a	horizon	against	which	human	sciences	attempt	to	positively	define	and	provide	
an	ontological	basis	 for	the	concrete	existence	of	men.	As	a	consequence,	 it	 is	
impossible	to	claim,	as	Agamben	does,	that	what	biopower	and	biopolitics	target	
with	 modernity	 is	 bare	 life.	 Rather,	 biopower	 and	 biopolitics	 imply	 a	 natural	











                                                
91	This	 is	an	 interview	given	on	26th	November	2012	for	the	website	“Books	&	 Ideas”	after	the	






can	man	 think	what	 he	 does	 not	 think,	 inhabit	 as	 though	 by	 a	mute	
occupation	 something	 that	eludes	him,	animate	with	a	 kind	of	 frozen	

















existence	of	men	 is	 rather	 a	 “a	web”,	 “pulsations”	 and	 “buried	energy”	which	
remain	 in	excess	of	possible	knowledge	and	 representation.	This	 is	 the	 reason	
why	the	modern	concept	of	“life”	cannot	be	understood	as	a	“bare”	metaphysical	







characterizes	 the	 emergence	 of	 biopower	 and	 biopolitics.	 The	 emergence	 of	
man’s	 knowledge	 of	 nature	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Archaic	 Greece	 corresponds	 to	 the	
dissolution	 of	 the	 sovereign	 unity	 between	 immanent	 acts	 of	 power	 and	 the	
immediate	performance	of	the	truth	of	the	world.	This	first	shift	corresponds	to	
the	definition	of	what	Foucault	calls	“the	will	to	know”	in	1970-1971.	In	the	same	
fashion,	 the	 1976	 “will	 to	 knowledge”	 (the	 subtitle	 of	 the	 first	 volume	 of	 the	
History	of	Sexuality)	corresponds	to	the	dissolution	of	the	sovereign	power	of	the	
King.	In	each	case,	the	concept	of	nature	and	the	truth	corresponding	to	it	locates	


























and	 the	 unquestionable	 universal	 which	 grounds	 the	 rationality	 of	 modern	
politics	of	life.	In	both	cases,	I	claim	that	the	philosophical	gesture	remains	the	
same	 but	 its	 object	 differs:	 whereas	 the	 critique	 of	 nature	 found	 in	 Foucault	
around	1970	 concerns	 the	 critique	of	 the	possibility	of	 knowing	 the	nature	of	






                                                
92	As	Michel	de	Certeau	puts	 it	 in	his	essay	“The	Black	Sun	of	Language”:	“Death	only	appears	
within	 the	 cohesive	web	of	 reason	as	 the	position	of	man	 in	 language,	or	 as	 the	evolution	of	
languages.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 historical	 phenomenon,	 not	 an	 individual	 fact,	 and	 is	 therefore	 not	
localizable.	Neither	is	the	wild	claim	of	an	author	who	would	like	to	burst	through	the	doors	of	
reflexive	 philosophy,	 smash	 the	 languid	 furnishings	 of	 consciousness,	 and	 plant	 his	 black	 flag	
there.	It	is	not	the	end	of	man	that	Foucault	proclaims,	but	of	the	conception	of	man	that	believed	
it	had	solved,	by	means	of	the	positivism	of	the	‘human	sciences’	[…].”	(De	Certeau:	1986,	182).	




However,	what	 is	common	to	both	mutations	 is	 the	 interdependence	between	
the	immanence	of	things	and	the	discourse	which	manifests	their	truth.	At	the	
dawn	 of	 Classical	 Greece,	 when	 the	 political	 sovereignty	 of	 gods	 and	 kings	
disappears,	 it	 is	 the	symbolic	 link	between	what	 is	said	and	seen	which	allows	
truth	to	be	completed	and	validated.	Similarly,	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age,	the	







with	 nature,	 it	 is	 by	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 by	 their	
functioning;	 or	 rather,	 in	 the	 general	 arrangement	 of	 the	 Classical	





















the	 order	 of	 nature	 for	 the	 Greek	 rationalists,	 must	 function	 as	 an	 originary	
founding	 logos	 which	 repeats	 with	 it	 the	 possibility	 of	 knowledge	 and	
representation.		
	
It	 is	 because	 the	modern	 subject	becomes,	 “the	difficult	 object	 and	 sovereign	
subject	 of	 all	 possible	 knowledge”	 that	 the	 truth	 of	 his	 nature	 replaces	 the	
sovereign	who,	either	 in	Archaic	Greece	or	during	 the	Classical	Age,	made	 the	
correspondence	 between	 words	 and	 things	 possible.	 If	 nineteenth-century	
anthropology	defines	“a	discourse	on	man’s	natural	finitude”	(Foucault:	2001e,	
280),	it	is	because	the	truth	of	his	nature	provides	the	foundation	the	law	of	the	




It	will	 no	 doubt	 remain	 a	 decisive	 fact	 about	 our	 culture	 that	 its	 first	
scientific	discourse	concerning	 the	 individual	had	 to	pass	 through	 this	
stage	of	death.	Western	man	could	constitute	himself	in	his	own	eyes	as	
an	object	of	science,	he	grasped	himself	within	this	language,	and	gave	
himself,	 in	 himself	 and	 by	 himself,	 a	 discursive	 existence,	 only	 in	 the	
opening	 created	 by	 his	 own	 elimination:	 from	 the	 experience	 of	
Unreason	was	born	psychology,	the	very	possibility	of	psychology;	from	
the	integration	of	death	into	medical	thought	is	born	a	medicine	that	is	
given	 as	 a	 science	 of	 the	 individual.	 And,	 generally	 speaking,	 the	
experience	of	 individuality	 in	modern	culture	is	bound	up	with	that	of	
death:	from	Holderlin’s	Empedocles	to	Nietzsche’s	Zarathustra,	and	on	
to	 Freudian	 man,	 an	 obstinate	 relation	 to	 death	 prescribes	 to	 the	

















knowledge	 both	 prevents	 and	 forces	 his	 disappearance:	 it	 is	 the	 fixity	 of	 the	




The	 precariousness	 of	 individual	 life	 and	 its	 finitude	 as	 living	 being	 is	






                                                
93	As	Fréderic	Gros	explains	in	his	essay	“Folie	et	finitude:	les	leçons	de	la	psychoanalyse”:	“[t]he	
destiny	of	thought	is	no	longer	to	discover	itself	as	universal	logical	substance,	but	to	question	
mute	 positivities	 in	 which	 it	 must	 recognize	 itself.”	 [“Le	 destin	 de	 la	 pensée	 n’est	 plus	 de	 se	
découvrir	 comme	substance	 logique	universelle,	mais	d’interroger	des	positivités	muettes	dans	
lesquelles	 il	 lui	 faut	 se	 reconnaître”]	 (Gros:	 1997,	 116).	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 knowledge	which	
emerges	with	human	sciences	constitutes	an	attempt	at	providing	a	positive	content	to	men’s	
existence.	However,	the	concept	of	Life	as	positive	form	of	finitude	is	a	mute	positivity.	It	refers	
to	 an	 abstraction	 which	 cannot	 be	 superimposed	 with	 the	 existence	 of	 men	 understood	 as	
concrete	and	lived	experience.		
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to	 death	 an	 affirmation	 of	 the	 sovereign’s	 law	 through	 its	 power	 on	 the	
condemned	body,	death	has	now	come	to	occupy	the	condition	of	possibility	of	






always	 a	 theologico-political	 field	of	 sacrilizing	 formation,	 though	one	
that	 functions	 differently	 now	 because	 the	 modern	 finitudinal	
immanentization	of	the	eschaton,	as	an	open	horizon	of	possibility	rather	
than	 the	 threshold	 of	 everlasting	 life,	 transforms	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
eschaton	and	the	mode	of	(political)	being	instituted	by	it.	Modern	time,	
in	short,	is	no	less	eschatological	than	Christian	time.	But	it	is	different,	




the	 modern	 finitudinal	 eschaton.	 […]	 For	 biopolitics	 is	 also	 a	 regime	
speaking	truth	about	the	nature	of	times	through	the	truth	of	the	end	of	
times,	and	the	mode	of	being	required	to	live	in,	live	out,	and	live	up	to	
the	 eschatological	 security	 imperative	 to	 resist,	 at	 whatever	self-













Foucault’s	work	on	 the	mutation	of	 jurisdiction	 in	Archaic	Greece	allows	us	 to	
understand	 the	 interplay	 between	 positivity,	 negativity	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	
man’s	finitude	in	modernity.	Whereas	the	divine	law	is	fundamentally	negative	
(both	 exoteric	 and	 limiting),	 the	 law	 of	 nature	 is	 what	 appears	 and	 remains	
through	 the	 use	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 nomos	 in	 Classical	
Greece.	In	the	same	fashion,	whereas	the	law	of	the	King	limits	or	annihilates	the	
life	 of	 his	 subjects	 up	 to	 the	 Classical	 Age,	 the	 truth	 of	 man’s	 nature	 which	
constitutes	his	modern	finitude	lets	the	possibility	of	his	essence	appear	whilst	
his	 lived	 individual	 and	 concrete	 existence	 disappears.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	









erased	 in	 the	 course	 of	 history.	 Man’s	 finitude	 is	 heralded	 –	 and	
imperiously	 so	–	 in	 the	positivity	of	 knowledge;	we	know	 that	man	 is	
finite,	as	we	know	the	anatomy	of	the	brain,	the	mechanics	of	production	
costs,	 or	 the	 system	 of	 Indo-European	 conjugation;	 or	 rather,	 like	 a	
watermark	running	through	all	these	solid,	positive,	and	full	forms,	we	
perceive	 the	 finitude	and	 limits	 they	 impose,	we	 sense,	 as	 though	on	




















order	 of	 things)	 but	 a	 framework	 of	 normalization	 (which	 seeks	 to	 make	




















Gilles	Deleuze	clearly	 identified	Foucault’s	diagnosis	of	 the	replacement	of	 the	
figure	of	God	by	the	concept	of	man.	 In	the	appendix	to	his	Foucault,	Deleuze	
takes	care	to	distinguish	the	Classical	 from	the	modern	episteme	 in	 relation	to	










is	a	God-form,	and	not	at	all	a	Man-form.	This	 is	 the	world	of	 infinite	
representation.	In	the	orders	derived	from	it	we	must	find	the	element	
that	is	not	infinite	in	itself,	but	which	nonetheless	can	be	developed	to	
an	 infinite	degree	and	 consequently	enters	 into	a	 scene,	or	unlimited	
series,	 or	 continuum	 that	 can	 be	 prolonged.	 This	 is	 the	 sign	 of	 the	
classical	 forms	 of	 science	 still	 prevalent	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century:	
‘character’	 for	 living	 beings,	 ‘root’	 for	 languages,	money	 (or	 land)	 for	










Deleuze	 coins	 the	 concept	 “God-form”	 in	 order	 to	 express	 the	 relationship	
between	 a	 knowing	 subjectivity	 and	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 things	 to	 know	
determined	 by	 God.	 Thus,	 the	 God-form	 describes	 an	 episteme	 which	 makes	




their	 origin	 and	 determination	 by	 the	 subsuming	 genus.	 “Character”,	 “root”,	
“money”	and	“land”	are	also	origins	which	determine	series	of	things	organised	
according	 to	 this	 primordial	 origin:	 it	 is	 the	 characters	 of	 living	 beings	 which	








the	 primordial	 unfolding	 allowed	 by	 the	 infinity	 of	 God	 becomes	 a	 fold:	 an	
unavoidable	mismatch	caused	by	the	impermanence	of	the	object	of	knowledge	







of	 series:	 only	 the	 comparison	 can	 account	 for	 the	 variations	which	 existence	
introduces.	This	is	the	reason	why	Deleuze	writes:	
Everywhere	comparisons	replace	the	general	fact	that	was	so	dear	to	the	
seventeenth	 century:	 comparative	 anatomy,	 comparative	 philology,	
comparative	economy.	Everywhere	it	is	the	Fold	which	dominates	now,	
to	follow	Foucault’s	terminology,	and	this	fold	is	the	second	aspect	of	the	
active	 thought	 that	 becomes	 incarnated	 in	 the	 nineteenth-century	
development.	 The	 forces	 within	 man	 fall	 or	 fold	 back	 on	 this	 new	
dimension	of	in-depth	finitude,	which	then	becomes	the	finitude	of	man	
himself.	 The	 fold,	 as	 Foucault	 constantly	 says,	 is	 what	 constitutes	 a	
“thickness”	as	well	as	a	“hollow”.	(Deleuze:	1988,	128)	
	
In	Deleuze’s	 terminology,	 “the	 forces	within	man”	 indicate	 an	existence	which	
precedes	 fixation	 or	 formalisation.	 These	 forces	 (i.e.	 the	 lives	 of	 men)	 then	
become	 forms	of	man’s	 finitude	 fixated	as	 the	 “quasi-transcendentals”	of	 Life,	
Labour	and	Language.	The	impossibility	of	the	fold	or	the	impossible	reduction	of	
those	forces	into	knowledge	is	what	explains	their	“quasi”	character:	they	cannot	
constitute	 pure	 transcendentals	 because	 they	 cannot	 provide	 the	 absolute	
conditions	of	possibility	of	human	experience.	Because	the	lives	of	men	are	first	
of	 all	 a	 matter	 of	 historical	 existence,	 its	 essence	 cannot	 be	 known	 and	
determined	prior	to	experience	itself.		
	
	The	 conclusions	which	 Foucault	 develops	 in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 The	 Order	 of	
Things,	 which	 famously	 ends	 with	 the	 disappearance	 of	 man	 as	 an	
epistemological	 concept	 “like	 a	 face	 drawn	 in	 sand	 at	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 sea”	
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of	 this	 dispersion	 which	 it	 is	 simultaneously	 grouping	 together	 and	
spreading	out	before	us,	 indicated	compellingly	 from	every	side,	 is	an	
essential	 void:	 the	 necessary	 disappearance	 of	 that	 which	 is	 its	
foundation	-	of	the	person	it	resembles	and	the	person	in	whose	eyes	it	
is	only	a	resemblance.	This	very	subject	-	which	is	the	same	-	has	been	















regarding	 the	mutation	 of	 knowledge,	 truth	 and	 jurisdiction	 at	 the	 turn	 from	
Archaic	to	Classical	Greece	help	us	understand	the	mutation	of	knowledge,	truth	











existence)	 but	 gets	 displaced	 to	 a	more	 fundamental	 logos	 which	 the	 clinical	
experience	of	medical	knowledge,	amongst	other	modern	sciences,	attempt	to	
synthesize.	But	 the	 second	part	of	The	Order	of	Things	 tells	us	more	 than	 the	
dissolution	 of	 the	 fugacity	 of	 experience	 into	 the	 stability	 of	 a	 fundamental	











terminology,	 “the	 master	 who	 is	 representing”	 needs	 the	 stillness	 of	 “the	
sovereign	who	is	being	represented”.	In	The	Order	of	Things,	Foucault	writes:	
Homo	 oeconomicus	 is	 not	 the	 human	 being	 who	 represents	 his	 own	
needs	to	himself,	and	the	objects	capable	of	satisfying	them;	he	is	the	
human	beings	who	spends,	wears	out,	and	wastes	his	life	in	evading	the	
imminence	 of	 death.	He	 is	 a	 finite	 being:	 and	 just	 as,	 since	 Kant,	 the	
question	of	finitude	has	become	more	fundamental	than	the	analysis	of	











of	 Sexuality,	 confession	 ceases	 to	be	 “a	 test”	and	becomes	 “a	 sign”	 (Foucault:	
1998d,	67).	It	ceases	to	be	the	act	by	which	one	breaches	the	rule	and	opposes	
the	divine	law	and	becomes	the	symptom	of	a	natural	truth.	Finitude	is	not	what	





This	 is	 why	 the	 form	 of	 finitude	 which	 interests	 us	 most	 (i.e.	 Life	 as	“quasi-
transcendental”),	fixes	the	norms	according	to	which	the	rationality	of	the	living	
man	 can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 discourse	 of	 knowledge:	 that	 is	 when	 a	




to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 positive	 knowledge	 according	 to	 which	 what	 the	
individual	does	 starts	 to	 signify	beyond	 the	 strict	 immanence	of	 the	act.	With	




[…]	 There	 is,	 amongst	 the	 various	 social	 practices	 and	 power	
relationships	 to	 which	 these	 concepts	 are	 applied,	 no	 real	 common	
signified	which	corresponds	to	them;	there	is	on	the	contrary,	circulating	
throughout	 the	 social	 field	 and	 in	 between	 institutions,	 the	 signifiers	
such	 as	 “norm”,	 “normality”,	 “anormality”,	 etc.,	 in	 relation	 to	 which	
























jurisdiction	 which	 reduces	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 evanescent	 acts	 and	
















to	 Classical	 Greece	 and	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 Classical	 Age	 to	modernity.	 Unlike	



















necessary	to	reconsider	 the	sense	of	 the	Aristotelian	definition	of	 the	





















by	 the	 essence	 of	 politics	 itself	 (i.e.	 through	 the	 ontological	 determination	 of	
sovereign	power	which,	by	excluding	bare	life	from	the	sphere	of	right,	ultimately	
includes	 it	 as	 the	 direct	 object	 of	 the	 unrestrained	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign).	
Nevertheless,	what	Agamben	fails	to	understand	is	that	Foucault’s	description	of	
modern	politics	contrasts	with	this	definition:	 it	 is	not	the	ontology	of	political	




The	 historical	 torsion	 by	 virtue	 of	which	man	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 his	 own	
knowledge	 corresponds	 to	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 modern	 episteme	 I	 have	
described	 in	 the	 third	section	of	 the	previous	chapter.	 It	 is	as	 the	 result	of	an	
anthropological	 fold	 that	 modern	 man	 becomes	 an	 empirico-transcendental	
doublet	who	 takes	 his	 own	 existence	 as	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 and	 political	
intervention.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 epistemic	 shift	 Foucault	 targets	 in	 the	 first	
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volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality	corresponds	to	the	historical	emergence	of	a	






of	the	self	according	to	which	the	 individual	binds	himself	 to	his	own	 identity.	
Agamben	writes:	
As	shown	by	a	seminar	held	in	1982	at	the	University	of	Vermont,	in	his	
final	 years	 Foucault	 seemed	 to	 orient	 this	 analysis	 according	 to	 two	
distinct	 directives	 for	 research:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 study	 of	 the	
political	 techniques	 (such	as	 the	science	of	 the	police)	with	which	 the	
State	assumes	and	integrates	the	care	of	the	natural	life	of	individuals	







the	 individual	 to	 his	 identity,	 define	 the	 fixation	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 a	
subject	and	 its	objectification	(between	the	subject	and	his	existence	taken	as	
the	manifestation	of	his	nature	and	between	the	subject	and	his	own	 identity	
taken	 as	 the	manifestation	of	 this	 same	nature).	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 the	 subject	
becomes	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 which	 political	 techniques	 manage:	 this	
objectification	is	performed	on	the	basis	of	the	relationship	between	the	subject	





In	 both	 cases,	 what	 Foucault	 describes	 is	 the	 fixation	 by	 political	 power	 of	 a	
relationship	which	 defines	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 natural	 ontology	 –	 an	 ontology	
which	becomes	the	focal	point	from	which	the	historical	establishment	of	such	a	


















undertaken	 here	 has	 revealed	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 ontology	 expressing	
nature	 (either	 the	possibility	of	 a	discourse	expressing	 the	nature	of	 things	 in	
                                                
97	As	Muriel	Combes	claims,	there	is	“a	modality	of	objectivation	of	the	subject	by	itself,	of	auto-
constitution	 as	 subject	 within	 auto-subjecting	 procedures”	 [“une	 modalité	 d’objectivation	 du	




modernity)	 proceeds	 from	 the	 fixation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 acts	 and	
discourse	through	the	symbolism	Foucault	describes	when	he	reads	Sophocles’	
Oedipus	Rex.	As	Revel	explains,	the	emergence	of	the	concept	of	nature	as	an	




use	 for	 this	 reference	 to	 the	 natural,	 which	 is	 in	 itself	 absolutely	







and	 an	 ontological	 discourse	 which	 determines	 the	 true	 discourse	 about	 this	
object:	 it	 thus	masks	 the	 fundamental	 heterogeneity	which	makes	 it	 a	 power	
relationship.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why	 political	 modernity	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 both	
"political	techniques	[…]	with	which	the	State	assumes	and	integrates	the	care	of	
the	 natural	 life	 of	 individuals"	 as	 well	 as	 "technologies	 of	 the	 self	 by	 which	
processes	 of	 subjectivization	 bring	 the	 individual	 to	 bind	 himself	 to	 his	 own	
identity"	(Agamben:	1998,	11).		
	

















governed,	 a	 family	 can	be	 governed,	 someone	 can	be	 governed.	And	
when	I	say	“govern	someone”,	it	is	simply	in	the	sense	of	determining	
their	 conduct	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 strategies,	 using	 a	 certain	 number	 of	
tactics.	 So,	 if	 you	 will,	 it	 is	 governmentality	 in	 the	 broadest	 sense,	
understood	 as	 a	 set	 of	 relations	 of	 power	 and	 techniques	 that	 allow	
these	power	relations	to	be	exercised	–	this	is	what	I	tried	to	study.	How	
have	we	governed	the	mad?	How	did	we	pose	the	problem	of	governing	
the	 sick?	 And	 once	 again,	 I	 put	 the	word	 “government”	 in	 quotation	
marks,	giving	it	at	once	a	vast	and	rich	meaning	–	how	did	we	govern	the	
sick;	what	was	done	with	them;	what	status	did	we	give	them;	where	did	
we	put	 them,	 in	what	system	of	 treatment,	of	surveillance	as	well,	of	
care-taking,	of	philanthropy,	in	what	economic	field	was	care	brought	to	
the	sick…	I	 think	that	all	of	 this	should	be	explored.	 (Foucault:	2014b,	
240)		
	








of	 government”,	 since	 in	 using	 the	 word	 “to	 govern”	 I	 left	 out	 the	
thousand	and	one	different	modalities	and	possible	ways	that	exist	for	




considered,	 and	 again	 this	 year	will	 only	 consider	 the	 government	 of	
men	insofar	as	it	appears	as	the	exercise	of	political	sovereignty.	[…]	I	
wanted	to	study	the	art	of	governing,	that	is	to	say,	the	reasoned	way	of	
governing	best	and,	at	 the	same	 time,	 reflection	on	 the	best	possible	
way	 of	 governing.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 grasp	 the	 level	 of	
reflection	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 government	 and	 on	 the	 practice	 of	
government.	In	a	sense,	I	wanted	to	study	government’s	consciousness	




and	 outside	 government,	 and	 anyway	 as	 close	 as	 possible	 to	
governmental	practice.	I	would	like	to	try	to	determine	the	way	in	which	
the	 domain	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 government,	with	 its	 different	 objects,	
general	rules,	and	overall	objectives,	was	established	so	as	to	govern	in	
the	 best	 possible	 way.	 In	 short,	 we	 could	 call	 this	 the	 study	 of	
rationalization	 of	 governmental	 practice	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	
sovereignty.	(Foucault:	2008b,	2)		
	
Both	 definitions	 agree	 upon	 the	 fact	 that	 governmentality	 concerns	 the	
determination	or	direction	of	the	conduct	of	men.	In	the	definition	provided	in	
The	 Birth	 of	 Biopolitics,	 Foucault	 adds	 that	 he	 did	 not	 plan	 to	 look	 at	 the	
successive	forms	that	governmentality	has	taken	in	history	but	rather	the	way	in	
which	the	“best	possible	way	of	governing”	has	been	determined,	that	is	to	say	






years	 earlier,	 he	was	 claiming	 to	 try	 and	 “grasp	 the	 level	 of	 reflection	 in	 the	
practice	 of	 government	 and	 on	 the	 practice	 of	 government”	 that	 “was	








but	 to	a	practice	 taken	within	 sets	of	power	 relationships	defining	 techniques	
which	take	part	in	directing	this	practice.	What	Security,	Territory,	Population	and	
The	Birth	of	Biopolitics	focus	on	is	the	historical	formation	of	the	“rationalization	




lives.	 The	 confrontation	 of	 these	 two	 heterogeneous	 elements	 (i.e.	 the	 law	
known,	performed	and	actualized	by	the	sovereign	and	the	conduct	of	the	lives	
of	men	whose	formalization	happens	a	posteriori)	is	another	way	of	expressing	







[…]	 the	 reason	 from	which	norms	receive	 their	 legitimacy	 is	not	a	pure	
reason,	which	as	such	 is	disengaged	 from	any	relation	with	experience,	




it	 appears	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 course	 of	 things	with	which	 it	 tends	 to	
confound	itself.	This	is	the	reason	why	the	sort	of	obligation	that	norms	




Macherey’s	 thesis,	 according	 to	 which	 norms	 proceed	 from	 “a	 reason	 which	
comes	from	below”,	refers	to	Foucault’s	point	from	the	first	volume	of	the	History	
of	Sexuality	according	to	which	“power	comes	from	below”:	




very	 depths	 of	 the	 social	 body.	 One	 must	 suppose	 rather	 that	 the	
manifold	relationships	of	force	that	take	shape	and	come	into	play	in	the	





concerned	 with	 the	 defense	 of	 a	 territory	 and	 of	 a	 people	 is	 fundamentally	
heterogenous	to	the	logic	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics:	it	is	no	longer	concerned	
                                                
98	“[…]	 la	 raison	dont	 les	normes	 tirent	 leur	 légitimité	n’est	pas	une	 raison	pure,	 comme	 telle	






















other	 power	 relationships	 function	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 only	 relationships	 of	
power	which	influence	each	other.	This	is	the	reason	why	Foucault	adds	that	“one	
is	 always	 ‘inside’	 power,	 there	 is	 no	 ‘escaping’	 it”	 (Foucault:	 1998d,	 95).	 But	
Foucault’s	 rejection	 of	 a	 conception	 of	 power	 which	 posits	 the	 primacy	 of	 a	




the	 case	 that	 the	 impossible	 correspondence	 between	 an	 ontological	
determination	of	the	conduct	of	individuals	and	their	immanent	existence	makes	





The	 epistemological	 and	 ethical	 implications	 of	 refusing	 a	 metaphysical	
understanding	 of	 life	 have	 been	 clearly	 identified	 in	 Foucault’s	 work	 by	
Macherey,	 who	 sees	 in	 the	 irreducibility	 of	 the	 immanence	 of	 existence	 to	
rational	 knowledge	 the	mark	 of	 an	 unavoidable	mismatch	 between	 the	 truth	
sought	 and	 spoken	by	 the	discourses	of	 human	 sciences	 and	 the	existence	of	







We	 thus	 see	 how	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 norm,	 in	 the	 relationship	 it	
maintains	 with	 society	 and	 the	 subject,	 also	 refers	 to	 the	 distinction	
between	the	two	possible	forms	of	knowledge	stressed	in	The	Order	of	
Things:	 the	 one	 of	 an	 abstract	 grid	 of	 rationality,	 hanging	 over	 the	










rationalité,	 surplombant	 le	 domaine	 des	 objets	 qu’elle	 est	 censée	 “représenter”	 en	 les	







refer	 to	 one	 and	 the	 same	 epistemic	 configuration	 according	 to	 which	 the	
rationality	of	knowledge	and	truth	constitutes	a	truth	which	precedes	the	strict	
immanence	 of	 the	 subject’s	 existence	 and	 ultimately	 determines	 its	 validity.	
Rather	 than	 “two	 possible	 forms	 of	 knowledge”,	 it	 is	 one	 and	 the	 same	
morphology	of	knowledge	which	acquires	its	positivity	from	the	primacy	of	the	
immanence	 of	 the	 objects	 it	 takes	 into	 account:	 the	 lives	 of	 individuals	 as	





which	overcomes	 the	 immanent	 experience	of	 the	doctor	 and	patient.	 In	 this	
context,	 what	 is	 seen	 by	 the	 doctor	 and	 said	 by	 the	 patient	 partake	 in	 a	
knowledge	 validated	 by	 the	 precedence	 of	 a	 transcendental	 truth	 which	
constitutes	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	 clinical	 experience.	 Macherey	
writes:	
One	sees	that	the	game	of	the	“said”	and	the	“seen”	through	which	such	




                                                
100	“On	voit	que	le	jeu	du	“dit”	et	du	“vu”	à	travers	lequel	se	noue	une	telle	“expérience”	passe	
par-dessus	le	malade	et	 le	médecin	lui-même,	pour	réaliser	cette	forme	historique	a	priori	qui	




The	 reference	 to	 the	 symbolic	 complementarity	 of	 the	 “said”	 and	 the	 “seen”	
resolved	in	an	a	priori	logos	constitutes	an	echo	of	the	morphology	of	knowledge	














With	 the	 conditions	 which	 make	 the	 clinical	 experience	 possible,	
death,	and	with	 it	 life	 too,	ceases	 to	be	an	ontological	or	existential	
absolute	and	simultaneously	acquires	an	epistemological	dimension.	





                                                
101	“Dans	les	conditions	qui	rendent	possible	l’expérience	clinique,	la	mort,	et	avec	elle	aussi	la	














Sexuality,	 calls	 the	 sovereign	 “Right	 of	 Death”),	 becomes	 an	 ontological	




appears	 when	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 subject,	 understood	 as	 an	 immanent	
relationship	 towards	others	and	 the	world,	disappears.	This	 is	 the	 reason	why	
clinical	knowledge,	derived	from	the	symbolic	encounter	of	the	seen	and	the	said,	
annihilates	 the	 problem	 of	 life	 as	 immanent	 existence	 and	 yet	 prevents	 the	
disappearance	of	life	as	a	positive	concept:	the	rationality	of	life,	grounded	upon	
an	a	priori	knowledge	and	truth	which	survive	the	individual	existence	of	men,	






we	 have	 not	 yet	 escaped,	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 a	 return	 to	 the	 forms	 of	
finitude	 in	 which	 death	 is	 no	 doubt	 the	 most	 menacing,	 but	 also	 the	
fullest.	 Hölderlin’s	 Empedocles,	 reaching,	 by	 voluntary	 steps,	 the	 very	
edge	 of	 Etna,	 is	 the	 death	 of	 the	 last	 mediator	 between	mortals	 and	
Olympus,	the	end	of	the	infinite	on	earth,	the	flame	returning	to	its	native	
fire,	 leaving	 as	 its	 sole	 remaining	 trace	 that	which	 had	 precisely	 to	 be	
abolished	by	this	death:	the	beautiful,	enclosed	form	of	individuality;	after	
Empedocles,	 the	 world	 is	 placed	 under	 the	 sign	 of	 finitude,	 in	 that	
irreconcilable,	intermediate	state	in	which	reigns	the	Law,	the	harsh	law	






figures	 of	 knowledge	 and	 those	 of	 language	 should	 obey	 the	 same	
profound	law,	and	that	the	irruption	of	finitude	should	dominate,	in	the	
same	 way,	 this	 relation	 of	 man	 to	 death,	 which,	 in	 the	 first	 case,	





relationship	 to	 finitude	 which	 was	 ultimately	 tragic:	 it	 is	 when	 Empedocles	
attempts	to	overcome	his	human	condition	and	prove	he	is	a	god	that	he	commits	
suicide.	His	death,	the	mark	of	a	negative	finitude,	shows	the	clash	between	the	








thinking	 which	 sees	 in	 the	 forms	 taken	 by	 finitude	 the	 attempt	 to	 ascribe	 a	
positive	 form	 to	 the	 finite	 and	 allow	 its	 return	 as	 metaphysical	 and	
epistemological	origin.	It	is	when	individual	existence	ceases	that	the	objectivity	
of	 life	 appears	 as	 an	 object	 of	 knowledge	 and	 truth	 which	 paradoxically	
legitimates	 types	 of	 existence	 to	 come.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	
normativity	constitutive	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	constitutes	the	a	posteriori	
fixation,	in	the	domain	of	knowledge,	of	existences	which	become	the	objects	of	
political	 strategies:	 the	 scientific	normality	 (hence	 the	 identification	of	normal	
and	abnormal	 conducts)	 constitutes	an	attempt	at	 imposing	a	positive	 (hence	
representable)	 understanding	 upon	 modes	 of	 existence	 escaping	 a	 priori	
prediction.		
	
Within	 this	 framework,	 the	 logic	 of	 norms	 corresponds	 to	 a	 mode	 of	
governmentality	 which	 deals	 with	 the	 negative	 and	 turns	 it	 into	 predictable	
positivity:	 it	 is	 a	matter	 of	making	 actual,	 in	 relation	 to	 truth	 and	 knowledge,	
immanent	conducts	which	acquire	a	“quasi-transcendental”	possibility	since	they	
are	the	basis	from	which	the	meaning	of	lives	(understood	as	individual	existence)	







already	 in	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 Birth	 of	 the	 Clinic,	 “the	 subjective	 and	 the	
objective	exchange	faces”	(Foucault:	2003a,	245).	Therefore,	the	concept	of	norm	
will	serve	as	a	way	of	naming	the	alienation	of	individual	lives	into	the	objectivity	










[S]ociety	 […]	 is	 that	which	at	 the	 same	 time	 "makes	 comparable	 and	




















applied	 to	 body	 and	 population	 alike,	 which	 will	 make	 it	 possible	 to	
control	both	the	disciplinary	order	of	the	body	and	the	aleatory	events	
that	 occur	 in	 the	 biological	 multiplicity.	 The	 element	 that	 circulates	
between	the	two	is	the	norm.	The	norm	is	something	that	can	be	applied	
to	both	a	body	one	wishes	to	discipline	and	a	population	one	wishes	to	
regularize.	 The	 normalizing	 society	 is	 therefore	 not,	 under	 these	
conditions,	a	sort	of	generalized	disciplinary	society	whose	disciplinary	
institutions	 have	 swarmed	 and	 finally	 taken	 over	 everything	 –	 that,	 I	
think,	 is	 no	 more	 than	 a	 first	 and	 inadequate	 interpretation	 of	 a	
normalizing	 society.	 The	 normalizing	 society	 is	 a	 society	 in	which	 the	
norm	 of	 discipline	 and	 the	 norm	 of	 regulation	 intersect	 along	 an	
orthogonal	articulation.	To	say	that	power	took	possession	of	life	in	the	
nineteenth	 century,	 is	 to	 say	 that	 it	 has,	 thanks	 to	 the	 play	 of	
technologies	 of	 discipline	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 technologies	 of	
regulation	on	the	other,	succeeded	in	covering	the	whole	surface	that	






episteme.	 Because	 it	 precedes	 immanent	 acts	 which	 it	 determines	 as	 always	
latent,	this	concept	makes	possible	the	categorization	of	behaviours	yet	to	take	
place	whilst	seeing	in	their	actualization	the	confirmation	of	their	epistemological	
validity.	The	concept	of	population	refers	 to	an	ongoing	process	 rather	 than	a	
strictly	 achieved	 and	 finite	 reality.	 It	 is	 the	 reason	 why,	 as	 Foucault	 puts	 it,	
biopolitics	deals	with	"a	population	one	wishes	to	regularize".	The	concepts	of	
"regularization"	 and	 "normalization"	 refer	 to	 an	unfinished	process	whose	 so-
called	"natural"	manifestation	makes	it	possible	to	bring	it	back	into	the	positive	
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field	 of	 truth	 and	 knowledge.	 The	 orthogonal	 junction	 Foucault	 mentions	 in	






Such	 a	 reading	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 not	 see	 a	 strong	 proximity	 between	 the	




the	 said.	 Whereas	 the	 final	 discovery	 of	 truth	 in	 the	 play	 links	 the	 truth	 of	
Oedipus'	identity	to	the	confession	of	the	messenger	who	links	his	testimony	to	
what	he	has	seen,	the	logic	of	normalization	overcomes	the	strict	framework	of	
actuality.	With	biopolitics,	what	matters	 is	not	so	much	the	 truth-value	of	 the	
event	 as	 such	 but	 rather	 all	 the	 potentialities	 the	 manifestation	 of	 a	 nature	
signifies	 and	heralds.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 in	Security,	 Territory,	 Population,	
Foucault	defines	the	logic	of	modern	governmentality	as	one	which	breaks	away	
from	the	one	of	law	and	disciplinarity.	Foucault	writes:	
We	could	even	say	that	the	 law	works	 in	the	 imaginary,	since	the	 law	
imagines	and	can	only	formulate	all	the	things	that	could	and	must	not	
be	done	by	imagining	them.	It	imagines	the	negative.	Discipline	works	in	
a	sphere	that	 is,	as	 it	were,	complementary	to	reality.	Man	 is	wicked,	
bad,	 and	 has	 evil	 thoughts	 and	 inclinations,	 etcetera.	 So,	 within	 the	
disciplinary	 space	 a	 complementary	 sphere	 of	 prescriptions	 and	
obligations	is	constituted	that	is	all	the	more	artificial	and	constraining	
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So,	 I	 think	we	arrive	at	 this	 idea	 that	 is	essential	 for	 the	 thought	and	
organization	of	modern	political	societies:	that	the	task	of	politics	is	not	
to	 see	 to	 the	 establishment	within	men's	 behavior	 of	 the	 set	 of	 laws	
imposed	 by	God	 or	 necessitated	 by	men's	 evil	 nature.	 Politics	 has	 to	
work	 in	the	element	of	a	reality	 that	the	physiocrats	called,	precisely,	
physics,	when	they	said	that	economics	is	a	physics.	When	they	say	this,	
they	 are	 not	 aiming	 so	 much	 at	 materiality	 in	 the,	 if	 you	 like,	 post-
Hegelian	 sense	 of	 the	 word	 "matter",	 but	 are	 actually	 aiming	 at	 the	
reality	that	is	the	only	datum	on	which	politics	must	act	and	with	which	
it	must	act.	Only	ever	situating	oneself	 in	this	 interplay	of	reality	with	











(i.e.	 the	 heterogeneity	 between	 the	 said	 and	 the	 seen,	 words	 and	 things	 or	
knowledge	 and	 power)	 is	 concealed.	 The	 example	 of	 the	 physiocrats	 clearly	
reveals	that	the	structure	of	the	anthropological	fold	(and	already	the	structure	
of	knowledge	and	truth	which	emerges	with	Classical	Greece)	makes	it	impossible	
to	grasp	 the	 fundamental	heterogeneity	between	words	and	 things.	But	what	
bio-power	adds	to	the	obliteration	of	this	heterogeneity	is	the	fact	that,	with	the	









but	 rather	 the	 simultaneous	 reconstitution	 and	 alienation	 of	 the	 question	 of	
sovereignty:	 the	 coincidence	 of	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 (i.e.	 the	
coincidence	 between	 sovereign	 power	 and	 sovereign	 knowledge),	 which	
characterized	the	performative	power	of	the	sovereign	finds	a	counterpart	in	the	
modern	 concept	 of	 nature	whose	 “interplay	with	 itself”	makes	 the	 knowable	
always	 already	 achieved	 and	 the	 achieved	 always	 already	 knowable:	 the	
coincidence	between	human	nature	and	its	simultaneous	intelligibility	prevents	
an	ethical	reflection	or	political	critique	aiming	at	problematizing	life	as	a	praxis	
questioning	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 self	 and	 others	 or	 the	 self	 and	 the	
world.	
	
                                                
103	Contrary	to	Daniel	Zamora’s	argument	in	his	recent	Foucault,	 les	exclus	et	 le	dépérissement	
neoliberal	 de	 l’Etat,	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 that	 Foucault	 saw	 in	 neoliberal	 politics	 the	 overcoming	 of	
normativity	and	a	possible	emancipation	of	the	subject.	According	to	Zamora,	“homo	economicus	
is	an	agent	whose	rational	calculations	are	the	only	object	of	interest,	his	choices	are	not	judged	
from	 a	moral	 standpoint	 but	merely	 understood	 through	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 interest.”	 [“L’homo	
economicus	est	un	agent	dont	seuls	les	calculs	rationnels	intéressent,	ses	choix	ne	sont	donc	as	
jugés	d’un	point	 de	 vue	moral	mais	 simplement	 compris	 au	 travers	 de	 son	 intérêt.”]	 (Zamora:	









the	 politics	 of	 laisser-faire	 is	 actually	 at	 the	 very	 centre	 of	 the	 biopolitical	
question:	what	this	political	framework	obliterates	is	the	fact	that	facticity	itself	
is	a	historical	construct	and	that	the	laisser-faire	as	manifestation	of	a	truth	which	




that	 the	political	 task	which	corresponds	 to	biopolitical	modernity	 is,	 as	Revel	
puts	 it	 in	 Foucault	 avec	 Merleau-Ponty:	 Ontologie,	 Politique,	 Présentime	 et	
Histoire,	not	to	forget	that:	
[…]	meaning	[…]	is	diacritical	–	that	is	to	say	[…]	that	meaning	does	not	
spring	 from	 simple	 elements,	 but	 always	 from	 the	 background	 of	
complex	 establishments	 of	 relationships	 between	 heterogeneous	
elements	 –,	 […]	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 meaning	 production,	 one	 finds	 a	
fundamental	 “negativity”,	 that	 consequently	 does	 not	 mean	 that	
language	is	affected	by	a	lack	of	being	or	by	a	finitude	that	would	limit	
its	power	[puissance].	On	the	contrary,	this	negativity	takes	the	form	of	
an	oxymoron:	since	 it	allows	emergence,	 it	 is	 in	some	way	and	rather	
surprisingly	a	positive	negativity	which	produces	something	where	there	
was	nothing	–	since	before	composing,	through	their	arbitrary	gathering	
[assemblage],	 the	double	“difference”	which	grounds	 the	sign	and,	 in	
between	the	gap	between	signs,	meaning	all	at	the	same	time,	none	of	
terms	put	together	had	an	intrinsic	value.104	(Revel:	2015,	166)	





limiterait	 la	 puissance.	 Bien	 au	 contraire,	 cette	 négativité	 présente	 la	 forme	 d’un	 oxymore:	
puisqu’elle	 permet	 le	 surgissement,	 c’est	 en	 quelque	 sorte,	 et	 de	 manière	 étonnante,	 une	
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The	 “diacritical”	 dimension	 of	 meaning,	 applied	 by	 Revel	 to	 the	 relationship	



















ethical	 work.	 In	 this	 respect,	 I	 agree	 with	 Macherey	 who	 identifies	 a	 direct	







of	 an	 “art	 of	 living”	 [art	 de	 vivre]	 (Macherey:	 2009,	 106)	 which	 allows	 the	
deontologization	 of	 the	 correspondence	 between	 one’s	 acts	 and	 the	
manifestation	of	one’s	own	nature.	Macherey	writes:	








acquires	 with	 modern	 clinical	 experience	 and	 the	 meaning	 of	 “aesthetics	 of	
existence”	which	Foucault	develops	in	the	last	volumes	of	the	History	of	Sexuality:	
“learning	to	die”	corresponds	to	an	ethical	attitude	which	puts	oneself	in	a	critical	
position	 towards	 one’s	 own	 life	 (or	 towards	 one’s	 own	 conduct).	 If	 clinical	
experience	finds	in	the	positivity	of	death	the	rules	that	cast	meaning	upon	the	
life	of	man	taken	as	object	of	knowledge,	taking	the	risk	to	die	means	taking	the	
risk	 to	 question	 the	 rules	 which	 govern	 one’s	 life.	 Such	 a	 perpetual	 ethical	
questioning,	which	 Foucault	will	 emphasize	 very	 strongly	when	he	 studies	 the	
case	 of	 Cynical	 parrhesia	 in	 his	 last	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France),	
appears	as	the	necessary	condition	of	ethical	sovereignty.106		
                                                
105	“Et	on	pourrait	voir	 ici	 l’esquisse	de	ce	que,	dans	ses	derniers	écrits,	M.	Foucault	appellera	















manifestation	 which	 is	 preserved.	 Potte-Bonneville	 reminds	 us,	 in	 his	 essay	
“Disparaître”,	that	aisthesis	means	“sensation”	in	Greek	(Potte-Bonneville:	2012,	




imperceptibility	 of	 movement	 is	 the	 condition	 of	 a	 perception	
authentically	restored.107	(Potte-Bonneville:	2012,	154-155)	
	






world.	 If	 this	 allows	 “a	 perception	 authentically	 restored”,	 it	 is	 because	 the	
possibility	 of	 revaluing	 ethical	 and	 political	 conducts	 of	 the	 self	 and	 others	
                                                
Enfin,	 la	vie	cynique	est	une	vie	 immobile	et	souveraine:	 leur	empire	est	absolu.”]	 (Gros:	2002,	
165).	
107	“Sensation	qui	peut	d’ailleurs	être	directement	politique	[…]	Autrement	dit	encore,	s’il	 faut	
travailler	 à	 devenir	 imperceptible,	 c’est	 que	 l’imperceptibilité	 du	mouvement	 est	 la	 condition	
d’une	perception	redevenue	véritablement	telle.”	
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ultimately	 deontologize	 power	 relationships	 and	 shows	 that	 power	 and	
knowledge,	 if	 always	 reciprocally	 dependent,	 also	 maintain	 a	 fundamental	







It	 is	 in	 Subjectivité	 et	 Vérité,	 the	 1980-1981	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	
France,	that	the	definition	of	the	concept	of	 life	as	a	relationship	between	the	
self,	others	and	the	world	is	identified.	In	the	14th	January	1981	lecture,	Foucault	
specifically	 links	 the	 Greek	 bios	 to	 three	 Greek	 concepts	 which	 define	 the	
economy	of	the	arts	of	living	in	Classical	Greece:	mathesis,	askêsis	and	meletè.	





must	 be	 considered	 as	 true,	 it	 is	 what	 the	 Greeks	 called	 meletè	
(meditation,	reflection	upon).	And	finally,	this	work	of	trial,	of	successive	
and	 progressive	 attempts	 to	 see	where	 one	 stands	 and	whether	 one	
progresses	well,	it	is	this	very	dimension	that	the	Greeks	called	askêsis	
(asceticism).	Mathêsis,	meletè,	askêsis,	 these	are	 three	elements	 that	
you	will	find	[in	the	arts	of	living].	[…]	In	fact	the	Greeks	[…]	have	a	word	
that	designates	very	precisely	that	with	which	these	arts	of	conducting	
oneself	must	 be	 concerned.	 It	 is	 the	word	bios.	 You	 know	 that,	 for	 a	
Greek,	 there	are	 two	verbs	–	 that	we	 translate	by	one	and	 the	 same	






















relationship	 towards	 others	 proper	 to	 teaching	 and	 the	 relationship	 towards	
oneself	founded	on	a	practice	of	reflection	upon	one’s	own	attitude)	both	imply	
                                                
108	“Rapport	aux	autres,	enseignement:	c’est	ce	que,	dans	le	vocabulaire	grec	des	arts	de	vivre,	
on	 appelait	 la	mathêsis.	 Rapport	 à	 la	 vérité,	 c’est-à-dire:	 réflexion	 permanente	 et	 sans	 cesse	
reprise	de	ce	qu’on	a	eisengné	et	de	ce	que	l’on	doit	considérer	comme	vrai,	c’est	ce	que	les	Grecs	
appelaient	 la	meletê	 (la	 méditation,	 la	 réflexion	 sur).	 Et	 enfin	 ce	 travail	 d’épreuve,	 d’essais	
successifs,	progressifs,	pour	voir	où	on	en	est	et	si	on	progresse	bien,	c’est	cette	dimension-là	que	
les	Grecs	appelaient	l’askesis	(l’ascèse).	Mathêsis,	meletê,	askesis,	ce	sont	trois	éléments	que	vous	












form	 of	 knowledge	 or	 natural	 truth	 but	 upon	 a	 practice	 which	 implies	 a	
relationship	towards	alterity	–	either	the	alterity	of	the	ethical	self	upon	which	
one	reflects,	or	the	alterity	of	other	individuals.	This	practice	towards	oneself	and	
others	 is	 completed	 by	 the	 third	 dimension	 of	 the	 arts	 of	 existence	 (askêsis),	
which	requires	a	retrospective	evaluation	of	one's	progress.	The	concept	of	bios	












on	 the	 fact	 that	 “biotechnics”	could	 translate	 these	arts	of	 living	 (tekhnai	peri	
bion),	 except	 that	 the	 term	 “biotechnics”	 itself	 connotes	 the	 techniques	 of	
modern	 biology	 and	 its	 scientific	 understanding	 of	 life	 as	 object	 of	
epistemological	 positivism.	 Rather,	 he	 suggests	 the	 term	 “biopoetics”	 which	




precisely	 biotechnics.	 But	 of	 course,	 the	 word	 couldn’t	 really	 be	
employed,	 for	 the	 meaning	 given	 to	 it	 nowadays	 leads	 us	 towards	
something	 completely	different.	 So	much	 so	 that	 instead	of	 the	 term	
biotechnics,	I	would	rather	use,	in	order	to	designate	what	is	in	question	
in	 these	 arts	 of	 living,	 the	 expression:	 technique	 of	 the	 self	 –	 or	
technology	 of	 the	 self,	 as	 what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	 all	 those	 practices	 are	
procedures	 that	 are	 reflected	 upon,	 elaborated,	 systematized	 and	






















désigner	 ce	 qui	 est	 en	 question	 dans	 ces	 arts	 de	 vivre,	 plutôt	 que	 le	 terme	 de	 biotechnique	
employer	l’expression:	technique	de	soi	-	ou	technologie	du	soi	puisqu’il	s’agit,	dans	toutes	ces	
















government	of	 the	 self	 appears:	 this	 conduct	 is	never	 reduced	 to	a	 finite	 and	
positive	object	but	implies	a	necessary	position	of	critical	exteriority	which	makes	
possible	the	problematization	of	the	relationship	of	the	self	to	 itself,	to	others	
and	 to	 the	 world. 112 	The	 maintenance	 of	 such	 a	 relationship	 avoids	 the	
ontological	reductionism	of	the	self	to	a	subject	who	manifests	the	truth	of	his	
nature.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 expression	 “aesthetics	 of	 the	 self”	
should	be	understood	as	a	designation	of	the	conditions	according	to	which	our	
life	(i.e.	the	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world)	appears	to	the	self.	By	
challenging	 the	 metaphysical	 understanding	 of	 the	 subject	 sought	 by	 human	
sciences,	 Foucault	 attempts	 to	 disrupt	 both	 the	 intrinsic	 relationship	 it	
establishes	between	the	essence	of	life	(the	truth	of	human	nature)	and	the	form	
it	concretely	takes:	if	the	conduct	of	men	does	not	reveal	the	expression	of	an	
intrinsic	nature	but	 rather	 the	strict	manifestation	of	power	 relationships	 that	
change	 historically,	 life	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 the	 manifestation	 of	 a	 nature	
                                                
Foucault	was	providing	us	with	a	morality	for	our	epoch.	Of	course,	as	soon	as	it	is	a	matter	of	
morality,	many	people	do	 sit	 up	and	 take	notice.	But	was	 that	 really	what	 Foucault	 originally	






concern	 of	 truth,	 is	 the	 ethical	 foundation	 of	 the	 practice	 of	 freedom	 as	 an	 historico-critical	
experience	 of	 bios.”	 [“La	 pratique	 de	 la	 vérité,	 le	 dire	 vrai,	 comme	 attitude,	 comme	 êthos	























ontological	 relationship	 towards	 the	 truth	of	 the	world:	 the	 knowledge	which	










at	 the	end	of	The	Hermeneutics	of	 the	Subject,	Foucault	 is	 lead	 to	nuance	 the	
concept	 of	 bios	 introduced	 in	 Subjectivité	 et	 Vérité.	 As	 he	 concludes	 the	 24th	
March	1982	lecture,	Foucault	calls	bios	“the	way	in	which	the	world	immediately	
appears	to	us”.	He	writes:	
That	 bios,	 that	 life	 –	 by	 which	 I	 mean	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 world	
immediately	 appears	 to	 us	 in	 the	 course	 of	 our	 existence	 –	 is	 a	 test	
should	be	understood	 in	 two	senses.	Test	 in	 the	sense	of	experience,	
that	 is	 to	say	the	world	 is	 recognized	as	being	that	through	which	we	














thought	 corresponds	 to	 a	 covering	 of	 the	 epimeleia	 heautou	 by	 the	 gnothi	
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seauton	through	a	reading	of	Plato’s	Alcibiades.	Foucault	wants	to	show	that	the	
political	 initiation	of	Alcibiades,	 through	which	he	 should	 transform	himself	 in	









self)	 are	 entangled.	 Throughout	 the	 text	 you	 can	 see	 two	 things	
entangled:	by	 reminding	him	 that	he	would	do	well	 to	 take	a	 look	at	





































said).	 When	 Foucault	 studies	 the	 spiritual	 schools	 succeeding	 Platonism	 and	
preceding	 Christianity	 in	 Ancient	 Greece	 and	 Rome	 (mainly	 Stoicism	 and	
Epicureanism),	he	 focuses	on	the	 fact	 that	 these	schools	offered	a	contrasting	
problematization	of	the	relationship	between	care	and	knowledge.	According	to	
him,	 this	 relationship	 was	 not	 one	 of	 the	 overlapping	 of	 gnothi	 seauton	 by	




and	adjective.	 It	 is	 the	expression,	or	 series	of	expressions,	of	words:	
ethopoiein,	 ethopoiia,	 ethopoios.	 Ethopoiein	 means	 making	 ethos,	
producing	ethos,	changing,	transforming	ethos,	the	individual’s	way	of	
being,	his	mode	of	existence.	Ethopoios	is	something	that	possesses	the	





knowledge	of	 the	 gods)	 can	produce	ethos.	 And	 it	 is	 this	 that	marks,	

















the	 coincidence	 between	 power	 and	 knowledge	 he	 describes	 in	 “Truth	 and	
Juridical	Forms”,	which	corresponds	to	the	expression	of	truth	shifting	from	the	
sovereign	 act	 of	 its	 expression	 to	 the	 divorce	 between	 the	 said	 and	 the	 seen	




and	 of	 the	 world.	 However,	 this	 knowledge	 does	 not	 define	 a	 determination	
which	seeks	to	establish	the	nature	of	the	self	or	 its	relation	to	truth,	but	one	
which	allows	the	establishment	of	a	relationship	between	the	self	and	itself.	In	
this	 case	 the	 self,	 made	 aware	 of	 the	 way	 it	 lives	 its	 life,	 can	 be	 led	 to	 live	
differently.	What	Foucault	claims	to	 identify,	between	Platonic	philosophy	and	
Christianity,	is	an	alternative	way	of	thinking	and	problematizing	the	relationship	
between	 the	 self,	 bios	 and	 the	world	which	 occurs	 in	 Cynicism,	 Stoicism	 and	
Epicureanism.	 For	 example,	 Foucault	 describes	 Stoic	 philosophy	 as	 a	 way	 of	




Whereas	 the	 Platonic	movement	 consisted	 in	 turning	 away	 from	 this	
world	 in	order	 to	 look	 towards	another	–	even	 if	 souls,	who,	 through	
recollection,	have	rediscovered	and	savoured	the	reality	they	have	seen,	
are	led	more	by	force	than	by	their	own	will	back	to	this	world	in	order	
to	 govern	 it	 -	 the	 Stoic	 movement	 defined	 by	 Seneca	 is	 completely	
different.	It	involves	a	sort	of	stepping	back	from	the	point	we	occupy.	
This	 liberation	 enables	 us	 to	 reach	 the	 highest	 region	 of	 the	 world	







                                                
114	Seneca’s	Letter	XXVII	is	a	good	example	of	a	philosophical	guidance	which	applies	not	only	to	














We	see	that	 the	Stoics	use	 the	knowledge	of	 the	world	 in	order	 to	be	able	 to	
reflect,	at	the	same	time,	upon	the	life	of	the	self	within	this	world.	As	Foucault	
puts	 it,	 this	point	of	view	is	the	perspective	“from	which	God	himself	sees	the	
world”:	 it	 is	 a	 sovereign	point	 of	 view	 that	 allows	 a	 knowledge	 that	 does	 not	




through	which	 the	 self	 takes	 its	bios	 (i.e.	 its	 existence	within	 the	world)	 as	 a	
matter	of	ongoing	formation.		
	




as	 the	 true	sovereign	who,	because	he	denounces	 the	 intrinsic	 facticity	of	 the	
practices	men	hold	for	true	values	everywhere	he	goes,	he	also	performs	that	
sagittal	 perspective	 upon	men’s	 existence	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 permanent	
critique.	During	the	21st	March	1984	lecture,	Foucault	writes:	
The	 Cynic,	 who	 was	 only	 a	 king	 of	 poverty,	 and	 a	 hidden	 and	







politeuesthai	 is	no	longer	that	of	the	cities	and	States,	 it	 is	that	of	the	














time	an	 immediate	 living	example.	The	Cynic	displays	a	 life	which	 immanently	
produces	a	concrete	effect	upon	the	lives	of	others	and	the	world	understood	as	
the	common	reality	which	everyone	shares.115	In	this	respect,	the	purpose	of	the	
Stoics	 and	 of	 the	 Cynics	 represents	 a	 way	 of	 reconstituting	 the	 paradigm	 of	
                                                
115	The	 examples	 showing	Diogenes	 of	 Sinope	 adopting	 a	 shocking	 behaviour	which	 bypasses	









to	 dine	 in	 the	market-place	 .’”	 But	 the	 reduction	 of	 Diogenes	 of	 Sinope’s	 lifestyle	 to	 utmost	
simplicity	 did	 not	 only	 concern	 basic	 animal	 needs.	 It	 also	 applied	 to	 the	 refusal	 of	 everyday	








the	meaning	 of	 the	world	 and	 the	 order	 of	 things	 but	 it	 also	 produced	 truth	




study	 show	 the	 same	 concern	 for	 an	 immediate	 and	 immanent	 critique	 of	
existence.	 Between	 the	 philosophical	 attitude	 of	 the	 Stoics	 who	 attempt	 to	
reduce	the	succession	of	human	endeavours	to	the	“‘punctualizing’	[of]	ourselves	
in	 the	 general	 system	 of	 the	 universe”	 which	 constitutes	 a	 “liberation	 really	
brought	 about	 by	 the	 gaze	we	 cast	 over	 the	 entire	 system	 of	 natural	 things”	
(Foucault:	 2006,	 278)	 and	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 Cynic	 who	 is	 “a	 functionary	 of	
humanity	 in	general”	and	“[…]	a	 functionary	of	ethical	universality”	 (Foucault:	
2011b,	301-302),	the	same	ethico-political	concern	appears.		
	




and	 the	 visible:	when	 the	 truth	of	 the	modern	 subject’s	 nature	 is	 sought	 in	 a	
hermeneutic	relationship	to	his	discourse).	When	Foucault	defines	the	concept	
of	governmentality	in	The	Hermeneutics	of	the	Subject,	he	refers	to	the	alienation	
that	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 subjectivity	 entails:	 when	 the	 poietic	
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relationship	 the	 self	 establishes	 with	 itself	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 search	 for	 a	
discourse	 which	 establishes	 a	 connection	 to	 a	 truth	 distant	 from	 immanent	
action,	it	is	the	active	subject	which	gets	replaced	by	its	objectivation	within	the	
field	 of	 knowledge	 and	 representation.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	 why,	 in	 The	







the	 subject	 constituted	 through	 the	 set	 of	 phenomena	 and	 historical	





address	 this	 question	 of	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 subject	 in	
these	 three	 major	 forms,	 perhaps	 with	 blameworthy	 stubbornness.	
(Foucault:	2006,	253)	
	
Foucault	 claims	 to	have	asked	 the	question	of	 the	constitution	of	 the	 truth	of	
subjectivity	under	three	different	forms.	These	three	forms	have	in	common	the	
designation	of	the	objectivity	derived	from	the	knowledge	of	the	modern	subject	
within	 the	 anthropological	 mode	 of	 thinking	 proper	 to	 modernity	 since	 the	





works	 and	 lives	 provides	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 objectivation	 of	 life	 through	 the	




subject	 revealed	 by	 the	 confession	 of	 his	 desires.	 In	 each	 case,	 it	 refers	 to	 a	
subjectivity	which	does	not	correspond	to	the	individual	affirming	truth	through	
the	strict	immanence	of	acts	but	a	truth	always	already	taken	within	the	game	of	
the	 symbolism	 introduced	 by	 the	 disjunction	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	




regarding	 the	 “political	 strategy	 of	 biologizing	 life”	 does	 not	 strictly	 speaking	
appear	at	the	same	time	as	the	critique	of	the	concept	of	nature	found	“at	the	
basis	of	Western	metaphysics”,	 I	 claim	 that	both	 critiques	 are	 related	as	 they	
target	the	subordination	of	the	immanence	of	acts	to	the	rationality	of	a	 logos	
which	posits	the	concept	of	truth	at	the	transcendental	origin	of	the	meaning	of	







and	 “legible	 in	 nature”	 (Foucault:	 2013,	 153).	 In	 this	 case,	 even	 when	 the	
rationality	of	this	natural	logos	is	not	formulated	positively,	it	is	always	already	





Although	 the	 avowal	 still	 actualizes	 truth,	 it	 does	 so	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 split	
between	the	validity	of	the	truth	of	facts	(the	seen)	and	the	speech-act	of	the	
subject	who	actualizes	it	(the	said).	During	the	inaugural	lecture	on	2nd	April	1981,	










would	 be	 a	 pure	 and	 simple	 affirmation.	 If	 it	 were	 a	 question	 of	
promising	 one’s	 love,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 promise	 or	 a	 vow	 that	 could	 be	














immediate	advantage	of	 it	 to	 say:	 “So	now	you	will	obey	me”.	 In	 the	
strict	 sense,	 avowal	 can	 only	 exist	 within	 a	 power	 relation	 and	 the	




perform	 a	 kind	 of	 “redundancy”:	 the	 speaker	 does	 not	 only	 provide	 the	
description	of	a	true	fact,	he	also	establishes	a	fixed	relationship	towards	himself	
which	 constitutes	 him	 as	 a	 mad	 person:	 he	 becomes	 this	 sovereign	 who	
recognizes	himself	as	an	object.	But	this	sovereign	recognition	is	an	ambiguous	








emerges	 with	 Classical	 Greece,	 and	 the	 other	 that	 emerges	 with	 modernity)	
operate	 according	 to	 a	 similar	 alienation	 of	 sovereignty.	 Just	 as	 the	 exoteric	
words	of	gods	do	not	suffice	to	provide	a	truth	which	becomes	read	through	the	
knowledge	of	 the	nature	of	 things,	 the	speech-act	of	 the	patient	 is	 true	 if	 it	 is	
based	upon	a	redundancy	which	posits	his	pre-existence	as	an	object	determined	
by	 the	 truth	 of	 his	 nature.	 The	 problematic	 juxtaposition	 of	 two	 different	
concepts	 of	 truth	 (i.e.	 the	 immediate	 and	 sovereign	 manifestation	 of	 truth	
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through	an	act	versus	a	discourse	dependent	upon	a	transcendental	rationality)	
is	 a	 tension	 Foucault	 refers	 to	 in	 The	 Hermeneutics	 of	 the	 Subject	 when	 he	
problematizes	the	question	of	governmentality	as	a	relationship	between	the	self	












power	 as	 an	 institution	usually	 refers	 to	 a	 juridical	 conception	of	 the	
subject	of	right,	 it	seems	to	me	that	the	analysis	of	governmentality	–	
that	is	to	say,	of	power	as	a	set	of	reversible	relationships	–	must	refer	
to	 an	 ethics	 of	 the	 subject	 defined	by	 the	 relationship	 of	 self	 to	 self.	
Quite	simply,	this	means	that	in	the	type	of	analysis	I	have	been	trying	
to	 advance	 for	 some	 time	 you	 can	 see	 that	 power	 relations,	


















is	 that	 it	 is	 also	 an	 epistemological	 one	 as	 we	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 the	





It	 is	 precisely	 this	 question	 of	 life	 as	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	poiesis	 that	 Foucault	




(as	 the	 subtitle	 of	 the	 second	 volume	 of	 the	History	 of	 Sexuality.	 The	 Use	 of	
Pleasures	tells	us).	It	is	in	those	terms	that	Foucault	defines,	in	an	interview	given	








very	 important	 in	their	culture).	They	had	a	techne116	tou	biou	 in	which	
the	economy	of	pleasure	played	a	very	large	role.	In	this	“art	of	life”	the	
notion	of	exercising	a	perfect	mastery	over	oneself	soon	became	the	main	
issue.	 And	 the	 Christian	 hermeneutics	 of	 the	 self	 constituted	 a	 new	
elaboration	of	 this	techne.	 […]	What	 I	want	to	show	 is	 that	the	general	
Greek	problem	was	not	the	techne	of	the	self,	it	was	the	techne	of	life,	the	
techne	tou	biou,	how	to	live.	 It’s	quite	clear	from	Socrates	to	Seneca	or	












which	 the	 self	 might	 establish	 and	 problematize	 both	 an	 ethical	 and	 political	
relationship	between	itself,	others	and	the	world.		
	
The	 possibility	 of	 such	 a	 relationship,	 which	 implies	 a	 necessary	 distancing	
between	 the	 self	 and	 the	 world	 is	 what	 guarantees	 the	 possibility	 of	 ethical	
sovereignty:	it	is	because	the	self	questions	its	conducts	in	relation	to	others	that	
it	holds	together	but	still	distinguishes	the	relationship	between	acts,	knowledge	
or	 truth.	 As	 Foucault	 explains	 during	 the	 24th	 March	 1982	 lecture	 from	 The	
Hermeneutics	 of	 the	 Subject,	 the	 problem	 which	 the	 Western	 philosophical	
tradition	poses	is	the	one	of	the	tension	between	the	relationship	to	the	world	as	
a	 test	 and	 the	 apprehension	 of	 the	 same	 world	 through	 the	 technique	 of	



















life:	 philosophy	 is	 an	 art	 of	 living,	 a	 style	 of	 living	which	 engages	 the	
whole	of	existence.	However,	I	would	hesitate	to	speak,	as	M.	Foucault	
does,	of	“aesthetics	of	existence”	regarding	Antiquity	as	well	as	regarding	
the	 task	of	 the	philosopher	 in	general.	M.	Foucault,	as	we	have	seen,	
understands	this	expression	in	the	sense	that	our	own	life	is	the	work	we	
have	to	do.	[…]	In	fact,	what	these	philosophers	of	Antiquity	are	looking	





state	 which	 the	 philosopher	might	 never	 reach	 but	 towards	 which	 it	
tends,	trying	hard	to	transform	himself	in	order	to	overcome	himself.	It	
is	 a	mode	 of	 existence	 characterized	 by	 three	 essential	 features:	 the	
peace	of	the	soul	(ataraxia),	the	interior	freedom	(autarkeia)	and	(apart	

























movement	 through	which	 the	knowledge	of	 the	world	and	nature	 supposedly	
                                                
117	“Dans	ce	travail	de	soi	sur	soi,	dans	cet	exercice	de	soi,	je	reconnais	également,	pour	ma	part,	
un	aspect	essentiel	de	la	vie	philosophique:	la	philosophie	est	un	art	de	vivre,	un	style	de	vie	qui	
engage	 toute	 l’existence.	 Toutefois,	 j’hésiterais	 à	 parler	 avec	 M.	 Foucault	 d’’esthétique	 de	
l’existence’,	aussi	bien	à	propos	de	 l’Antiquité,	que	de	 la	tpache	du	philosophe	en	général.	M.	
Foucault,	nous	l’avons	vu,	entend	cette	expression	au	sens	où	notre	propre	vie	est	l’oeuvre	que	




que	 rarement,	 sinon	 jamais,	 chez	M.	 Foucault.	 La	 sagesse	 est	 l’état	 auquel	 le	 philosophe	 ne	
parviendra	 jamais,	 mais	 auquel	 il	 tend,	 en	 s’efforçant	 de	 se	 transformer	 lui-même	 pour	 se	
dépasser.	Il	s’agit	d’un	mode	d’existence	qui	est	caractérisé	par	trois	aspects	essentiels:	la	paix	de	
l’âme	 (ataraxia),	 la	 liberté	 intérieure	 (autarkeia)	 et	 (sauf	 pour	 les	 sceptiques)	 la	 conscience	




the	 use	 of	 knowledge	 as	 a	 tekhne,	 the	 emergence	 of	 Western	 subjectivity	
corresponded	conversely	 to	 the	moment	where	 life	ceased	to	be	 thought	as	a	
problematized	 relationship	 between	 the	 self	 and	 the	 world	 (as	 a	 tekhne)	 to	
become	the	occasion	through	which	the	self	started	to	manifest	the	truth	of	its	
own	nature.	But	 life	understood	as	bios,	 thought	as	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 self	
exerts	a	certain	tekhne	over	itself	to	produce	self-formation	and	transformation	
requires	the	possibility	for	the	self	to	challenge	its	own	truth.	It	is	through	its	own	




Such	 a	 technical	 relationship	 challenges	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 knowledge	 that	
manifests	truth	and	replaces	it	by	what	truth	and	knowledge	are:	the	products	of	
the	use	of	a	specific	technique	at	a	point	of	history.	By	putting	what	Foucault	tells	

























Foucault’s	 first	 lecture	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France	 in	 1970-1971	 and	 of	 the	 first	
volume	of	 the	History	of	Sexuality.	 I	have	proven	 that	 this	 recurrence	shows	a	
symmetry	in	Foucault’s	critique	of	Western	philosophy	and	Western	subjectivity.	
Even	though	the	concept	of	anthropological	truth	which	emerges	with	modernity	















perspective	 the	possibility	and	 limits	of	anthropological	knowledge.	This	 is	 the	
reason	why	 the	 1976	 “will	 to	 knowledge”	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 counterpart	 of	 the	
1970-1971	“will	to	know”.	The	historical	shift	through	which	the	modern	subject	
gets	caught	up	as	object	of	its	own	knowledge	with	the	emergence	of	modernity	
can	 and	 must	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 epistemological	 knowledge	
historically	appears	as	a	critique	of	 the	sovereign	power	of	gods	at	 the	end	of	
Archaic	 Greek.	 The	 political	 power	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 which	 coincides	 with	 its	
determination	of	the	truth,	gets	replaced	by	a	concept	of	truth	accessible	to	the	
knowledge	of	men.	Similarly,	the	knowledge	of	man	by	men	(the	anthropological	
structure	 of	 knowledge)	 is	 made	 possible	 through	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	
transcendence	of	political	sovereign	power.		
	
This	 in	 turn	 entails	 that	 the	 epistemological	 construct	 to	 which	 the	 modern	




within	 the	 space	 of	 an	 irreducible	 alienation:	 the	 so-called	modern	 liberation	
which	 makes	 his	 desires	 positive	 also	 inscribes	 them	 into	 the	 field	 of	









study	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 in	 Foucault’s	 late	 work	 makes	 it	




also	 take	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 (as	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	
knowledge)	on	an	ethical	level.	Whilst	the	Stoics	advocate	a	sagittal	perspective	
over	one’s	own	existence	in	order	to	become	the	judge	of	the	rationality	which	














without	questioning	 its	historical	 implications	 (as	numerous	 commentators	do	
nowadays),	 this	 study	 has	 attempted	 to	 read	 carefully	 what	 Foucault	 tells	 us	
when	he	introduces	the	concepts	of	bio-power	and	biopolitics	at	the	end	of	the	
first	volume	of	the	History	of	Sexuality.	Its	original	motivation	has	been	to	answer	
the	 following	 question:	 which	 evolution	 does	 the	 modern	 concept	 of	 life	








what	 Foucault	 contrasts	 it	with:	 the	power	of	 the	 sovereign	which	disappears	
historically	at	the	end	of	the	Classical	Age.	Not	only	has	this	approach	led	me	to	
radically	 differentiate	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 modern	 political	 power	 from	
Agamben’s,	but	it	has	also	allowed	me	to	demonstrate	that	although	the	figure	
of	the	political	sovereign	which	puts	his	subjects	to	death	disappears,	the	theme	











and	 things),	 within	 a	 transcendent	 external	 figure	 (God).	 However,	 with	 the	
advent	 of	 modernity,	 it	 is	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 sovereign,	 responsible	 for	 the	
coherence	 between	 things	 and	 their	 representation	 in	 language,	 which	
disappears.	In	other	words,	Foucault	tells	us	that	the	modern	subject	emerges	as	














object	 of	 knowledge.	 Since	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 biological	 is	 historicized	 by	









as	 object	 of	 knowledge	 which	 needed	 to	 be	 examined.	 Since	 the	 concept	 of	
biological	 life	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 satisfying	 starting	 point,	 the	 origin	 of	 this	
mutation	 had	 to	 be	 identified	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	 bio-power	 and	
biopolitics	 within	 Foucault’s	 work.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 Lectures	 on	 the	 Will	 to	 Know,	
Foucault’s	 1970-1971	 lecture	 course	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 that	 Foucault	
studies	for	the	first	time	the	historical	emergence	of	epistemological	truth.	His	
analysis,	 prolonged	 in	 “Truth	 and	 Juridical	 Forms”	 in	 1973,	 sees	 the	 historical	
emergence	of	epistemological	knowledge	at	the	end	of	Archaic	Greece	when	the	
political	paradigm	of	the	Assyrian	empire	disappears.	Foucault’s	account,	inspired	
by	 Détienne’s	 and	 Vernant’s	 analyses	 of	 the	mutation	 of	 truth	 at	 the	 end	 of	




truth	 corresponds	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 knowledge	 as	 tekhne.	 It	 is	 facticity	
understood	 as	 the	 disjunction	 between	 the	 visible	 and	 the	 expressible	 which	
characterizes	the	morphology	of	epistemological	truth.		
	
Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 epistemological	 truth	 is	more	 than	 a	
punctual	 historical	 and	 philosophical	 analysis.	 This	 thesis	 has	 shown	 that	 it	
constitutes	 the	 framework	 within	 which	 Foucault	 inscribes	 his	 genealogy	 of	
Western	 subjectivity.	 It	 is	 indeed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 “will	 to	 know”	which	 gets	
obliterated	by	the	primacy	of	knowledge	and	ontological	truth	that	the	“will	to	
knowledge”	appears	later	in	Foucault’s	work:	this	“will	to	knowledge”,	just	like	
the	 “will	 to	 know”,	 describes	 an	 attitude	 towards	 the	 world	 which	 	 seeks	 in	
objects	(either	the	objects	of	nature	discovered	through	knowledge	or	subjects	
become	natural	objects)	the	expression	of	an	a	priori	rationality.	 It	 is	this	 logic	
which	allows	to	understand	how	the	modern	subject,	whose	natural	inclinations	
and	desires	speak	in	spite	of	himself	in	his	discourses	or	acts,	historically	becomes	
the	 immanent	manifestation	 of	 a	 natural	 phenomenon.	 Consequently,	 I	 have	
reached	the	conclusion	that	bio-power	and	biopolitics,	which	operate	within	the	
field	of	anthropological	knowledge,	deal	with	a	broader	object	than	the	postulate	
















In	 other	 words,	 this	 thesis	 discovered	 that	 the	 anthropological	 alienation	
occurring	 with	 modernity	 is	 only	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 decline	 of	 an	 ethical	
relation	 which	 gets	 dissipated	 through	 the	 course	 of	 the	 history	 of	 Western	
subjectivity.	It	corresponds	to	the	possibility	of	thinking	life	in	other	ways	than	
the	natural	and	temporal	expression	of	an	essential	substance	(which	runs	from	







                                                








to	 imply	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 “natural”	 or	 “biological	 life”	 as	 an	




1978,	he	 claimed	 that	 critique	was	 “[the	art]	of	not	being	quite	 so	governed”	
(Foucault:	 1997,	 47).	 “Not	 being	 quite	 so	 governed”	 [“ne	 pas	 être	 tellement	
gouverné”119]	does	not	refer	to	an	anarchic	refusal	of	political	power.	Rather,	it	
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